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INTRODUCTION: THE ADJUDICATORY LANDSCAPE AS VIEWED
FROM THREE SCHWARTZ LECTURES
This article was prepared in conjunction with a conference on "Court
Reform Implications of Dispute Resolution," which began with Judge Jack
B. Weinstein's 1995 Schwartz Lecture1 and continued with three panel
discussions and two additional presentations. Speaking near the close of the
program provided an opportunity to attempt to synthesize observations
made earlier in the conference, which built upon prior dispute resolution
scholarship. Despite the frequent debate surrounding alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") and litigation, sufficient consensus exists to outline at
least a tentative roadmap for the next stage of judicial implementation of
ADR.
My formal presentation topic: "Should Courts Be Reformed to Adopt
Features of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")?", 2 seems at first
glance to be simultaneously daunting, rhetorical, and moot. The topic is
moot and rhetorical to the degree that courts have already adopted many
features of ADR in their operation.3 Although one might conclude that this
has all been a mistake and that this "ADRization" of the courts should be
1 See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, II OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1996).
2 At the risk of nitpicking, I want to define terms and emphasize my preference for
referring to means of conflict resolution other than traditional adjudication as "ADR" rather
than "DR" or dispute resolution. The latter term is occasionally used by advocates to connote
or contend that litigatory adjudication should not be regarded as primary while nonjudicial
means are viewed as secondary options. For example, the brochure for this Symposium
referred to "Dispute Resolution" (although every participant I can recall spoke of
"Alternative" Dispute Resolution).
At the risk of being politically incorrect, I can not help but refer to dispute resolution
methods and systems other than litigation as "alternative." Speaking of only "DR" rather than
"ADR" can serve to subconsciously remind the world, particularly the legal profession, that
litigation is not the be-all and end-all of conflict management. But that nomenclatural point
pretends that the dispute resolution movement of the past 20 years has no history. Its history is
a reaction to the perceived excesses and shortcomings of litigation. It does not demean the
modem dispute resolution movement to keep this in mind, but rather helps us to better assess
social change by gauging the growth of ADR in comparison to traditional adjudication.
3 By ADR methods or features, I mean techniques or processes for administering and
attempting to conclude controversies that differ in some significant fashion from classical
litigatory adjudication (e.g., a "full dress trial," as Justice Marshall once referred to it in First
National Bank of Arzona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)) or its immediate
auxiliaries (e.g., conclusion of the case by pretrial motion or stipulated settlement in open
court).
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jettisoned as soon as possible, the practicalities of court pressure, public
preference, and political power ensure that ADR in some form will be part
of the judicial system for at least the foreseeable future.4 In the remainder of
this century and the beginning of the next, there will be no return to the
"pure" or "classic" adjudicatory model that existed prior to the 1970s.5
4 See Infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation endorsing,
encouraging, or mandating ADR). In addition, Congress has acted in recent years to
strengthen the enforcement of and deference to arbitration agreements. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1994) (providing for interlocutory review of judicial refusal to compel arbitration, but
not for similar review of trial court orders compelling arbitration). The courts have shown
similar solicitude for arbitration but have stopped short of empowering courts to demand
litigant participation in some forms of ADR absent some indicia of voluntariness. See, e.g.,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (requiring arbitration of age
discrimination claim on the strength of boilerplate arbitration clause in which worker was
required to sign as prerequisite to employment); In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993);
Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (courts may not require parties to
participate in mandatory summary jury trial).
On the less tangible political front, criticism of full-scale adjudication seems to have
struck a responsive chord with the public. ADR promotion and a curtailment of traditional
adjudicative activity forms a significant part of the Republican party's "Contract With
America" and the "Common Sense Legal Reform Act* that is part of the legislative package
of the Contract. See Garrett M. Moore and Stephen Jacques, Personal Injury and Insurance:
Getting a Hold on Tort Reform, CONN. L. TRIB., June 19, 1995, at S24. Former vice
president Dan Quayle's attacks on lawyers and the legal system were well-received by the
public if not the legal establishment. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the
Adversary System: 7Te Enduring Problems of Distrust, Misunderstanding, and Narrow
Perspective, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 313, 325-26 (1993).
Philip Howard's THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994) was widely reviewed, praised,
and perceived as an attack on traditional legal thought, which by implication includes
adjudication. But Howard's more subtle work can be readily differentiated from much of the
lawyer bashing of the past decade, and praised discretion in decisionmaking, a trait of the
judicial approach to ADR suggested in this article.
Although different elements of the legal community debate the extent of docket
congestion and its impact on dispute resolution, there is no denying that caseloads are large
and have grown substantially in the past decade. For example, between 1960 and 1990,
federal case filings increased more than threefold (from 87,421 to 264,409). See COMMITTEE
ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 11 (Draft for Public Comment,
Nov. 1994).
S Although the ADR movement may not have supplanted the judicial/adjudicatory
paradigm of dispute resolution, the new ADR era has certainly brought extensive
modifications. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
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Thus, for better or for worse, the courts and ADR are commingled.
More difficult questions remain, making the topic of judicial absorption of
ADR daunting because it encompasses questions such as:
(a) What types of ADR mechanisms or approaches are appropriate for
judicial incorporation?
(b) What ADR techniques are best left to privatization?
(c) What degree of supervision should courts exercise over private
ADR?
(d) What ADR methods should be tightly regulated, discouraged, or
even prohibited by the court?
The nature of judicially embraced ADR-not merely its presence or
absence-is important. Some forms of ADR annexation can assist the
judiciary while others can detract from optimal conflict resolution in
society. Some forms of extra-judicial ADR are useful but require judicial
enforcement for support. Other ADR methods are problematic and deserve a
wary judicial eye. Now that ADR has its beachhead on the judicial shore,
the next phase of the movement requires additional experimentation,
learning, and selection of the appropriate court reaction to different forms
of ADR.
Without a doubt, ADR has ridden a crest of popularity that at times
resembles a fad. 6 The excited but uninformed embrace of ADR by some
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659,
662-64 (1993) (reviewing changes in political and public sentiment toward adjudication and
development of modem ADR movement).
Even that most hallowed Anglo-American institution, the jury, is under attack, an attack
that has reached the pages of America's most mainstream periodicals. See, e.g., Marilyn Vos
Savant, Should We Change the Ameican Jury System? Parade Readers Respond, PARADE
MAO., July 30, 1995, at 12 (responses to informal poll sponsored by "Ask Marilyn' column
overwhelmingly urge elimination, curtailment, or modification of jury system and imply
similar dissatisfaction with full-dress, adjudicative, and adversary proceedings). In addition to
criticizing the jury aystem, Americans appear to be fleeing it in record numbers. See Andrea
Gerlin, Jury-Duty Scofflaws Try Patience of Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1995, at BI
(citizen unwillingness to serve on juries hampers courts).
6 See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1
(1993) [hereinafter Nader, Controlling Processes]. Nader's subsequent summary of her views
on ADR as groupthink in response to criticism captures the point with more pith than I can
masage:
[Controlling Processes] focused mainly on why the ADR advocates, the people
who followed the initial innovators, were so uncritical. Controlling Processes proposed
that coercive harmony and, more generally, harmony ideology (something which the
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elements of society, including the supposedly flinty-eyed business
community, continues to remind me of the now-classic American movie,
The Graduate, which starred a then-young Dustin Hoffman as Benjamin
Braddock, the movie's protagonist. At a party thrown by his parents to
celebrate his college graduation, Ben is pressed with trite career advice by
one of his father's overbearing friends. 7 "Plastics," whispers the would-be
mentor, as if he has just told Ben to get in on the initial public offering for
Wal-Mart.
article distinguished from the non-hegemonic uses of harmony) produces an environment
which discourages critical thinking, and which furthermore strips people of their rights
as underwritten in our less than perfect judicial system. In other words, like the judicial
system, ADR has problems. But unlike the judicial system, these problems and flaws are
not made public for the many reasons cited in Controlling Processes.
Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor KIng, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 99, 101
(1994) [hereinafter Nader, A Reply to Professor King]. See also, Stephen G. Gey, The
Unforunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993) (arguing against
dangers of communal groupthink and enforced behavior).
Of course, many disagree with this view. See, e.g., Carol J. King, Are Justice and
Harmony Mutually Exclusive? A Response to Professor Nader, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 65 (1994). My own view is that Nader's explanation of the popularity of ADR in the
post-Pound Conference period is correct in identifying the rise of ADR and the legal elite's
groupthink toward ADR, but overstates the insidious osmosis of social control and harmony
ideology. The excessively rosy picture sometimes painted about ADR reminds me at least as
much of the honeymoon enjoyed by fads, novelties, and seemingly fresh movements as it does
a drive by opinion makers to enforce a harmony of ideology. Criticism normally does not take
wide root until the second stage of a movement. Where the movement is pure fad, the second
stage criticism may quickly become ridicule and effectively end the fad. Because ADR has
survived this second stage, it is now becoming more an institution than a fad.
In addition, Nader seems to gloss over the substantial criticism consistently leveled at the
ADR movement by herself and others such as Judith Resnik and Owen Fis (see infra notes
11-20 and accompanying text) which suggests that many have indeed been critical of ADR.
See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH: RESEARCH FINDINGS;
IMPICATIONS FOR THE COURTS; FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS (1994) (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994)
(summarizing range of studies of ADR programs, many of which have been critical). To be
sure, most of the critical comments come from the academic community while most of the
boosterism comes from the business and political communities. This may be consistent with
the Nader thesis, but hardly suggests that social views toward ADR have been uniformly
uncritical.
7 Ben is also pressed by his overbearing father, William Daniels, who later became an
overbearing heart surgeon in the classic television series St. Elsewhere.
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Perhaps I simply need to get to the theatre more often and acquire more
contemporary cinemagraphic images,8 but ADR and its endorsements
continue to remind me of the emerging plastics industry lauded by Dustin
Hoffman's buffoonish advisor in The Graduate. ADR clearly has been a
growth industry, and is unlikely to decline or disappear regardless of the
particular products produced by the industry in the future.9 However, the
exact future of the industry remains unclear, particularly regarding the
success of individual ADR initiatives. The bulk of the public and the legal
profession have embraced ADR even if they are not quite sure what it is or
how it should be deployed at the margin.
Like any trend, ADR has its skeptics and even some opponents.
Considerable debate exists regarding the degree to which the increasing
ADRization of traditionally judicial activity amounts to triumph or tragedy,
a point well-illustrated by the past Schwartz Lectures. In the 1993 Schwartz
Lecture, Professor Laura Nader described the ADR movement as a
byproduct of society's attempt to suppress or conceal uncomfortable
conflicts. 10 In the 1994 Lecture, Professor Judith Resnik essentially
concluded that the modern ADR movement has brought a regrettable de
facto closing of the court house (or at least raised barriers to entry) and
replaced reflective decisionmaking about claims and controversies with mere
dispute processing. 11 In the 1995 Lecture, Judge Jack B. Weinstein
recognized and seemed to share many of Resnik's concerns, but essentially
put forth a more optimistic view of the increasing hybridization of
American adjudication.12
My assessment falls somewhere between their theses but also differs in
ways apart from the degree to which one celebrates or mourns the decline of
traditional adjudication. Like others, I regard the Nader and Resnik theses
as too pessimistic. Although it may be a bit unfair to label them "litigation
8 Perhaps the better movie analogy of the intersection of adjudication and ADR is PULP
FICTION, SPECIES, or WATERWORLD, but as this article suggests, although I am frequently
cynical I am not altogether pessimistic.
9 Ben's parents' friends may have been maladroit (except, I suppose, for Mrs. Robinson)
but that does not mean they were wrong. In the quarter-century since this movie was released,
uses of plastic products have indeed multiplied and appeared in new areas (e.g., shrink wrap,
rollerblade wheels, children's jungle gyms). Whether some users of these products would
have been better off sticking with tradition is quite another question (I enjoy picking my own
vegetables from a pile in the produce section, but as this article suggests, I am something of a
traditionalist).
10 See Nader, Controlling Processes, supra note 6, at 1-3.
11 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211 (1995).
12 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 246-47.
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romanticists" (as have some commentators),13 they may overestimate the
accuracy, fairness, and wisdom of traditional adjudication. 14 But Resnik's
analysis in the 1994 Schwartz Lecture and other writings, which
consistently highlight the dark side of the ADR movement (and the general
move away from adjudication), serve as an antidote to ADR bandwagonism
and should give reasonable observers pause before rushing to dismantle the
existing judicial structure. But even if Resnik's criticisms of the trend
toward what might be termed "disadjudication"' 5 are correct, judicial
adaptation to the Zeitgeist on which the ADR movement rides will probably
be a more productive means of preserving core adjudicatory functions than
would a strategy of massive resistance or despair. 16
Thus, like Weinstein, 17 Resnik,' 8 and others, 19 I see ADR as having
13 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field:
What's Missing from the MacCrate Repor-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human
Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 604 (1994).
14 Certainly, this criticism can be made of Nader's 1993 Schwartz Lecture, which
argued that "Mandatory Mediation [or ADR] abridges American freedom because it is often
outside the law, eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal protection before an adversary
law, and is generally hidden from view." Nader, A Reply to Professor King, supra note 6, at
101; see also Nader, Controlling Processes, supra note 6, at 12. Although Nader's insights
relate to and reflect upon many of the observations made by Resnik and Weinstein, a
commentary on her central thesis lies beyond the scope of this article, which assumes the
continued growth of ADR and focuses on the most effective forms of judicial interaction with
ADR.
15 Resnik concluded her 1994 Schwartz lecture:
As this century draws to its end, we can observe the melding of ADR into
adjudication, and then the narrowing of ADR and its refocusing as a tool to produce
contractual agreements among disputants. The focus is shifting from adjudication to
resolution. Frank Sander's lovely image of the accessible, multi-doored courthouse-
with one door wide open for adjudication-has now been eclipsed. The door to the
twentieth century's version of adjudication is closing.
Reanik, supra note 11, at 265.
16 Although one might argue that staunch defenders of adjudication should stand
resolutely against this gale in hopes of reversing public and political sentiment, the picture I
see is not of a small group with conviction turning back the tide, but rather of the Dutch boy
with his finger in the dike. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see Iqfra notes 32-96
and accompanying text (describing the popularity of ADR and the low regard for lawyers,
judges, and juries in traditional roles held by political elites and the public generally).
17 Weinsin, supra note 1, at 243 ("During the course of the last quarter century, many
have posited a need to develop approaches to resolving disputes that avoid full traditional
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become a part of the judicial system, perhaps inevitably2" and certainly for
the present. Regardless of the effectiveness of ADR in particular situations,
there is no doubt that socio-political forces will continue to promote it and
will not be turned back by a call for adoption of (or a return to) a greater
use of traditional, full-dress adjudication of disputes. 21
litigation.").
18 Resnik, supra note 11, at 214 ("During the last few decades, ADR has become an
integral part of the state's mechanisms for responding to disputes.").
19 Although, as discussed in infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text, I see the 1976
Pound Conference as an ADR watershed and inaugurating event, the arrival of ADR as a
fixed part of the legal establishment can perhaps be most clearly marked as the mid-1980s, a
time when the first major ADR coursebooks were issued. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG
ur AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); LEONARD L. RISEKN AND JAMES E. WESTBROOK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (1987); SUSAN M. LEESON AND BRYAN M. JOHNSTON,
ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA (1988). Second editions have emerged. See,
e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERO Er AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2d ed. 1992). Other important
books frequently assigned in law school also emerged during the 1980s. See, e.g., ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
(1981).
According to Thomas Kuhn's theory of shifts in professional ideology, one key measure
of professional change is the content of textbooks. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 137-40 (2d ed. 1970). Although the emergence of ADR courses and
coursebooks hardly amounts to the "rewriting" of texts that Kuhn saw as indicative of a
complete scientific revolution (most law school coursebooks still deal primarily with litigation
and appellate adjudicative opinions), these publications and a survey of the evolution of law
school course offerings during the 1980s are indicative of the beachhead ADR has established
in the legal profession.
Prior to the emergence of ADR coursebooks, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the rise
of a substantial ADR literature in legal periodicals. See, e.g., Sally Merry & Susan Silbey,
What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYs. J. 151 (1984);
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982). See also Stempel,
New Paradigm, supra note 5, at 695-737 (applying Kuhn's theories to changes in the judicial
system, including the ADR movement).
20 As Resnik notes in reviewing arbitration scholarship (principally Ian MacNeil's
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
(1992)), American courts prior to the modem era were not consistently hostile to litigation.
See Resnik, supra note 11, at 212-15.
21 Recent legislation has promoted ADR. For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473(6) (1990), deemed ADR a major principle for litigation
management, and ADR was specifically encouraged in the Delay and Expense Reduction
Plans which all judicial districts were required to complete.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat.
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However, my view of the optimal manner for judicial adoption of ADR
techniques differs from Weinstein's. I interpret Weinstein as warning
against the mass privatization of conflict disputing and justice via systematic
ADR that occurs largely outside the court system. To combat this,
Weinstein proposes a reform of substantive law and litigation procedure so
that modem disputes which depart from the traditional bipolar adjudicatory
model may be more effectively addressed.2 By implication, Weinstein
would have the courts more stringently police and even prohibit some large
categories of private ADR.23 In addition, he hopes for government-led
efforts to eliminate or resolve disputes that depart from the traditional
adversary framework that governs much of litigation and ADR. 24 Although
I tend to agree with this sentiment, it is not a realistic possibility in what
might be termed the "Newt Gingrich Era."25
2736 (codified in portions of 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1994); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); 28 U.S.C.
I 2672 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 3711 (1994); and 41 U.S.C. §§ 605,
607 (1994)) directs federal agencies to "adopt a policy that addresses the use of" ADR and
case management (which I see as a form of ADR) for certain matters.
In the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969, 5
U.S.C. §§ 581-90, agencies were authorized and implicitly encouraged to formulate
regulations through negotiations with affected industries rather than through formal
ulremaking, which often has adversarial qualities.
The Justice Department has directed its lawyers to consider ADR in its actions and much
of the proposed "tort reform" legislation would promote or require ADR in lieu of or as a
prerequisite to traditional adjudication. See Carl Tobias, Executive Branch CYvil Justice
Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521 (1993); Henry J. Reske, DOJ Adopts ADR Program,
A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 38.
22 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 275 ("Procedural and substantive law must be
updated, more than it has been, to reflect changes in the ways in which the world does
business.").
23 See Id. at 298 ("The power to control the law and justice cannot be permitted to seep
out of the hands of the people through privatization.").
24 See Id. at 275 ("Protection of the public through administrative agencies and
compensation through a health and security system offer a better alternative to the tort
system.*).
2S The Common Sense Legal Reform Act and other portions of the Republican Contract
With America (see supra note 4) not only urge curtailment of traditional litigation but also
evidence a desire for a contraction of other government initiatives. This suggests that the U.S.
House and Senate are unlikely to create, foster, or fund administrative agencies or
compensation schemes that in some degree replace traditional adjudication rather than
eliminating it. See generally Carl Tobias, Common Sense And Other Legal Reforms, 48
VAND. L. REv. 699 (1995) (analyzing and criticizing proposed GOP legal changes).
However, less ideologically driven but hardly government-expanding congresses have
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Streamlined "mini-adjudications" or "focus points" hold greater
potential for effecting judicial improvements than the settlement brokering
or broadbrush resolutions of large scale claims that seem to comprise so
much of the judiciary's ADR efforts. In particular, courts should
incorporate and control the application of some forms of ADR as part of the
menu of judicial services provided to disputants. This is a variant of the
"Multi-door Courthouse" advanced by Professor Frank Sander nearly a
generation ago26 and used to some degree in practice by some courts. 27
Unlike Resnik, I see the intelligent application of this concept as holding
out the prospect of opening doors to the average litigant rather than closing
them.28 But like Resnik, Weinstein, and others, I emphasize that, at their
core, courts must remain courts both to preserve and protect their important
social role and to provide the foundation from which effective private and
public ADR can proceed. 29
Thus, my answer to the question posed by the conference is that courts
should not only adopt but co-opt a good deal of ADR into the mix of
services they provide. While doing this, however, courts must be careful to
protect in purified form the mother lode of their legitimacy: painstaking
adjudication performed under rigorous rules of procedure, that carefully
applies substantive law, and is subjected to meaningful quality control. In
short, the judicial system must adapt and expand its range of services, but
must retain enough of an adjudicatory core to cast the "shadow of the
law"30 that enables ADR and settlement to function effectively. Part of this
supported legislation that supplants traditional adjudication. See, e.g., National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10-34 (1994) (discouraging product liability
claims from vaccine-related injuries and substituting administrative claims process); Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1994) (providing for federal benefits to
persons totally disabled by pneumoconiosis or their eligible survivors).
26 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, Address Delivered at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D.79 (1976), at 111 [hereinafter Pound Conference].
27 See Inftra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
28 Despite the dangers of creating a multi-door courthouse that does everything but
adjudication, significant research suggests that the concept can and has succeeded in
improving access to justice, although significant contrary research also exists. See STATE
JUSTICE INSTFTUTE, NATIONAL COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH, supra
note 6, at 89-110.
29 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 295 ("The power to control the law and justice cannot
be permitted to seep out of the hands of the people through privatization.").
30 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE .J. 950 (1979) (determining that divorce litigants negotiate
within a framework of knowledge regarding the default rules and outcomes established by the
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judicial shadow includes various levels of scrutiny applied to private ADR,
including both enforcement and abrogation or modification.
This article first briefly reviews the history of ADR and outlines a
number of clarifying points or caveats often overlooked in the ADR debate.
It next outlines a proposed second-generation, multi-door courthouse
applying a mix of publicly administered ADR methods as useful adjuncts to
the core of adjudication. I consider the use of this model as applied to a
variety of recurring types of cases. In advancing the notion of a second-
generation, multi-door courthouse as an effective judicial absorption of
ADR, I conclude that the most pronounced error of the modem dispute
resolution movement in the judiciary has been its focus upon (and
misdirected effort toward) advancing settlement qua settlement rather than
providing what might be termed semi-adjudicatory options in addition to
full-dress trial and settlement initiatives.31
II. ADR HISTORY AND CAVEATS FOR ANALYSIS
A. The Development of the Modern ADR Movement
The modem ADR movement can be said to be entering a young
adulthood of sorts as it nears its 20th birthday. Many view the 1976 Pound
Conference as the birth, or at least the kickoff, of the modem Court
Reform/Alternative Dispute Resolution movement. 32 As discussed more
extensively later in this section, commentators should be careful to
legal regime).
311 do not mean this criticism so literally as to suggest that courts have not made any
effort to incorporate what I call "semi-adjudicatory" or "quasi-adjudicatory" ADR (I prefer
the former term) into their list of options. Indeed, there are many courts that have adopted a
range of these options, most prominently court-annexed arbitration. See COURT-CONNECTED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6 (reviewing ADR programs in various courts).
32 By "modem" movement, I mean what I later refer to as "new ADR," discussed in
Infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. Depending upon what one uses as a measuring
stick, one can consider "old ADR" as dating back to the merchants of the Middle Ages or
Renaissance. See Juuus H. COHEN, COMMERCtAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAw 78 (1918).
Alternatively, I offer other suggested points for inaugurating the modem era of ADR. Two
possibilities are the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, or the
founding of the American Arbitration Association, both of which occurred in 1925. For a
historical sketch of the development of arbitration and judicial reaction, see Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Pifaa/s of Public Policy: The Case of Arbiration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ.
259, 269-302 (1990). For reasons elaborated in infra notes 127-53 and accompanying text, I
regard both of these important events as part of "old ADR" and view the Pound Conference
as the advent of "new ADR."
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distinguish between the contemporary or "new ADR" movement and
traditional or "old ADR," which has existed in some form for centuries (if
not millennia) and in a "semi-modem" form since the passage of the
Federal Arbitration Act in 1925. 33
The Pound Conference's technical title was the "National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice." The invocation of the Pound imagery even included a geographic
link, as the 1976 Conference was held in St. Paul, Minnesota, the site of
Pound's famous speech to the ABA in 1906.3 St. Paul was also home to the
Conference's driving force, Warren Burger, then-Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.35
In treating the conference as the inaugurating event of the modem era, I
33 See IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS,
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT Chs. 1, 4, 6 (1994); IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALrZATON Chs. 4, 6 (1992); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to
Arbirability, 65 TULANE L. REv. 1377, 1380-83 (1991) (reviewing traditional arbitration
practices and the development of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15).
3 4 See Roscoe Pound, 7he Causes of Popular Dissatisfacdon with the Administradon of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REPORTS 395 (1906), and 57 A.B.A. J. 348 (1971) (abridged version).
The publication of the essay in abridged form more than 60 years later and its use as the
imagery peg for a conference on its 70th anniversary testify, of course, to the prominence of
Pound's speech, which similarly testifies to the deep-seated anxiety felt by American society
(even its lawyers) toward the national system of dispute resolution. Although my relative
ignorance of comparative systems may betray me, I find it hard to believe that continental
Europeans, Asians, or Africans might have an insider's polemic about their system possessed
of the "staying power" held by Pound's essay. The British might observe the anniversary of
similar legal events (Mansfield's appointment, the publication of Blackstone's commentaries)
but would likely be celebrating their system rather than decrying it. See, e.g., ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, APPELtATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (1990) (American lawyers make their system sound much worse than it is and the
English lawyers make their system sound much worse than it is).
35 Burger was appointed Chief Justice in 1969 by President Richard M. Nixon and
retired in 1986. Prior to the Chief Justiceship, Burger was a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, having been appointed by President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, in whose Justice Department he had served. Burger was born in St. Paul,
Minnesota and practiced in the Twin Cities prior to his move to Washington and had been
active in Minnesota politics as well. See THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES
AND MAJOR OPINIONS (Leon Friedman and Fred Israel eds.) (1995); BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 11-13 (1979); Chief
Justice Warren Burger Dies, S. CT. HIST. Soc'Y Q., Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, at 1, 19.
JUDICIAL ADR AND THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE
borrow heavily from Stephen Subrin's analysis,36 a view shared by many
legal scholars. 37 According to Subrin, a "new ideology [of civil litigation]
emerged" at the Conference.3 8 As Subrin summarizes:
iTihere was an unmistakable tone at the Conference that the
[previously prevailing] underlying ideology of liberality of pleading,
wide-open discovery and attorney latitude was no longer feasible. The
alleged litigation explosion would have to be controlled; the few bad
lawyers could not be trusted to control themselves.
3 9
The "sea change" also occurred in the courts [at approximately
the same time and]40 at the local level as well.4 1
36 See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate,
59 BRooK. L. REv. 1155, 1156-58 (1993).
37 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 11, at 216-18; Nader, A Reply to Professor King, supra
note 6, at 100-01 ("ADR was publically declared in 1976 at the Roscoe Pound Conference
[which was] ... a turning point on a public debate that began, for present purposes at least,
in the 1960s when opposing groups of people voiced dissatisfaction with the American legal
system. One issue that was debated was access to law. The first group wished to reform the
legal system by the inclusion of excluded citizens. The second group wished to find
alternative solutions; solutions that were outside of the judicial system for some of those same
constituents--consumers, civil rights activists, environmentalists, workers, and others. Those
of us who were privileged to attend the Pound Conference can remember the press, the
television crews, and the fanfare surrounding what anthropologists in other contexts would
call a social drama. It was argued that the "garbage cases," as they called them, should come
before alternative forums; the courts should be reserved for more important cases.").
38 Subrin, supra note 36, at 1156. Subrin's rhetoric is perhaps strained. The new
ideology that trumpeted streamlined adjudication and criticized full-scale adjudication as
wasteful and insufficiently valuable had been on the scene for some time. See, e.g., Wayne D.
Brazil, 7he Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1988). The Pound Conference gave this viewpoint legitimacy and
exposure, however, as well as something of a rhetorical push. See Nader, Controlling
Processes, supra note 6, at 101 (Pound Conference participants suggested that "garbage
cases" unworthy of full-scale adjudication were clogging the courts).
39 Subrin, supra note 36, at 1158.
40 Id. at 1158 (citing the example of some 1970s precedents that "began requiring quite
precise pleading [in lieu of notice pleading] for certain types of cases" most prominently and
outrageously civil rights claims, a practice ruled erroneous by a unanimous Supreme Court in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)). The Supreme Court's
Leatherman opinion can, of course, be seen as evidence refuting the contention that courts
have constricted the open access that, at least in theory, characterized the id-1950s through
mid-1970s era in civil litigation.
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Viewed in historical perspective, the Pound Conference is notable for
both its criticisms of the status quo in litigation and its full-court press on
behalf of ADR made by an all-star cast assembled and applauded by the
Chief Justice. According to Subrin, the Pound Conference was something of
a watershed in that it forcefully put the legal-judicial establishment behind
ADR and set the critical tone toward courts that exists to this day. The
background, theme, and rhetoric of the Pound Conference made ADR
fashionable and brought it to the fore of the American adjudicatory scene. 42
41 Id. at 1159 (citing a proliferation of local rules designed to limit or regulate discovery
and to encourage compromise between disputants regarding both pretrial procedural positions
and the underlying controversy).
42 As Subrin notes, the Pound Conference was not exclusively stocked with litigation-
phobes or ADRophiles. Most prominently, an essay by Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,
7he Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D. 134 (1976), and panel commentary
by Prof. Laura Nader, THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
114 (A. Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds. 1979), took issue with the crisis rhetoric and rush
to streamlining solutions that dominated much of the Conference.
For the most part, however, the Higginbotham and Nader pieces can be seen as
something of a cameo appearance by the left in what was essentially a center-right dominated
event decrying both excessive rights-based social engineering through litigation and attorney
obsteporousness. The leading example of the former is the oft-cited article by former D.C.
Circuit judge and failed Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork, Dealing With the Overload
in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976) (accusing litigants of childishly resorting to court
over trivial slights or to assert far-fetched concepts of entitlement). An example of a similar
attack on supposed attorney misbehavior is by then-ABA Antitrust Section head Francis R.
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199
(1976).
Of the 11 articles or essays from the Conference reprinted in Federal Rules Decisions,
only the Higginbotham piece can be seen as defending the then-traditional adjudicatory model.
An article by then-Judge and subsequent Iran-contra prosecutor Lawrence Walsh was
essentially descriptive, as were contributions by then-Attorney General and former University
of Chicago Law Professor Edward Levi and Judge James A. Finch. Harvard Law Professor
Frank Sander's Multi-door Courthouse piece Varieties of Dispute Processing, 35 F.R.D. 111
(1976), which I discuss at length below, was largely moderate, despite the implicit criticism in
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Adernative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication.
See Resnik, supra note 11. The remaining six articles can accurately and fairly be described
as conservative in tone, urging a deliberalization of court access and social investment in
adjudication. Some of these admonitions were gentle, see, e.g., Judge Alvin B. Rubin, How
Can We Improve Judicial Treatment of Individual Cases Without Sacrificing Individual
Rights: The Problems of the Criminal Law, Pound Conference, supra note 26, at 176, while
the Bork piece leaked venom. What is important to me, however, in confirming Subrin's
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Depending upon one's opinion of contemporary ADR and judicial
politics, Chief Justice Burger deserves a good deal of the credit or blame.
During the early 1970s, he lent his bully pulpit to the cause of lawyer-
bashing by leveling strong criticism at lawyers. In particular, he singled out
the lack of trial litigation skills as a major failing of the profession.43
Undoubtedly, Chief Justice Burger's rhetoric, which received great
exposure and came clothed in the prestige of his office, brought down the
image of the profession and can be scene as a major beachhead for the anti-
lawyer sentiment of the 1980s and 1990s. By taking lawyers down a peg,
Chief Justice Burger also made the body politic more receptive to proposals
for changing courts or reducing their power, a result that perhaps not
coincidentally paralleled his agenda for reducing judicial interference with
the police and constricting the reach of the individual liberties portions of
the U.S. Constitution. 44
But, it would be incorrect to view Chief Justice Burger's efforts as a
broad-based assault on courts. To a large degree, his rhetoric called to mind
and advocated a return to an earlier period when lawyers were civil
gentlemen trained at the feet of worthy mentors who went to court with a
minimum of pretrial fanfare to obtain decisions that resolved disputes
(including criminal matters) and allowed the local community to move on.45
asesment is that the collective gestalt of the Pound Conference was to place some of the
legal profession's most prominent members on the side of reform designed to undo a good
deal of the adjudicatory status quo. Even former federal judge, noted liberal establishment
lawyer, and William 0. Douglas comrade Simon Riikind, of New York's politically correct
Paul, Weiss, Riikind, Wharton & Garrison, weighed in on behalf of the Conference theme,
Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, Pound Conference, supra note 26, at 96. The total
effect of the Pound Conference appears to concur with Subrin's assessment: the old era of
adjudicatory freedom was decried and the new era of ADR fashionability was announced.
43 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, 7he Special Sdlls of Advocacy: Are Specialized
raning And Certifcation of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice, 42 FORDHAM L.
Ray. 227 (1973).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Chief Justice Burger voting
with the majority for the exception to an exclusionary rule barring illegally seized evidence
where a police officer acted in good faith); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Chief Justice Burger dissenting from majority
opinion finding a private right of action for Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations).
45 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Reflections on the Adversary System, 27 VAL. U. L.
REV. 309, 310-11 (1993) (suggesting that lawyers and parties are too contentious, often
expending twice as much in disputing costs as the value of a claim in a dispute); Warren E.
Burger, Address to the American Law Institute (May 15, 1984) (quoting Rodgers v. Lincoln
Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 13, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("When the elder statesmen among
you here came to the bar, I am sure you were told, as I was, that your signature on a pleading
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This nostalgic attitude toward law and lawyering also parallels his voting
record as Chief Justice, which generally restricted the scope of adjudicatory
options for litigants in favor of a more traditional model of bipolar, event-
centered private litigation.46
Chief Justice Burger's attack on the dearth of lawyering skills was a
major catalyst in the move toward clinical legal education during the 1970s
and the move toward adding lawyering skills training to the internal law
school curriculum during the 1980s. 47 Ironically, the academics most active
in these pedagogical movements are Chief Justice Burger's political
opposites, as liberal as he is conservative. 48 This seeming contradiction
or motion was something like your signature on a check.")).
46 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (Chief Justice
Burger voting with the majority to preclude a broad-based application of a state's law to a
mineral rights dispute involving citizens of several states); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Chief Justice Burger voting
with the majority against the aggregation of claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement in class action litigation). In resisting the broad application of one legal standard
to multistate disputes because of administrative convenience, Chief Justice Burger has
substantial company. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.
1995) (Posner, J.) (rejecting adoption of "esperanto" law to a class action involving citizens
of 50 states). But see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 268-69 (citing Rhone-Poulenc and taking a
different view that implicitly accepts some "fudging of the state law-Erie problem" in order to
reach a "satisfactory resolution").
47 See LEaAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM 135-40 (Robert MacCrate ed. 1992) (major ABA-commissioned study popularly
known as "MacCrate Report" identifies ADR as a fundamental skill that should be taught in
law schools); Subrin, supra note 36, at 1165-66 ("Since I became a law professor in 1970,
many, if not most, law schools have added courses in ADR, complex litigation, and
international procedure as integral parts of the overall law school civil procedure
curriculum."); but see generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13 (criticizing the MacCrate
report as placing excessive emphasis on legal education).
48 For example, the recently instituted Clinical Law Review was initiated to a significant
degree by the efforts of the New York University clinical and skills faculty, whose most
prominent member and designer of the NYU Lawyering Skills program is Anthony
Amsterdam, a noted death penalty opponent and defender of criminal defendants' rights. See
ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF A CRIMINAL CASE (4th ed.
1984). The first issues of this publication contained a high percentage of articles by law
faculty generally regarded as left-liberal politically, even when counting the ideologically
diverse zet of speakers in the Clinical Law Review's symposium on the MacCrate Report. Id.
at 348-458. Although one can dispute the degree to which clinicians and skills faculty are
"liberals" rather than "conservatives," even a casual legal reader would quickly observe a
difference between the Clinical Law Review and, for example, the Journal of Legal Studies or
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probably stems from the other catalysts of the clinical/skills movement: the
defendants' rights movement, the antipoverty movement, and the desire to
expand legal services to the middle class, all of which were largely
championed by political liberals.49 The clinical/skills movement has also
been supported by educational theorists of both the left and right who
regard legal education as enhanced by the practice of linking legal theory to
the application to lawyering tasks. 50 Ironically, Chief Justice Burger's blast
at lawyers helped to enhance a segment of legal education that would not
only train lawyers better but unleash them in the service of those whose
politics differed rather dramatically from his own.
51
By the mid-1970s, Chief Justice Burger had moved from criticizing
lawyers and urging their improvement within the legal system to endorsing
efforts to evade the legal system. Specifically, he suggested the substitution
of arbitration for litigation as a "better way" of resolving disputes.5 2 In the
effort to promote arbitration and other forms of ADR, Chief Justice Burger
harnessed the prestige of his office to produce the Pound Conference and
other efforts. As noted above, the Pound Conference made heavy use of the
Pound imagery, invoking the name of this giant of American jurisprudence;
the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, whose pages generally reflect the views of
more conservative authors.
49 Many clinical teachers, particularly in criminal defense representation programs,
previously worked as public defenders or legal aid lawyers, organizations whose attorneys are
normally drawn to the work in part because of liberal political views regarding individual
rights and government policy.
50 Although many feel that the legal academy continues to pay insufficient attention to
the real world problems of lawyering. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MiCH. L. REV. 34 (1992); but see
Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1647 (1993) (arguing that
Edwards underestimates the practical value of much theoretical and interdisciplinary legal
scholarship and that the rise of clinical and skills education during past the 20 years refutes
Edwards' criticism).
51 Clinical and skills courses frequently train lawyers who subsequently provide
aggressive representation of criminal defendants and poor or disfavored groups asserting
constitutional rights-entities never high on Chief Justice Burger's list of favored litigants.
Occasionally, in a manner similar to criticisms of legal aid, law school clinical programs
themselves come under attack from conservatives or the business community as fomenting
undesirable litigation seeking advantage for workers, the poor, women, or racial minorities.
52 See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Beter Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). The
Chief Justice continued expressing this theme in his writings. See, e.g., Burger, Reflections on
the Adversary System, supra note 45, at 310-11 (expressing pride in the accomplishments of
the Pound Conference but stating "litigation in our courts remains a timely and costly
endeavor for everyone involved.... Are we litigating when we should be arbitrating?").
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staging the conference almost on the spot where Pound once (I cannot resist
this pun) expounded on the deficiencies of American justice; and publishing
the proceedings in West's Federal Rules Decisions reporter, which
guaranteed wide exposure of the Conference's pro-ADR sentiments,
especially to the nation's federal judges. 53
It was not so much the content of the Pound Conference as its tone that
marked it as a movement away from the "merits-oriented" ethos of the 1938
Federal Rules and toward a dejudicialization of dispute resolution.54 The
Conference even included some progressive sentiments in favor of merits-
based adjudication and solicitude for the litigants. 55 But the thrust of the
Pound Conference, even from speakers generally regarded as liberals, was
that courts were becoming clogged due to an avalanche of more traditional
cases and the efforts of some litigants to thrust courts into new and probably
inappropriate roles. The Pound Conference podium's most conservative
speaker, Judge Robert H. Bork, leveled a polemic attack on modem
adjudication, particularly the individual rights movement and impact
litigation of the 1950-1975 period. 56 The program also included a
presentation by Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 57 who not coincidentally would later
be identified as a major proponent of "managerial judging,"58 an example
of the changing nature of adjudication and a type of ADR itself subject to
considerable debate.59
53 In appraising the Pound Conference from some temporal distance, Chief Justice
Burger understandably crowed, but did not focus on ADR:
An a result of the ideas that flowed from the Pound Conference in 1976 and the
dedication of no many judges and lawyers in implementing them, much of the deferred
maintenance of the American systems of justice that was desperately needed has been
accomplished. To name a few examples, the Court of International Trade was created, as
was the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Congress pasned the Omnibus Judgeship Act
in 1978 and also enacted the Dispute Resolution Act. Modem computer systems are
commonplace in our courts, and we have sen improved juror protection and
compensation in the federal and state systems alike.
Burger, Reflectlions on the Adversary System, supra note 45, at 310.
54 See Subrin, supra note 36, at 1158 ("[There was an unmistakable tone at the
Conference that the underlying ideology of liberality of pleading, wide-open discovery and
attorney latitude was no longer feasible.").
55 See Higginbotham, supra note 42.
56 Robert H. Bork, supra note 42, at 233 (courts are too often used in "self-defeating
effort to guarantee every minor right people think they ought ideally to possess.").
5 7 Rubin, supra note 42.
58 See, e.g., Hubert Will et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75
F.R.D. 203 (1978).
59 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (criticizing
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In the wake of the Pound Conference, ADR continued to advance: (1)
as part of the legal profession's lexicon; (2) as a source of continued
experimentation-both by private entities and the courts; (3) as a growing
industry; (4) as a source of authority for altering litigation procedure,
sometimes streamlining it (managerial judging)60 and sometimes enlarging it
(through the proliferation of local rules and detailed standing orders that
create a de facto second set of local rules); 61 (5) as a wellspring for legal
doctrine more solicitous of the application of ADR; 62 and (6) as a reference
point for criticizing courts, lawyers, and adversarialism. 63 By the late
aggressive judicial management and efforts to prompt settlement). Resnik's assessment
touched off a debate that continues. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and
the Evolution of Procedures, 53 U. CHi. L. RnLv. 305 (1986).
60 One might alternatively view managerial judging as destroying it, depending upon
one's position. See supra notes 58-59.
61 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2020-2023
(1989) (1988 U.S. Judicial Conference Study finds more than 5000 local rules, with over 400
relating to discovery).
62 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)
(upholding arbitrators' award of punitive damages despite choice of law clause selecting state
law that forbid arbitrator to make punitive damage award); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (requiring arbitration of age discrimination claim subject to
industry-wide required arbitration clause); De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and finding claims
under Securities Act of 1933 subject to arbitration); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (requiring arbitration of claims under Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (requiring arbitration of antitrust claims thought by many to be exempt from
arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (Arbitration Act
requires court to enforce arbitration clause in contract).
Although there have been notable Supreme Court decisions refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements, these have largely been based on the limited scope of the arbitration
agreement. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1987). Despite
having significant quarrels with the Supreme Court's clumsy approach to issues of contractual
consent in the ADR context (see Stempel, supra note 33) and statutory interpretation
regarding the employment exception to the Federal Act, (Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering
the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section I of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259), 1 generally applaud the
removal of public policy-based objections to ADR, particularly ADR chosen at the disputants'
volition, even through pre-dispute agreements. See Stempel, supra note 32.
63 However, it may be the other way around. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 255-60
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1970s, the words "alternative dispute resolution" tripped readily off the
tongue of any lawyer conversant with contemporary legal thindng. In 1977,
Congress, at the urging of the Justice Department, began the "experiment"
with court-annexed arbitration that is now nearing its 20th year.64 By the
turn of the decade, managerial judging was sufficiently widespread to
provide an inviting target for Professor Resnik's feature-length attack upon
it, which in turn spurred retaliation and counter-debate.65 During the 1980s,
arbitration and mediation services grew apace, with entire industries such as
securities brokerages successfully privatizing much of the dispute resolution
for investor and employee disputes.66 To be sure, there was debate and
counterattack nearly every step of the way. 67 For the most part, however,
(noting that ascendancy of ADR movement was coupled with derogation of litigation and
discussing the degree to which embrace of ADR was the cause or effect).
64 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-68 (1994); BARBARA S. MEiERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1990) (the ten original federal district courts to
adopt court-annexed arbitration are: Eastern Pennsylvania, Middle Florida, Western Missouri,
Western Oklahoma, Middle North Carolina, Northern California, Western Michigan, New
Jersey, Eastern New York and Western Texas; many state courts have similar programs, some
of which predate the federal models; the Pittsburgh ares state courts are generally credited
with initiating court-annexed arbitration in 1952).
65 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
66 See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: Te Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1095 (1993); New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Symposium on Arbitration in The Securities Industry: A Report (May 30, 1995).
67 For example, the arbitration of employment disputes, both in the securities industry
and other fields, has prompted controversy and efforts to limit the reach of mass-produced
arbitration agreements. See, e.g., David E. Rovella, EEOC Says No to Forced Arbitration,
NAT'L. L.J., June 5, 1995 at B1; but see Agency Watch, Justice Hires; the EEOC Embraces
ADR, NAT'L. LJ., April 11, 1994, at B2 (I am honestly not attempting to imitate the New
Republic's editorial section featuring inconsistent headlines, often from the same newspaper);
Margaret Jacobs, Questions Arise over Arbitrators' Powers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at
B6, GI1; Margaret A. Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Losing Battles, Investors Fare Poorly
Fighting Wall Sreet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at Al. The EEOC's newfound misgivings
about mass mandatory arbitration resulted in its filing suit to obtain injunctive relief against
the practice. See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, No. H.-95-775, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6140 (S.D. Tex. April 19, 1995).
Even lawyers are not immune. Law firms are beginning to require new associates to sign
arbitration agreements as a condition to beginning employment. See Mark Curriden, Sign It,
Alston & Bird Staff Told, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 25. The article states:
The 270-lawyer Atlanta firm required all staff-partnde, associates, paralegals and
secretaries-to sign employment contracts.
The two-page contract restricts release of confidential information and mandates
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the journey has proceeded in linear fashion. 68
The development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during the
contemporary ADR era is harder to place, and while largely consistent with
the advancement of ADR, exhibits a somewhat contradictory path that also
serves to illustrate the relative speed of the change in attitudes toward
adjudication. For example, not that long before the Pound Conference, the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference, as implicitly
endorsed by the Conference, Supreme Court, and Congress, undertook
procedural reforms that have been favorite whipping boys for those critical
of courts and favoring increased use of ADR. In 1966, Rule 23 was
substantially revised to facilitate increased use of class actions. 69 In 1970,
that all staff disputes be resolved through arbitration. Senior partners at the firm say the
covenant reduces the possibility of the firm's "dirty laundry" being aired in the press or
in the courtroom.
[However, associates] objected to what they called the "old white male provision"
of the contract, which required the arbitrator to have at least 20-years' experience at a
similarly sized law firm. The concern was that such a person may not be sensitive to
clair-s of sexual harassment and race discrimination.
Id.
Other employers have gone further, imposing arbitration agreements on employees
designed to be effective without signature. See, e.g., Brown & Root, THE BROWN & ROOT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM (1993) (brochure setting forth arbitration agreement
providing for AAA arbitration of "problems that happen at work"). The company position
regarding contract formation was that:
Effective June 15, 1993, Brown & Root will adopt this four option program
rincluding an "open door policy," a conference, and mediation as precursors to
arbitration] as the exclusive means of resolving workplace disputes for legally protected
rights. That means, if you accept or continue your job at Brown & Root after that date,
you will agree to resolve all legal claims against Brown & Root through this process
instead of through the court system.
Id.
68 Id. For example, the California courts have found legally operative a bank's
arbitration clause in credit card agreements that, like the Brown & Root employment clause
discussed in the preceding note, purport to make continued participation in the relationship
operative consent to the arbitration agreement. See Badie v. Bank of America, No. 944916,
1994 WL 660730 (San. Fran. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994); Hal Davis, Banks Follow Brokerages:
Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 12, 1994, at BI (discussing Badie case).
69 See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 703-05 (6th
ed. 1993) (1966 Amendments expanded class actions by substituting functional tests for prior
conceptual categories, but "[s]ince the 1966 amendments, even the utility of class actions has
been the subject of much debate").
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the discovery rules were expanded, principally by removing the "good
cause" requirement for document production and expanding the Rule 26
definition of discoverable matter to include anything related to the "subject
matter" of the case (rather than directly tied to a "claim or defense"),
including matters that were not admissible at trial so long as the information
sought was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. "70
By the time of the Pound Conference a decade later, both of these Civil
Rules reforms were under substantial attack, although their defenders
appeared to be holding the metaphorical fort.71 For example, the bulk of the
academic literature was highly critical of the 1970s Supreme Court decisions
limiting the reach of the class action, 72 and discovery was still presented to
law students, 73 lawyers, 74 and the public75 as a breakthrough enabling
litigation to find truth and right wrongs. After the Pound Conference, the
ascension of ADR was paralleled by decreasing confidence in adjudication,
particularly following the 1966 and 1970 reforms. By the early 1980s, the
words "discovery abuse" were on the lips of many lawyers and virtually all
politically conservative litigation interest groups such as the defense bar,
manufacturers, insurance companies, as well as political conservatives
generally. 76 The movement was sufficiently strong to prompt an amendment
70 See ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACICE § 12.2 (2d ed.
1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
71 See CouND, supra note 69, at 849 (upsurge in discovery sanctions after National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) and Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), "which strongly supported the use of sanctions"
for discovery misconduct); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem, - 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979) (describing
1970s controversies over apt use of class action device); Note, The Emerging Deterrence
Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
72 See, e.g., Miller supra note 71.
73 See, e.g., COUND, supra note 69.
74 See supra note 70; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
75 See, e.g., JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE SUPER-LAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL
WORLD AT THE GREAT WASHINOTON LAW FIRM (1972) (citing examples of lawyers using the
discovery process to break open cases).
76 See ROBERT E. RODES ET AL., SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (1981) ([Clourts are reluctant to impose sanctions,
this results in "considerable laxity in the day-to-day application of the rules. Attorneys ae
well aware that sanctions will be imposed only in the most flagrant situations."); C. RONALD
ELLINOTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979); Abraham D. Sofaer,
Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited
Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680 (1983); Mary M. Schroeder & John P.
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of the Federal Rules to require some restraint in discovery, a move Justice
Powell criticized as toothless in dissenting from the promulgation of the
Rule change.77
In 1983, Rule 11 was amended to give it teeth, forbidding the written
submission of any statement not "well grounded in fact," "warranted by
law," or justified by an argument for law reform.78 The bar and bench
responded to Rule 11 like children with a new toy: they used it until it
broke. Rule 11 was quickly and frequently applied to a wide range of
disputes, sometimes harshly, unfairly, and erroneously. Rule 11 proved a
popular judicial tool for punishing complaints viewed as unmeritorious and
was also directed aggressively at perceived discovery abuse, a surprising
outcome in view of the timidity with which the bench had applied (or failed
to apply) Rule 37's provision for fee-shifting against those who took
unjustified positions regarding discovery disputes. 79 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on a number of Rule 11 cases and managed to, if
anything, make the situation worse8s Late 1980s grumbling led to studied
Frank, Discovery Reform: Long Road to Nowheresville, 68 A.B.A. J. 572 (1982); Charles B.
Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264 (1979). It is
perhaps not coincidental that two of the authors critical of discovery excess (Renfrew and
Sofaer) were federal district judges while a third author (Ripple) subsequently was appointed
to the Seventh Circuit.
77 Letter of Transmittal, 446 U.S. 996, 999 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
78 See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAw PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES, Ch. 2 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe
Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It With Pre-Verdict Dismissal
Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 257 (1991); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are And
Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475 (1991).
79 See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 383 (1990); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1925 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
OChdllng" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ.
1313 (1986). My characterization of the federal judiciary's application of Rule 11 (which
perhaps extends beyond the scope of the criticisms cited) may be a bit unfair. Many
commentators observed a substantial improvement in Rule 11 jurisprudence by the late 1980s.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105
(1991). During this five-year "shakedown cruise," however, many lawyers and litigants
suffered unnecessarily for only speculative gain to the judicial system.
80 See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992) (upholding imposition of
sanction even though the court was later found to lack subject matter jurisdiction); Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991) (deciding
the case on a fact-specific basis and making broad statements about Rule 11 that could be
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reform efforts by the Advisory Committee and other elements of the
rulemaking establishment, culminating in the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11,
which clarified the standard, made sanctions discretionary, and provided a
"safe harbor" from monetary sanctions for lawyers who withdrew an
offending assertion when served with a Rule 11 motion.
81
Rule 11 provides an interesting illustration of the frequently
schizophrenic behavior of bench and bar. In one breath, aggressive action is
taken against a perceived problem, often without significant empirical
analysis of the problem or anything resembling a canvass of the elements of
the legal profession and society that are not wired into the rulemaking
establishment. In the virtual next breath, problems are recognized and the
earlier changes are rolled back, such as when Rule 11 was amended.
Sometimes contradictory action is taken, often without any seeming
realization that it is contradictory. In my view, for reasons discussed at
length later in this article, the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 establishing a
system of disclosure and presumptive limits on interrogatories and
depositions82 (which probably exacerbates the problems of delay, cost, and
dispute resolution)83 are a similar example in that they not only offend
adjudicatory purists but also fail to meet the streamlining goals of the ADR
movement.
But whether one likes or loathes disclosure, there is no doubt that its
arrival provides further evidence of the rise, plateau, and decline of
enthusiasm for full-scale litigation, all within a mere 30 years, with the
interpreted as advocating either aggressive or cautious application of sanctions); Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (providing that trial court imposition of
sanctions will be reviewed according to a relatively lax "abuse of discretion" standard even as
to factual disputes and that sanctions could be imposed on the basis of a claim voluntarily
withdrawn) (the latter situation is now effectively precluded by the 1993 Amendments to Rule
11); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (providing that
only the signing party is subject to Rule 11, effectively allowing law firm partners to force
associates to assume sanctions risk in submitting papers to court) (a decision later "overruled"
by the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11, which provides for vicarious liability in such situations).
81 See generally Vairo, supra note 78, Ch. 1; George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to
Amendment, 61 U. MiSs. L.J. 5 (1991).
82 See COMMrrrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS 72-78 (1993) (promulgating amended Rule 26(a) and amended
Rule 11).
83 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 342-54; Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again 77me for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991); but see
Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992)
(arguing that disclosure will improve the efficiency of litigation).
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Pound Conference in retrospect appearing as a significant turning point.
From enthusiastic expansion of discovery in the 1970s, we have moved to
constriction of it and heightened scripting of the fact development process
by rules, local rules, and standing orders as well as an implicit attitude that
facts are simply "there" waiting to receive the application of predictable
rules of law and that adversarial fact gathering (e.g., through depositions of
adverse witnesses) carries more costs than benefits. Although the picture is
mixed, the overall development of the Federal Rules during the modem era
of ADR is largely consistent with the ADR movement, and represents the
profession's bending to ADR-style thinking rather than a resistance to ADR
and a defense of the adjudicatory model.
Of course, one can criticize aspects of a social movement, particularly
its tone and process, but still find much of value in the movement. The
history of the Pound Conference and the ADR movement may offend one's
sensibilities to the extent it can be seen as a history of political
conservatives and business or other monied interests attempting to solidify
power or to turn back the gains made by individuals, consumers, racial
minorities, women, or progressives.84 It is no accident that the corporate
community has embraced ADR not only as a means of controlling costs in
disputes between commercial entities but also as a means of preventing
individuals from placing claims before a jury.85 In addition, the tone of
ADR advocates or fellow traveler reformers often has an air of
condescension. Most illustrative of this trait is Justice Scalia's call for
reduced federal court jurisdiction, implying that the matters he would
remove from the consideration of federal court are simply not very
important.86 In similar fashion, ADR advocates often make the de facto
84 See Nader, Controlling Processes, supra note 6, at 23-24.
85 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 36, at 1167 n.56 (describing exchange with Aetna
Insurance Vice President Judyth W. Pendell concerning portion of litigation claims that are
frivolous). Aetna has been active in promoting ADR on a number of fronts and, among other
things, provided funding for the Brookings Institution Report, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING
COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIOATION (1989), which served as a major underpinning of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwather: The
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 800-05 (1993); Lauren K.
Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 131
(1991) (also noting the degree to which corporate America generally has championed court
reform and ADR and the prospect that CJRA chief sponsor Sen. Joseph Biden (D.-Del.) may
have been influenced by the high concentration of corporations chartered in his home state).
86 See Address by Justice Antonin Scalia to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted In 34 Fed. B. News
& J. 252 (1987). See also Resnik, supra note 11, at 258-59; Judith Resnik, Housekeeping:
The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909 (1990)
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suggestion that claims involving lower stakes can safely be relegated to
modes of processing that are more streamlined than the courts although not
perhaps as sagacious.8 7
B. Sander's Multi-door Courthouse as the Unifying ADR Initiative
As my version of ADR history perhaps reveals, I have many misgivings
about many ADR efforts, but I also find many aspects of ADR attractive
(assuming, of course, that they are intelligently and fairly administered;
both slipshod ADR and incompetent adjudication are dreadful). 88
Consequently, despite some troubling aspects of its lineage, Prof. Sander's
multi-door courthouse proposal continues to hold considerable attraction.
Among the many aspects of the Pound Conference worth remembering, it
stands out as a particularly instructive potential blueprint for the future-an
argument developed at greater length in Part II. For the moment, it is
sufficient to review Sander's contribution to the Pound Conference and the
multi-door courthouse as envisioned by Sander in 1976. Sander's
contribution to the Pound Conference 9 remains the most useful, a view
widely shared in the legal profession and evidenced by his article's status as
the most-cited component of the Pound Conference.90  Sander's
comprehensive attack on the problem also provides a yardstick for
evaluating intervening developments.
Sander began by accepting the basic Burger premise of the
Conference-that court caseloads were growing too fast to maintain the
current system. He then outlined a number of means of preventing this
(noting that prominent figures such as Richard A. Posner, Robert H. Bork, and others
(including, occasionally, people who never were on the University of Chicago Law School
faculty) have made similar arguments).
87 Stempel, supra note 5, at 717-27; Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger:
The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-7ier Trial System in Cvil
Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808 (1986). Both can be read as implicitly taking this view, but I
read Alschuler more benignly. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
88 Incompetent adjudication may be even more dangerous than slipshod ADR in that
adjudication usually has more formality, finality, and precedential impact than ADR.
89 Sander, supra note 26.
90 Sander's Multi-door Courthouse article has been cited repeatedly and quoted at length
in textbooks and has frequently been a focal point of scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
Resnik, supra note 11, at 216-18. Although LEXIS searches depend on the vagaries of author
citation and the specific database, it appears that Sander's article is by far the most cited
Pound Conference Article (69 full blue book citations in the law review database),
outdistancing even the well-known Burger (49) and Bork pieces (35) by wide margins.
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possible imbroglio, such as:
a) preventing disputes through clarified legal rules, including
replacing judicial discretion with fixed formulae or "greater emphasis
on preventive law," a development he thought would be hastened by
the growing use of prepaid legal services. 91
b) Sander also suggested exploring "alternative ways of resolving
disputes outside the courts." In particular, Sander criticized lawyers
for tending "to assume that the courts are the natural and obvious
dispute resolvers, when, [i]n point of fact there is a rich variety of
different processes... [that] may provide far more 'effective' conflict
resolution. " 9 -
Sander also proposed "the following criteria for determining the
effectiveness of a dispute resolution mechanism: cost, speed, accuracy,
credibility (to the public and the parties), and workability," adding that
"[in] some cases, but not in all, predictability may also be important."9
Sander then outlined the variety of disputing methods he regarded as
apt:
a) adjudication;
b) arbitration, either court annexed or private (which still is
subject to some judicial supervision pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act);
c) an administrative procedure (either subject to judicial review
or administered by the court);
d) problem-solving efforts by a government ombudsman or a
similar fact-finding inquiry;
e) mediation or conciliation by the parties;
1) negotiation; or
g) avoidance of the dispute.94
Since Sander wrote, hybrid forms of this basic dispute resolution menu
have developed, including med-arb (an attempt at mediation followed by
arbitration if the mediation should not succeed in resolving the dispute), the
summary jury trial, and early neutral evaluation.9" In addition, different
91 Sander, supra note 26, at 112.
92 Id. at 112-13.
93 Id. at 113 n.7.
94 Id. at 114.
95 The summary jury trial involves an abbreviated presentation by the parties (usually
consisting of a witness or two, key documents, and attorney narrative and argument) to a
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forms of arbitration seem more common, including high-low arbitration,
final offer arbitration, and what might be termed "lit-arb," arbitration that
provides more document exchange and other information gathering from
adverse parties than does traditional arbitration.96
Sander listed his ADR devices in descending order of judicial
involvement but did not state in detail the degree to which the court system
might be involved in actively operating ADR methods such as arbitration or
mediation rather than policing it.
Adding yet another list of considerations, Sander also advanced criteria
for determining "how particular types of disputes might best be resolved":
1. The Nature of the Dispute
Sander argued that unusual or unprecedented events were better served
by litigation. He also saw controversies inapt for all-or-nothing solutions as
well suited for ADR, which could craft more flexible solutions. High
volume, routine, replicable matters were apt for litigation but demanded a
mock jury chosen from the actual jury venire. After hearing the presentations, the jurors
return a nonbinding verdict which provides the parties and counsel with additional information
which can be used to facilitate settlement. See Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk, The
Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980) (proposing and outlining technique).
Judge Lambros is said to have "invented" the device. But see Richard A. Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Altenrative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986) (criticizing summary jury trial).
Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE") is a process in which the parties and counsel are
compelled to present the gist of their claims to an impartial third party shortly after the case
has commenced. The neutral party reviews the controversy and renders a nonbinding opinion
as to the value of the claims and likely result if the matter were fully litigated. See JOSHUA
ROSENBERG ET AL., REPORT ON THE EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION PROGRAM FOR THE U.S.
DISTRICt COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DIsTRICr OF CALIFORNIA (1992); see also Jay Folberg
et al., Use of ADR In California Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1992)
(reviewing ENE and other court-connected ADR mechanisms).
96 See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 19 (2d ed. 1992); COUND, supra note
69, at 1311-18 (listing the following as primary ADR programs: small-claims court,
arbitration, final-offer arbitration, one-way arbitration, court-annexed arbitration, private
judging, negotiated settlement, mediation, court-annexed mediation, a neighborhood justice
center, an ombudsperson, the mini-trial, and the summary jury trial in addition to containing
an early excerpt from Sander's multi-door courthouse article); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., JUST
SOLUTIONS: A PROGRAM GUIDE TO INNOVATIVE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 8-15 (1994)
(listing the following programs: early neutral evaluation, criminal mediation, small claims
mediation, neutral case evaluation, public dispute mediation, night prosecutor mediation,
'settlement now" initiative, and the District of Columbia Multi-door Courthouse).
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more streamlined form of litigation such as processing by an administrative
agency. Determining principles for application (the law making and public
policy making of courts) was most apt for adjudication and should remain a
court function. However, application of settled principles to complex fact
disputes, according to Sander, might be better handled by a more
streamlined proceeding. 97
With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, some of Sander's illustrations here
and elsewhere in the article appear almost quaint (e.g., his sanguine outlook
on the efficacy of prepaid legal service plans). 98 For example, his
illustration of a dispute that could be factually determined without full-scale
adjudication was divorce, where he thought that questions of living apart
were of a nature "that a clerk can determine," while issues of irreconcilable
breakdown in the marriage "could readily be relegated to a ministerial
official." 99 Although Sander was careful to confine his suggestions for
streamlining to the decision to authorize a divorce rather than decisions
regarding child custody and support, alimony, or property division,
subsequent work concerning the complexities of these areas and the
potential for disserving weaker disputants, usually wives and children, in
the divorce process suggest that Sander probably spoke too soon.10 0
2. The Relationship Between the Disputants
Sander observed that adversarial disputing culminating in a dramatic
and final adjudication might be a fine crescendo for unaffiliated combatants
but also noted that entities with long-term relationships would probably
benefit from a less combative case processing system such as mediation. 10 1
Although this point is now so commonplace that it is regarded as a near-
97 Sander, supra note 26, at 118-20.
98 Sander is, of course, not the only commentator who in retrospect seems to have been
overly seduced by the siren vision of prepaid legal services expanding citizen access to legal
assistance. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Patrick W. Shea & Jeffrey W. Stempel Project, An
Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE LJ.
122, 155 (1980) (concluding, based in part on empirical analysis of ABA-ABF SURVEY ON
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBuC (Barbara Curran, Rptr., 1976), that closed-panel prepaid
legal services pans and storefront legal clinics held substantial potential to increase public
access to legal services). Although these and other nontraditional methods of delivery have
had some success, prepaid plans, despite favored tax treatment as an employee fringe benefit,
have simply not enjoyed widespread use.
99 Sander, supra note 26, at 119.
100 See intfra notes 254-60 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of
mediation for domestic disputes and controversy surrounding its use).
101 Sander, supra note 26, at 120-24.
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axiom in a field of law where axioms are few, it was an important and
perhaps novel insight in 1976.102 Sander's examples of relationship disputes
that might better be resolved outside of courts were those involving
neighbors, family members, and inmates.
3. The Amount in Dispute
Sander regarded this factor as relatively unimportant standing alone,
noting that "a small case may be complex, just as a large case may be
simple." Sander suggested that a lay individual or paraprofessional might
first deal with small disputes at a "preliminary investigative-conciliational
stage" so long as there was "ultimate recourse to the court," thus
"preserv[ing] the adjudicatory process for those cases where the issues have
been properly joined and there is a genuine dispute of fact or law. "1°3
Although there is significant merit in this idea (which I expropriate in Part
II for advancing my vision of the future multi-door courthouse-Sander's
breezy suggestion, delivered in a paragraph, oversimplifies both the task
and the risks, an oddity in light of Sander's recognition only a few lines
earlier that "the evidence now seems overwhelming that the Small Claims
Court has failed its original purpose; that the individuals for whom it was
102 Indeed, the bulk of Sander's list appears to have stood the test of time quite well to
date. For example, see Pamela Chapman Enslen, The Art of Negotiating: When to Use
Alternative Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 90-91, which listed the following as
circumstances which should prompt counsel to consider ADR:
1) The parties have a continuing relationship they want to preserve (suggesting
mediation);
2) Only one issue in a lawsuit is blocking a settlement (suggesting summary jury
trial);
3) The only issue in a simple contract dispute is whether the contract was
breached, and if so, what damages are (suggesting arbitration);
4) The cost of going to court would exceed the amount in controversy (suggesting
a compromise settlement);
5) The dispute will inevitably arise during the ongoing performance of a contract
(suggesting the need for an arbitration clause that will encompass future disputes);
6) Technical matters involving a great deal of money are at issue (suggesting
expert arbitration or mini-trial);
7) Employment situations (suggesting mediation/arbitration to minimize tension
and avoid publicity).
Although Enslen's list can be misread or seen as too "pat," her generalizations are
largely accurate and can form a basic guideline for intake and screening practices proposed in
the modified multi-door courthouse of Part II, Infra.
103 Sander, supra note 26, at 124-25.
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designed have turned out to be its victims." 104
4. Cost
Like others at the Pound Conference, Sander wanted disputing to cost
less. In determining the appropriate level of investment, he suggested courts
be guided by a cost-benefit analysis that balanced the importance of the
matter, its complexity, and value to the parties. Most particularly, he
criticized the broad-based subsidization of adjudication and suggested that
court users pay something closer to the actual cost of their use of the
judicial system through the imposition of higher filing fees or a similar tax.
Sander compared subsidized adjudication to arbitration's typical imposition
of filing fees based on stakes of the controversy. Based on anecdotal
evidence, Sander concluded that many lawyers and clients were erroneously
deterred from arbitrating due to the cost of filing fees. 10 5
Oddly, Sander failed to consider the implications of this observation, if
it is at all true; but Sander was probably talking to some atypical attorneys.
If arbitration has the cost and speed advantage posited by its backers, it
presumably would be preferred to litigation even if larger user fees were
assessed by the tribunal. Unless the user fees are exorbitant or the dispute
unusual, counsel fees and similar costs of pressing the case generally dwarf
user fees. Where the user fee is based on the amount at issue, rational
combatants will invest more in disputing costs, ensuring that these costs
continue to outpace user fees. If the arbitration process is significantly faster
and cheaper to undertake than litigation, the comparative savings in
disputing costs should far exceed the higher, unsubsidized, user fees
charged by private arbitration organizations. 106
If Sander's lawyer sources are acting shrewdly by avoiding arbitration
because AAA fees are higher than court filing fees, this constitutes a
powerful indictment of the notion that arbitration, being less procedurally
involved than litigation, is cheaper to use. Not surprisingly, subsequent
studies of arbitration in practice, even those generally favorable to
arbitration, have found that it is not appreciately faster or cheaper than
litigation of similar matters. Court-annexed arbitration may even prompt an
increase in costs to the extent it becomes an additional layer of procedure
104 Id. at 124.
105 Id. at 125-26.
106 See generally Avery Katz, Measuring he Demand for Lidgadon: Is the English Rule
Really Cheaper, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 143 (1987) (discussing escalation effect and its
negative implications for prospects of success for English "loser pays" rule, and concluding
that it will increase litigation costs).
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simply engrafted onto the existing adjudication system. 10 7
At the very least, Sander's lawyer sources at least are suggesting that
any "efficiency gap" between litigation and arbitration is much narrower
than commonly thought. However, both seemingly inconsistent
observations can be true. Arbitration may not be all that much more
efficient than litigation but the subsidization of judicial user fees may be
both a bad thing-in that it encourages free riding and other problems-and
a taxpayer-funded means of preventing the behavior of disputants from
accurately illustrating their relative preferences for litigation as compared to
arbitration or other ADR forums that charge more for their services.
5. Speed
All other things being equal, Sander, like most of us, prefers resolving
disputes faster. However, as he acknowledges, perhaps insufficiently, a
dispute resolution process that rushes to judgment is not an improvement
over litigation where it results in inaccuracy, unfairness, or frayed relations
between the disputants or between the disputants and the tribunal. 10 8
Subsequent developments have suggested that the danger of excessively
accelerated decision-making may be greater than traditionally supposed. The
late 1970s ushered in a new class of long-latency tort claims such as those
involving asbestos, hazardous waste, and biomedical products, such as the
Dalkon Shield. In all of these instances, time has been an ally in
ascertaining more information about the actual operation of these products
or the conduct of the defendant manufacturers. Today, much continues to
remain uncertain about the nature of pollution claims and the actual impact
of breast implants on users. Despite this incomplete knowledge, these
claims are being resolved by settlement, ADR, and even full-scale trial
without awaiting enhanced information about the underlying claim.
This may be inevitable in a world where claimants, counsel,
defendants, and insurers wish to close unpleasant matters and move on, but
it illustrates that speed may not always be a virtue in dispute resolution. If
combatants lack the resources or patience to await more accurate fact
finding, they always retain the option of settling informally at an early
stage. A disputing process that moves too quickly does not enhance this
prerogative, but may reduce the quality of resolution that results, making
for a net loss of social welfare. However, the flip side of this conundrum is
1 07 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Cilique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993);
John P. Mclver & Susan Keilitz, Court-Annexed Arbitration: An Introduction, 14 JUST. SYs.
1. 123 (1991).
108 Sander, supra note 26, at 126.
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that a disputing method which moves painstakingly and expensively toward
ultimate truth gives the parties with greater expertise and resources a big
advantage in negotiating settlements, allowing them to engage in a war of
attrition as part of the settlement strategy. Time appears generally to have
been the ally, albeit not a completely successful one, of increased
compensation for the claimants. The trust funds created to pay claims by
asbestos maker Johns-Manville and Dalkon Shield maker A.H. Robins, both
of which filed for bankruptcy in the face of the claims, rely on some delay
in the process of claims filing, review, and payment in order to generate
revenue from investment of the core funds deposited for the settlement by
the defendants. 109 Even the seemingly clear criterion of speed possesses
some uncertainty when evaluating ADR and litigation alternatives.
Sander's suggestion for accommodating his list of occasionally
conflicting considerations was expressly to recognize that it would be
difficult to determine ex ante which disputing mechanism was most apt for a
given dispute. With this recognition-one still overlooked, ignored, or
forgotten by many ADR advocates-Sander proposed that the principal
default system for disputing be a government administered clearinghouse or
dispatcher that would preside over the initial intake of a matter, evaluate its
suitedness to the major disputing options, and then assign the controversy
accordingly. He termed his revised semi-judicial entity a Dispute Resolution
Center,110 although it was quickly dubbed the "multi-door courthouse" and
has continued to hold this nom deplum in discussions of ADR.III
Sander's multi-door courthouse was one presided over by a "screening
clerk" who should direct disputants to one of several "rooms" for further
case processing. Combatants would be directed toward mediation,
arbitration, administrative fact finding, a malpractice screening panel, an
ombudsman, or even the plain old litigating court, depending on the
screening clerk's assessment. 112
The malpractice screening panel was to be composed of physicians and
109 See Georgene M. Vairo, 7he Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617 (1992) (describing Trust established for victim
compensation and comparing to similar asbestos and agent orange facilities); but see RICHARD
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991)
(criticizing Trust and implying similar criticism of other facilities as needlessly reducing
compensation to the benefit of corporate tortfeasors).
110 Sander, supra note 26, at 130-32.
111 Resnik, supra note 11, at 216 (citing commentators at n.19 and using the term
'multi-doored' courthouse). I prefer the term "multi-door" courthouse for simplicity. It is
also the term Sander himself used (but with a hyphen) in a subsequent article. See Frank A.E.
Sander, The Multi-door Courthouse, NATIONAL FORUM, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, Fall 1983.
112 Sander, supra note 26, at 131.
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blue ribbon laity or judicial personnel and was justified by the technical
complexity of medical matters and a concern for intercepting weak claims
early in order to protect the medical profession.113 Like other parts of the
article, Sander's enhanced focus on medical malpractice is a bit of a
historical artifact. Policymakers in the mid-1970s perceived themselves in
the middle of a medical malpractice "crisis" in which insurers were
cancelling coverage, leaving doctors exposed and unwilling to undertake
certain activities. Although then, as now, medical malpractice claims
comprise a relatively small amount of civil actions, it weighed heavily upon
the frontal lobes of lawyers, insurers, and politicians.114 In response, most
states enacted changes in substantive tort law to give doctors more
protection and to facilitate the formation of special insurance companies,
often physician-owned, to provide malpractice coverage. 115 Within a year of
the Pound Conference, these reforms had been sufficiently successful,
causing talk of a malpractice crisis to abate. 116 There have been occasional
resurgences of concern because, on the whole, medical coverage and
exposure has generally not been viewed as one of the trouble spots of either
tort or insurance law during recent years. In its place, product liability and
pollution claims have largely taken center stage as the focus of concern
about tort liability and insurance availability. 117
Sander's vision of a multifaceted disputing center generally received a
warm reception from lawyers across the ideological spectrum. 118 However,
his precise concept, even if well-executed, has weaknesses. Most obviously,
it places great authority in the screening clerk, a bureaucratic official
lacking the stamp of approval provided by the nomination-and-confirmation
appointments or elections used to select judges. 119 The multi-door
courthouse also holds the potential to delay case resolution and increase
costs when cases are assigned to a "room" in which resolution fails to
113 Id. at 129.
114 See Jean A. Macciaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model
Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990) (reviewing 1970s and
contending crisis continues); Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reforn
Act, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 135 (1986) (describing New York activity during 1974-86 period).
115 Macciaroli, supra note 114; Rosen, Note, supra note 114.
11 6 See generaly Patricia Danzon, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1986); Patricia Danzon, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982).
1 17 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96
YALE LJ. 1521 (1987).
118 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 11, at 216-18.
119 At least this in my picture of the screening clerk based on Sander's presentation. See
Sander, supra note 26, at 131.
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occur: these cases eventually are shifted to another "room" or return to the
court for "regular" adjudication at the option of any party unsatisfied with
the status of the case after its initial or subsequent assignment. 120 Sander
allowed, as he realistically must have allowed, that disputants would be
permitted to seek full-scale litigation of the complaint and need not accept
arbitration or screening panel responses to their claims or defenses. 121
However, an adverse result from either arbitration or the screening panel
would shift responsibility for costs to the disputant who pressed forward
unsuccessfully to litigation. 122 Although this would undoubtedly deter some
weak "appeals" of adverse ADR results, it could hardly be counted on to
weed them all out. Alternatively, cost shifting might discourage worthy
challenges to adverse ADR results because of the potential financial penalty.
Consequently, the multi-door courthouse concept can be criticized as both
potentially increasing costs and perhaps undermining the accuracy and
procedural values traditionally associated with litigation. Certainly,
Sander's article, for all of its insight and creativity, springs from the same
troubling well of crisis rhetoric that has driven the misplaced semi-reform
efforts of the past decade. 123 Nonetheless, my intrinsic reaction to the multi-
door concept is that it was, and remains, a sound one, albeit one in need of
careful construction and administration. In Part II, infra, I suggest a variant
of this approach that holds some promise for attaining the ADR goals of the
Pound Conference organizers and as militating against the concerns of
Weinstein, Resnik, and others. 124 Regardless of whether one is persuaded
by endorsements or criticisms of the concept, Sander's multi-door
courthouse concept and article retain visionary status. Although aspects of
the ADR movement can be held responsible for the developments Resnik
criticizes and Weinstein fears, these undesirable developments do not, by
120 Sander does not expressly acknowledge this possibility when outlining the multi-door
courthouse, suggesting that the case is on the downhill slope to termination as soon as it has
been assigned by the screening clerk. His subsequent discussion reflects his understanding of
the possibility, but perhaps an underappreciation of it. See id. at 131-33.
121 But Sander was not exactly overjoyed about having to make this concession, noting
that "we are robbed of much-needed flexibility by the constitutional requirement of jury trial."
Id. at 132.
12 2 Id. at 130.
123 Id. at 133 ("In view of the desperate state of some of our civil calendars, it seems to
me that the burden of persuasion should shift to those who maintain that the high costs are
justified by unique advantages afforded by jury trials [and, implicitly, full adjudication]."). On
the "Chicken Little" nature of modem crisis-based court reform rhetoric, see Robel, supra
note 85.
124 See Weinstein, supra note 1; Resnik, supra note 11; Nader, Controlling Processes,
supra note 6; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
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and large, indict the multi-door courthouse idea. 125 In some jurisdictions,
the concept has been implemented (although not exactly as sketched by
Sander) and largely applauded by its operators and inspectors. 126 Perhaps,
as it enters young adulthood, the multi-door courthouse is ready for
extensive prime time exposure.
C. Caveats for Discussing and Evaluating ADR
Part of the difficulty in discussing ADR and adjudication stems from
something of a failure of the scholarly and political community to
distinguish adequately among the varieties of ADR and adjudication.
Although Sander's article is what might be termed an excellent start to the
post-Pound Conference conversation, subsequent discussion has often done
little more than note the superficial distinctions between ADR methods or
list the posited prima facie differences between courts and other
decisionmaking entities. An attempt to outline the potentially useful
adoption of ADR methods by the courts requires some effort to avoid these
oversights. In particular, the ADR-vs-Courts debate would be more useful if
participants kept the following caveats in mind.
1. Distinguish Between Old ADR and New ADR
The foregoing historical sketch focused on what I call "new" ADR, the
modem ADR movement of the past twenty to twenty-five years. To be sure,
however, ADR existed long before Chief Justice Burger and the Pound
Conference. I label these pre-1970 forms of dispute resolution "old" ADR.
Although both movements share the commonality of being alternatives to
courts and use many of the same processes or techniques (e.g., arbitration),
there is a palpable tension between "new" ADR and "old" ADR, which
ADR advocates have failed to acknowledge and ADR opponents have
probably overstated.
Old ADR has several identifying traits. In particular, it usually:
a) is confined to a subset of industry. A classic example is provided by
guilds which arbitrate the application and enforcement of quality standards.
The textile industry, for example, is subject to its own set of rules and has a
125 A point Resnik acknowledges although she is skeptical of, or dismayed by,
subsequent developments. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 217 ("Whatever the number of
doors, the call was for access to and preservation of the courthouse.").
126 See Erica Gray, Multi-Door Courthouse, A Woriing Paper for the National
Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Research (Oct. 15-16, 1993), in STATE
JUSTICE INSTruTE, supra note 6, at 91-109.
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subsidiary division of the American Arbitration Association. 127 The
diamond dealers concentrated in a few European and American cities
constitute an especially closely linked group of merchants with shared
interests who have long operated under an arbitration system backed by
formal, but effective, enforcement mechanisms. 128
b) it involves a system of relationships in which the participants form
virtually their own miniature society or fraternity and are likely to have
repeated contact with one another. The commodities merchants of the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, which provides for automatic arbitration of
inter-member disputes according to its own rules and regulations, provides
an example. 129
c) involves commercial matters and commercial actors, as in the
examples cited above.
d) focuses on issues of contractual interpretation or performance, often
with recurring issues regarding quality, excuse of performance, adequacy of
tender, or mitigation and amount of damages. The custom of the industry,
trade usage, or prior course of dealing between the disputants often provides
the yardstick for determining rights and responsibilities.
As noted above, old ADR has been around for some time, 130 perhaps
127 See American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for Textile Claims (1995);
see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 33, at App. TV. However, the arbitration clauses used
in textile contracts and the American Arbitration Association rules for textile disputes are
nearly identical to those of commercial and construction arbitration. See American Arbitration
Association, Arbitration Rules for Commercial Claims (1995); American Association
Association, Arbitration Rules for Construction Claims (1995). What may often differ by
industry are the substantive norms of behavior, e.g.,: When does an oral agreement count?
Who is responsible if a shipment of raw material is late? When does a breach by the other
party justify walking away from the remainder of a contract? How are damages calculated?
128 See Lisa Bernstein, The Oldest Law Merchant: Private Commercial Law in the
United States, (March 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter The
Oldest Law Merchant]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Ertralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
129 See Rules and Regulations of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (1995), in particular,
Rule 4, which provides that in the event of a dispute between members, arbitration shan be
automatic even if there is no arbitration clause in the disputed contract. An arbitration clause
is required before a member company may insist on arbitrating a claim against an objecting
nonmember, but a nonmember may insist on arbitration even in the absence of an arbitration
clause. See also Little Rock Grain Exchange v. Thompson, 93 F.Supp. 571, 573 (E.D. Ark.
1950) (Grain Exchange acts as arbitrator between members and nonmembers).
130 The major traditional treatises present their discussions under a background
assumption that old ADR is the norm. See, e.g., ROBERT RODMAN, COMMERCIAL
ARBrRATION WITH FORMS (1984); G. WiLNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCtAL ARBrrRATION
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longer than the legal literature has traditionally acknowledged. 131 Although
old ADR has been characterized more by anecdote than rigorous study, it
appears to have succeeded in many cases because it differs from courts in
substance as well as procedure.
New ADR differs from old ADR in several respects in that:
a) it is mass produced ADR that affects large classes of persons or
entities (e.g., all investors who open a discretionary brokerage account)
rather than only the relatively small group of a trade guild such as the
Diamond Exchange.
b) one of the disputants is often a so-called "one-shot" player who is a
stranger to the ADR forum while the other disputant is a "repeat player"
who frequently contests matters in the ADR forum. 132
c) new ADR is far more likely than old ADR to involve personal rather
than commercial matters. A leading and troubling example of new ADR is
the securities industry's insistence that brokerage house employees sign an
agreement requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes.1 33
(1984). Even the most recent and quite excellent major treatise on arbitration proceeds from
the largely unspoken assumption that old ADR arbitration is the controlling arbitration
framework. See MAcNEIL ET AL., supra note 33, chs. 1-7 (1994) (although the treatise
devotes substantial discussion to the problems of enforcing new ADR arbitration clauses; id.
at chs. 15-21).
Although labor arbitration lies largely outside the scope of this article, I consider it a
type of old ADR. See DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBrrRATION LAW AND PRAcTCE 3 (1979)
("Private... disputes were organized in England in the 1860s, and in the 1870s, arbitrations
were held in the Pittsburgh iron trade, the Massachusetts shoe industry, and the Appalachian
coal fields."). In addition to age, labor arbitration shares other important characteristics of old
ADR in that it results from a tangibly bargained agreement between two principals of roughly
equivalent bargaining power and sophistication regarding the understanding of the impact of
substituting an arbitration scheme for the default rule of adjudicating disputes. Although
individual employees seldom are in this position vis-a-vis an employer (star professional
athletes and sought-after CEO candidates being perhaps the leading exceptions), the union
provides employees with representatives similar to that existing when two businesses contract
for old ADR arbitration.
131 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 33, ch. 4; Bernstein, The Oldest Law Merchant,
supra note 128.
132 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Linits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974) (noting and outlining distinction between
repeat players who frequently participate in litigation-and, by implication, other ADR
processes--and one-shot players who have isolated and rare contact with courts and
disputing).
133 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's 1991
Gilmer decision and controversy over mandatory employee arbitration contracts).
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d) unlike old ADR, which usually centered on questions of contract
interpretation and obligation, new ADR is far more likely to involve
statutory questions and a range of legal issues rather than focus on contract
text, industry custom, or prior actions of the parties.
New ADR should not necessarily receive a different level of judicial
scrutiny than old ADR merely because it is different. However, the
converse is also true: new ADR should not necessarily be as readily
endorsed and deferred to by courts simply because courts have chosen to
defer to old ADR mechanisms. Unless similar analysis supports a wide
judicial berth for new ADR, courts must make serious inquiry before giving
the metaphorical rubber stamp of approval to new ADR.
Instead of making this sort of searching inquiry, however, courts have
largely produced an unimpressive record of brittle formalism and shallow
policy analysis when analyzing any form of ADR. Prior to the mid-1960s,
courts were unduly hostile to even the comparatively benign, familiar, and
congressionally authorized old ADR. In place of sensitive contract inquiry,
the courts at first resisted old ADR on the basis of tortured construction, 134
a narrow view of statutory reach,1 35 or a somewhat paranoid view of
unconscionability. 136 Misplaced hostility to old ADR was mortally wounded
134 See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Kom-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Atlanten, 252 U.S. 313 (1920). The trial court in the Southern District of New York (Learned
Hand, J.), the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court (Oliver Wendell Holmes, J.) all found a
broadly worded arbitration clause inapplicable because the clause spoke of disputes over
"performance of the contract" and one party was completely denying the contract. Imagine
trying this defense the next time you have an argument with Visa or Mastercard ("We don't
have a dispute over late payment subject to arbitration; I deny the validity of the credit card
agreement"; perhaps BankAmerica's credit card customers can use this in the wake of the
Badie decision (see supra note 68)). The Federal Arbitration Act passed a few years later in
1925, but it was not until nearly 50 years later that the Supreme Court effectively overruled
the Korn-Og approach to arbitration enforcement. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). But see infra note 136.
135 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (refusing to enforce
arbitration agreement on ground that state law forbid arbitration of such claims). Bernhard:
was sidently but effectively overruled in Souddand Corp. v. Keadng, 465 U.S. 1 (1984),
which held that the Federal Arbitration Act creates substantive law in cases where it is
applicable because of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce, thus making
irrelevant state law sentiments about the propriety of similar arbitrations under state law. See
also Id. at 21, 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing in vain that Bernhardt was rightly
decided and should control disposition of the instant case).
136 See, e.g., Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
The court refused to enforce an arbitration clause in construction contracts because the
objecting party alleged it had been "defrauded" into entering into an unfair ADR clause
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with the Steelworkers' trilogy of labor arbitration cases in 1960137 and
appeared buried with the 1967 Prima Paint decision, which held that a
defense of fraudulent inducement to contract was within the scope of a
contract's arbitration clause.13 8 However, even old ADR agreements will
not be enforced unless they clearly cover a dispute. 139
Despite this occasional backsliding with regard to enforcement of old
ADR, the court has simultaneously endorsed new ADR with a perhaps
uncritical vengeance. Starting with the 1957 Wilko v. Swan decision, which
read the Securities Act of 1933 to include a statutory prohibition on
providing for arbitration in New York. The Moseley holding is really more of an
unconscionability opinion, although it is largely clothed in the language of fraudulent
inducement. See Stempel, supra note 33, at 1397-98. It can also be ascribed to author Justice
Hugo Black's occasionally embarrassing populism and fear of corporations and city slickers
taking advantage of country folk. See, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311 (1964) (enforcing contract clause designating agent for receipt of service of
process); id. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding gives a green light to every large
company in this country to contrive contracts which declare with force of law that when such
a company wants to sue someone with whom it does business, that individual must go and try
to defend himself in some place, no matter how distant, where big business enterprises are
concentrated, like, for example, New York, Connecticut, or Illinois, or else suffer a default
judgment.'). Justice Black's notion that an unreasonably inconvenient forum may make ADR
unconscionable is correct as a general principle but his application to it in commercial
situations like Szukhent and Moseley seems demonstrably incorrect.
To the extent Moseley actually held that a party may avoid arbitration based on a claim
of fraudulent inducement into the contract, it was overruled by Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). However, objections directed specifically to the
making and validity of an arbitration clause may still preclude arbitration until a court has
ruled on the objections. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 648-51 (1987); Stempel, supra note 32, at 280 n.85.
13 7 See United States v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Collectively, these cases, which all
enforced labor arbitration agreements or awards, are referred to as the "Steelworkers'
Trilogy." See Nolan, supra note 130, at 45-50. The approach of these cases has been
influential regarding enforcement and review of nonlabor arbitration agreements as well.
138 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1968) and
supra notes 134, 136.
139 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); Twin City
Monorail, Inc. v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 728 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1984) (although the Eighth
Circuit's tortured construction rivals that of Judge Hand and the Supreme Court three-quarters
of a century ago in Korn-Og (see supra note 134)).
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predispute arbitration agreements between broker and customer, 140 the court
moved toward the enforcement of such agreements not only rejecting
defenses based upon the Securities Exchange Act of 1934141 and the 1933
Act, 142 but also glossing over issues of contract formation, knowing
consent, adhesion, unequal bargaining power, and unfair surprise. 143
Perhaps its dimmest hour came in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation,144 which required arbitration of an Age Discrimination Act
claim according to the literal language of an arbitration form the worker was
required to sign as a condition of employment. Gilmer reached this arguably
oppressive result notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act's language
making it inapplicable to any "contract of employment." 145 With reasoning
that would make even a sophist blush, the Court concluded that the
agreement was not the worker's "contract of employment," but was instead
merely a collateral requirement of the New York Stock Exchange that raised
no serious issue concerning the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act. 1 46
Recently, the Court, perhaps owing to the arrival of Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, has mercifully stepped back from the
rigid harshness of Gilmer in cases like Mastrobuono,1 47 which upheld an
investor's arbitration award of punitive damages in the face of contract
language that made a colorable but sneaky invocation of New York common
law precedent holding that an arbitration award of punitive damages violates
"public policy" (on the view that only the august and sagelike judiciary may
impose punishment). 148 However, in the same, most recent term, the Court
has reiterated the broad sweep of the interstate commerce scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 149 but acted to limit an arbitrator's power to
14 0 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
141 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
142 See Rodriguez Do Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
143 See Stempel, supra note 33, at 1383-90.
144 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
145 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
146 500 U.S. at 24-27.
147 Mastrobuono v. Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
148 Id. at 1217-21. The New York ban on arbitrators awarding punitive damages is
based on Garrfty v. Lyle Stuart, 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976), a case with rationale and result
widely criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in
Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of
State Law, 63 FORmHAm L. Rsv. 529 (1994); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages In
Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953 (1986).
149 See Allied-Bmce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (enforcing
arbitration clause in home pest control contract and rejecting state court's abrogation of it
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adjudicate a commercial dispute of seeming old ADR proportions. I °
In short, Supreme Court arbitration law has been something less than a
hallmark of either consistency or reason. This results in large part from the
Court's inability or unwillingness to recognize that old ADR and new ADR
differ, and therefore, new ADR agreements, although deserving of
enforcement in many, perhaps most, cases, nonetheless require a more
sensitive analysis solicitous of the noncommercial one-shot players
frequently found on what might be termed the "receiving end" of the brunt
of mass produced and imposed arbitration clauses. 151 Equally important, a
more sophisticated assessment would prevent the broad brush criticisms of
arbitration and ADR that border on hysteria merely because a matter is not
presided over by a judge. 152
In short, distinguishing between old and new ADR should improve
judicial regulation of ADR. In particular, the history of the waxing,
waning, and renewed waxing of judicial enthusiasm for old ADR may have
some lessons for the current debate. Moreover, studies of the more closely
knit old ADR communities may suggest that courts and policymakers
should be skeptical of ADR applied in situations that differ too greatly from
those communities that have been the historical cradle of old ADR. 153
2. Distinguish Between ADR That Brokers Settlement and ADR
That Acts as a Surrogate for Adjudication
ADR methods can be viewed as a continuum ranging from those that
are largely adjudicatory, but proceed in a manner that differs from that of
courts to those that are exclusively designed to attempt to arrange a
settlement, but have no significant decisionmaking authority. Binding
merely because parties did not contemplate interstate activity; test for applicability of Federal
Arbitration Act under 9 U.S.C. § 2 is whether transaction has significant aspects of interstate
commerce, a standard satisfied by interstate transportation of materials used in transaction). At
roughly the same juncture, however, the Court suggested that the reach of the Commerce
Clause and statutes based on it are not limitless. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995) (federal law attempting to criminalize drug activity near schools
unconstitutionally exceeds permissible reach of Commerce Clause).
150 See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
151 See Stempel, supra note 33.
152 See Stempel, supra note 32.
153 In particular, courts and legislators might ask whether the "market* that created old
ADR and permitted it to flourish for most of the 20th Century suggests that significant state
asubsidies' of ADR, particularly new ADR, is a mistake. See infra notes 197-98 and
accompanying text (regarding the subsidization question).
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arbitration is perhaps the best example of the former, and noninterventionist
mediation is perhaps the best example of the latter. 154
The judicial settlement conference might be regarded as an example of
the latter as well, particularly prior to the mid-1970s (the Pound Conference
demarcation point rears its head again). During the past 20 years, however,
especially since being granted more express authority in the 1983
Amendments to Federal Civil Rule 16, judges have frequently combined
settlement conferences with either rulings on disputed issues or
foreshadowings of rulings. Even where the matters at issue are not
technically dispositive, this sort of judicial activity is sufficiently
interventionist to muddy the definitional waters. For example, if a judge
suggests that he will order certain documents produced notwithstanding a
claim of privilege, this may exert a powerful pull on the threatened litigant.
It was, of course, this melding of communication and coercion that
prompted Resnik to inaugurate the managerial judging debate. 155
Despite these sometimes troubling aspects of judicial settlement efforts,
the settlement conference remains more on the settlement end of the
continuum since the conference itself involves no authoritative rulings.
Authoritative judicial decisions, of course, come in separate orders, can be
challenged accordingly, although often not until after final judgment, and
fall in the middle of my posited continuum. They are adjudicatory acts often
designed to spur settlement even more than to move a case toward judicial
decision.
The various hybrids of mediation, evaluation, arbitration, and
adjudication all fall at different points in the fuzzy middle of the continuum
that I am suggesting. For purposes of the instant analysis, it is not as
important where they fall. What is important is the distinction between
pursuing settlement through alternative means, and pursuing decision
through alternative means.
154 I am assuming for the purposes of making this point that the mediator is purely a
facilitator of conversation between the disputants and does not render opinions designed to
foreshadow adjudicatory results should the parties press on. See Fla. Stat. § 44.1011 (defining
mediation as facilitation of voluntary settlement); see infra notes 224-91 and accompanying
text (discussing varieties of mediation and recommending that courts offer mediation services
of substantial formality, with mediators who eventually offer judgments where parties have
counsel during mediation sessions). However, even this "pure settlement" line is hard to hold
since the rendering of a neutral opinion on a claim may well stimulate settlement. See Florida
Dispute Resolution Center, The Resolution Report (Vol. 10, No. 2) (July 1995) at 3 (mediator
sanctioned by Disciplinary Panel for rendering legal opinion). For the most part, however, I
view these sorts of ADR activities (e.g., ENE, summary jury trial) as quasi-adjudicatory
events designed to stimulate settlement, rather than settlement efforts per se.
155 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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The traditional means of prompting settlement was an early and firm
trial date. 15' It provided the threat of adjudication prompting parties and
counsel to bargain harder in the "shadow of the law." 1 57 At least according
to the conventional wisdom, courts did not waste time jawboning to attempt
settlement; settlement took care of itself if the court just took care of
adjudicating. The increasing civil court backlogs have made the trial date of
reckoning a paper tiger, particularly in urban areas. In reaction, the
judiciary has attempted to procure settlements through alternative means:
Managerial judging;
Mandatory conferences;
Tighter pretrial deadlines;
Disclosure in lieu of discovery to force the parties to "place their cards
on the table" in the belief that this will encourage swifter settlement at
lower legal cost; 158
Various regulations making continued litigation onerous so that parties
are effectively urged to settle rather than undergo the pain of litigation; 159
and
ADR forms which either attempt to provide exit from the court system
or the settlement-spurring function once held by the fixed, firm, early trial
date.160
156 Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76
IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991) (citing Richard L. Williams, J. (E.D. Va.)).
15 7 To again use the memorable phrase of Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 30.
158 See Winter, supra note 83 (outlining this aspect of rationale for disclosure
requirement).
15 9 Although I know many will disagree, I find the expansion of local rules and standing
orders that micromanage the practice of law to function much like unrealistic pretrial deadlines
in that they work to make litigating so unpleasant (as if it were not intrinsically unpleasant;
remember Learned Hand's dictum that he dreaded a lawsuit more than anything but sickness
or death) that counsel (who must jump through the variegated but nondispositive hoops) and
litigants (who must help by producing documents, attending meetings, etc.) essentially settle
to stop the increased pain of litigation. Subrin captures a part of my cynicism when he
sketches the burdens of litigating in the District of Massachusetts:
IT]he Federal Rules require only a complaint and an answer. Under the
Massachusetts Federal Local Rules, however, the lawyer now finds that she is told what
to discuss with her client, what to discuss with her opponent, what to discuss with the
judges and to then file a written certification and a written joint plan-a plaintiff's
lawyer must give the other side a written settlement demand. Moreover, additional rules
strongly suggest mnagement conferences and a "final" pretrial conference, each with
their own detailed set of rules.
Subrin, supra note 36, at 1161 (citations omitted).
160 See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War
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Despite its imperfections, ADR strikes me as the best, or at least the
least objectionable, of this arsenal of options for reducing judicial
caseloads. The promoters of settlement frequently forget to count all the
costs. For example, the disclosure rules were designed in part to reduce
caseload and to remove discovery disputes from the court. Even if they
work this way, and I have argued that they do not and will not, the
disclosure rules nonetheless impose costs on counsel and clients. Whether
these costs are greater than any savings of "hard core" judicial costs, the
time invested by judicial employees, is quite literally anybody's guess at
this juncture. 161 Similarly, we have no real proof of whether managerial or
settlement judges spend more time disposing cases by managing and
jawboning than they would if they simply adjudicated and let settlement
follow as a matter of course, and even allowing a few cases to actually
proceed to final judgment.
My own opinion is that the net cost to society is higher with the
managerial or settlement model of judicial activity than with the decision-
rendering model and would be proven so if we could literally place an
opportunity cost meter on judges, judicial employees, lawyers and their
staff, litigants and their agents. By contrast, ADR that "mimes
adjudication" 162 fulfills a good deal of the "firm trial date or shadow of
adjudication" pressure that creates a market for settlements with minimal
transaction cost, particularly directly publicly funded or subsidized
transaction costs. In addition, "when ADR mimes adjudication, the critique
of ADR as a lawless or factless process loses strength." 163
If one agrees, however, the obvious next question is why society will
simply not commit more resources to litigation and forgo quasi-adjudicatory
ADR as either an alternative forum or a spur to settlement. First, the
practicalities of the contemporary era require it: the body politic will not
support sufficiently expanded traditional adjudication for reasons of both
funding and perceptions of ineffectiveness or excessiveness. These
perceptions may be incorrect, but they are real and only subject to modest
alteration in the near future. Second, court-connected ADR has the potential
to offer the benefits of litigation when they would otherwise be unavailable,
because civil adjudication is currently rationed by scarcity to some extent.
The political culture will not support a phalanx of new Article I judges
and courts but appears willing to provide increased ADR. My argument is
With the Profession and ts Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 956 (1993) (noting that court
system has moved "from trials to dispute resolution").
161 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 342-54.
162 To again borrow a memorable phrase from Resnik. See Resnick, supra note 11, at
263.
163 Id.
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that this ADR should be designed to provide a decision rather than merely
to explore settlement from increasingly varied angles. Although others
disagree, I remain convinced that at least the legal profession's discussions
and decisions about ADR will improve if it observes the distinction between
settlement ADR and decisional ADR.
3. Address the Political and Distributive Issues Forthrightly
There is a more controversial history to the modem ADR movement
than is admitted by most commentators, particularly the proponents of new
ADR. As noted above, the Pound Conference can be criticized as an effort
by more politically conservative social forces to reverse the gains obtained
by some groups through litigation during the 1960s and early 1970s. 164
ADR should invoke neither paranoia nor Pollyannaism, but without doubt
the battle over ADR has a political and distributive dimension. It is no
coincidence that ADR's biggest boosters are commercial organizations,
employers, insurers, political conservatives, and Republicans. Its most
vociferous critics are liberals, minorities, Democrats, and academics. To the
extent that new ADR succeeds in imposing privatized brute creditor
enforcement or unfettered employer discretion to treat employees as though
state and federal legislative protection had ceased to exist, it will deserve the
contempt of its critics. To the extent that new ADR strips the public of
adequate recourse to fact finding and legal inquiry with no significant
return, new ADR constitutes a political victory (undesirable in my view) by
the legal-political Right over the Moderate and Left.1 65
But increased ADR does not necessitate oppressive ADR. Any
164 See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
165 This is not to suggest that the Leftist political viewpoint should be preferred to those
of the Center or Right. My own political self-image is decidedly centrist. But I also give
traditional adjudication high marks for reaching correct results in given cases and generating
wise rules of law. The adjudication process, despite flaws, tends toward the substantively
rational. See Owen M. Fiss, 7he Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A 7Weny Year Perspectve:
Reason In All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990). To the extent that some political
actors, including the citizenry, wish to reduce the role of adjudication in American politics,
this suggests to me a relative decline in reflective decisionmaking and substantive rationality-
a bad development. The unspoken drawback of a strong judicial role, even if one accepts my
argument, is the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty: the fear that the very job security that
allows judges to be substantively rational and deliberative will produce philosopher kings or
the unfair imposition of minority viewpoints on society. Although this concern is obviously
legitimate, it is also frequently overstated. So long as a strong traditional judicial system
functions within a larger system of checks and balances, it is likely to deliver more social
benefit through rationality than detriment from undermining democracy.
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development can have modem benefits but historically tainted roots (e.g.,
public education, which was motivated in part by a desire to socialize recent
immigrants into being "real Americans"). Anti-claimant, anti-rights
underpinnings of the court reform movement should not blind observers to
the value of ADR. Just the same, the complex political history of ADR
suggests that sweeping and private ADRization of the nation would
unwisely diminish the rights of some Americans.
Even doctrines historically helpful to individual rights such as federal
supremacy, which aided the enforcement of civil rights legislation in the
face of local resistance, can become oppressive when applied uncritically by
ADR proponents insensitive to the political aspects of ADR. For example,
the First Circuit stymied Massachusetts' efforts to soften the occasionally
mechanical and sharp sweep of the new ADR by regulating the formation of
arbitration agreements. 166 According to the court, this effort as applied to
securities account agreements was preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act. 167 Although the issue was a close doctrinal contest, one might have
expected some judicial solicitude for the state's consumer protection efforts,
especially when an "erroneous" decision in favor of the state would need to
survive potential alteration by a Congress favorably inclined to ADR (both
old and new). 168 Instead, the court, through actual or feigned obliviousness
to the political and social issues raised by new ADR, rushed to federal
supremacy and ran roughshod over competing considerations.
My goal, at least for this article, is not to choose sides and pick fights
on specific issues. My point is simply that most decisions about the role of
ADR and the courts will have at least some distributive effect, or
occasionally even a substantial or highly partisan impact. Rather than
ignoring it, legal policymakers should attempt to identify it. They will
probably not be able to eliminate it. However, they may be able to
minimize it or counteract it. They may even want to accept or embrace it as
an advance over the status quo. But they should at least try to know what
they are doing.
4. Distinguish Between Private, Public, Voluntary, and
Involuntary Means of Conflict Resolution
Although Judge Weinstein is a prominent exception, 169 many ADR
166 See Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
167 1d at 1117-18.
168 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Stauoy Interpretation,
Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 583 (1991)
(arguing that absent other compelling factors courts in doubt regarding close cases should
impose burden of legislative correction on litigant best situated to bear that burden).
169 See generally Weinstein, supra note 1; see also Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice
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commentators tend to discuss ADR as though it matters not at all who
operates the ADR mechanism and how participants come to participate in
the ADR process. Thus, for the most part, debate over whether arbitration
is preferable to adjudication has not differentiated between ad hoc
arbitration (e.g., a couple agreeing that their clergyperson may divide
property in the event of divorce), institutionally administered voluntary
arbitration (e.g., a bank and a customer agree to AAA arbitration in the
event of dispute), institutionally imposed involuntary arbitration (e.g., the
NYSE requirement that employees arbitrate job disputes), or judicially
annexed arbitration (e.g., a requirement that certain claims be submitted to
nonbinding arbitration as a prerequisite to adjudication).
Although like so much of ADR, little is certain, my operating
hypothesis is that privatized ADR poses more of the danger posited by ADR
critics than does publically controlled or administered ADR. Although
privatized ADR has the advantage of removing certain disputes or even
whole classes of disputes from the admittedly crowded judicial system, 170 it
holds substantial potential for unfairness at least so long as judicial review
of private arbitration remains highly deferential. Although it has become
fashionable to criticize public entities, I remain old-fashioned, and logical,
in positing that a publically run ADR system would be less likely to favor a
particular industry, entity, or viewpoint than would a private ADR
mechanism established or administered by that industry, entity, or persons
holding that viewpoint.
Simultaneously, a useful trial hypothesis is that the judiciary and the
body politic should be less concerned about truly voluntary ADR. If ADR
is voluntarily chosen (e.g., the Diamond Exchange merchants), 71 it is
unlikely to be unfair to the participants since most disputants are sufficiently
rational to avoid selecting an adverse forum unless ignorant, foolish, or
deceived. Even where this occurs, society's desire to respect even poorly
made voluntary choices will counsel noninterference with the ADR
selection. 172
and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891 (1993); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott,
The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 42 (1988).
170 See BROOKINOS INST. REP., JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 85 (also arguing that
increased use of ADR will reduce cost and time required for resolving disputes).
171 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
172 See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519
(1988) (arguing that American absorption of views of John Stuart Mill continues to result in
public policy favoring individual choice even where the selections are arguably unwise); Cass
R. Sunatein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 1129 (1986)
(accepting minimal government regulation of individual choices but arguing that intervention
or overruling is justified in certain circumstances).
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Of course, even if these two trial hypotheses are correct, they may be in
conflict. For example, court-annexed arbitration or Early Neutral
Evaluation (ENE) has the benign aspects of publicly administered ADR, but
is imposed upon the parties irrespective of their actual preferences. Another
example of this tension is private securities arbitration. Although it might
currently be described as semi-voluntary and perhaps a candidate for
acquisition by the judicial system, this would come at the cost of adding a
large number of cases to the public system. In addition, it appears that
traditions of integrity and market forces have produced NYSE arbitrations
that are quite fair to and even solicitous of the involuntarily arbitrating
investors, at least as to financial matters. 173 Under these circumstances, the
optimal solution to concerns about the vastly privatized securities ADR
would appear to be government-mandated disclosure and contracting
protections and somewhat less deferential review of securities association
ADR outcomes, rather than the wholesale takeover of this segment of ADR
by the judiciary. Whether this approach is apt for ADR involving
employment relations in the securities industry remains unclear. 174
Even this limited suggestion is, of course, subject to debate. A more
ambitious inquiry such as the generally proper relationship between the
public and private sectors of ADR obviously entails considerable
controversy. However, to arrive at a stable national ADR policy, the
questions of public or private authority over ADR and government tolerance
for, or encouragement of, involuntary ADR arrangements must be
addressed forthrightly and at length.
173 See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REv.
1113 (1993) (finding system of industry-imposed new ADR of securities brokerage arbitration
to be largely a "level playing field" with sufficient regulation for fairness by industry).
Whether other securities organizations are as hospitable to investors presents a more
difficult question. For example, some commentators have criticized arbitrations conducted
under the auspices of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) as being too
favorable to broker-dealers. See, e.g., Club NASDAQ, WORTH (June 1995) at 111-13 (arguing
that over-the-counter-exchange provides insufficient protection and enforcement for
investors).
In addition, controversy surrounds industry-wide arbitration of employment disputes
between the securities industry and its workers. See Symposium, Arbitration in the Securides
Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. Rv. 1501 (1995) (exchange between employee attorney Judith
Vladek and brokerage house attorney Theodore Kresbach).
174 Although I continue to believe that Congress spoke to the issue nearly 70 years ago
when it stated that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to "contracts of employment."
See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); Stempel, supra note 62.
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5. Appreciate the Extent to Which Metaphor Can Distort
Analysis
Similarly needed by policymakers is an effort to assess ADR free of the
limiting visions imposed by our own concepts of adjudication. A good deal
has been written in the past few years about the power of narrative and
symbol. Although the "call of stories" 175 undoubtedly has an influence over
our beliefs and conclusions, the impact is not uniformly positive. Efforts to
talk rationally, dispassionately, and empirically about dispute resolution
have fallen prey to the emotive power of a batch of conflicting visions
regarding conflict management and resolution. Various camps in the dispute
resolution debate have adopted these visions so strongly that they have
become reflexive and unrealistic proponents or opponents of tinkering with
the judicial system.
Among the imagery prisms governing views of adjudication is the
vision of justice as a humanist temple. Under this view, the quest for full
justice in each individual dispute is of the utmost importance to society, and
thus, demands substantial investment of public resources and a preference
for meticulously fair process, such as substantively rational and objective
consideration of the issues presented, and involved means of ensuring the
quality of adjudication. In a variant or subset of this vision, adjudication
entails considerably more than the refined resolution of disputes: it also
involves a major role for the judiciary in articulating norms of conduct. The
quest for justice becomes more than that and has aspects of a nonsectarian
morality play or deliberative effort to achieve civic virtue.
Another vision is justice as an assembly line. In this view, the main
role of courts is to furnish consistently and inexpensively an acceptable
product-final dispute resolution. The product need not be of uniformly top
quality and certainly need not be customized so long as benefits to society,
from dispute resolution, outweigh individual dissatisfaction or error costs.
Either courts or another entity might fulfill this role.
A variant of these views might employ a retailing analogy. To those
favoring finality, there may be support for "justice as a mall," in that it
argues for some degree, perhaps considerable, of contestant choice as to the
general form of disputing, but does not provide customized or high cost
dispute resolution unless the contestant is willing to invest substantial costs
through queuing and paying for full dress adjudication. To those favoring
accuracy or context-appropriate results justice is not a mall, but a boutique
in which the contestant may receive more individualized and higher caliber
dispute resolution. One alteration of this approach might see justice as a
175 See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971
(1991).
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transaction: whatever goals and format are agreed upon by the contestants
becomes by definition the favored approach and should be enforced by
society. The judicial role would be limited to questions of voluntarism and
would not seek to require more adjudicatory investment than the parties
desire merely on grounds of public interest in the outcome.
Other visions exist of justice as a bureaucracy, as an incentive
structure, or as a release valve for social pressure. The main divide in these
visions appears to be the conflict between case processing versus value
definition and norm articulation. Regardless of the correctness of either
vision, these labels can cloud assessments of ADR efforts. Furthermore, the
vision of a justice temple that attracts one adherent may repel the citizen
who desires only an assembly line of finality in its stead.
An example of the degree to which different concepts of "good"
adjudication can distort or exaggerate assessments is provided by differing
views of the activist judge. Those who subscribe to the justice as a temple
vision may be unduly hostile to any informality in adjustment of the
litigation process. A perhaps apt example for this conference is Linda
Mullenix's recent criticism of Judge Weinstein's style of judging,
particularly his flexible and innovative approaches to mass torts.
1 76
Mullenix commented, "I prefer judges in their robes, and on the bench." 177
Mullenix makes a number of sound and useful observations about the
approach of the judiciary to mass tort claims when she criticizes the
increasing settlement of such ADR claims, particularly resolution that
comes from what a critic might term "lumping" them together and
"homogenizing" them by formula into portions that may not do a very good
job of reflecting either fault or legal responsibility. Mullenix then
excessively assaults Weinstein's methods by suggesting that he has moved
from a role of innovative judging to that of philosopher king.
Although Weinstein is no stranger to controversy and is perhaps
deservedly criticized, 178 I resist the notion that his style or methods of case
17 6 See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 579 (1994) (discussing Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994)).
177 Id. at 590.
178 See, e.g., the tug and pull between Judge Weinstein and the Second Circuit on the
issue of Rule 11 sanctions in: Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, No. CI 84-0690
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Weinstein finds Rule II gives judge discretion over whether to sanction
frivolous claim and elects not to impose sanction); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Second Circuit finds Rule 11 mandates imposition of
sanction and remands for sanctioning); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.
Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Weinstein effectively "overrules" Second Circuit order that he
must impose sanction by ordering sanction of only $1,000 against commercial entity where
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disposition reflect undue zeal, hubris, or insensitivity. Rather, I see
Weinstein, along with Judge Sam Pointer in the breast implant litigation
179
and Judge Robert Mehrige in the Dalkon Shield litigation,18 0 as doing their
best to solve seemingly intractable problems for which the judicial system
was not designed. Although their methods and decisions should always be
open to free criticism, we should hesitate to assume arrogance or
illegitimacy simply because their decisions violate a particular idealized
vision of adjudication. In the absence of clear answers or established
custom, the activist judge faced with novel problems attempts to "satisfice"
through the exercise of discretion and nontraditional dispute resolution such
as sampling, settlement, use of special masters, trust funds, and the like.
6. Focus More on a Key Conflict of Values: Individualism vs.
Collectivism
Critics of judicial management, discretionary justice, and activist
judgments have a point in asserting that perhaps flexibility and individual
case management is the enemy of justice in some cases. For example,
perhaps some mass tort cases would work out better if the courts took them
as a queue of individual litigation disputes, started trying representative
cases, and left it for purely private settlement activity to devise any
alternative means of resolving the lawsuits. Perhaps every case-even every
claims found frivolous resulted in approximately $50,000 cost to defendant); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring Weinstein to impose
sanction of at least $10,000).
See also Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Facyinding at the Frontier
of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986) (criticizing Weinstein for granting summary
judgment to defendants against opt-out plaintiff's claim in Agent Orange litigation in view of
factual issues as to this particular plaintiff's exposure to dioxin and damages). In a continuing
legal education presentation that I attended in Minneapolis in 1984, Nesson was a featured
speaker and ascribed Weinstein's decision to the Judge's desire to ensure that the Agent
Orange class action "held together," requiring that opt-out claimants be discouraged from
attempting to obtain more by verdict than they could by settlement. See generally PETER
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: ToxIc DISASTERS IN THE MASS COURTS (1986) (noting
controversy but generally praising Weinstein's approach to the case); Richard L. Marcue,
Apocalypse Now?, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1267 (1988) (reviewing Schuck's book and suggesting
that classwide resolutions of mass torts may create injustice).
179 See IUndsey v. Dow Coming, No. 94-P-11558-S, No. 94-P-1558-S CIV.A., 1994
WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
180 See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989), cen. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989) (affirming district court approach).
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case within a class-deserves to be decided, by a form of decisionmaking
ADR, if not full dress litigation. Obvious possibilities, in lieu of classwide
settlement or claims tribunals, are streamlined procedures such as special
mastering; arbitrations within a class subject to judicial direction; neutral
evaluation as a precursor to either an arbitrator's or master's decision; a
presumptive, but not preclusive or punitive, schedule of benefits for
successful claimants; or limited review of the individualized assessments of
fault, causation, or damage. Although this would not be optimal dispute
resolution as we traditionally think of it, it might well be preferable to
judicially imposed or cajoled mass settlements.
One possible avenue for both those who prefer package solutions and
those who wish to see more individual determinations for those unfortunate
enough to be part of a massive litigation event is to give courts more power
to consolidate matters, and therefore to attack the threats of inconsistency
and diffusion. In mass tort cases, federal courts perhaps should be able to
bring all similar cases under federal control regardless of the normal ground
rules of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In this way, opt-out
runaway verdicts might be less likely to erode attempts at global
settlements. But without such idiosyncratic adjudication, the real story of
mass tort claims might never emerge. Ultimately, society must come to
grips with the question of whether some inefficiency and dispersion of
outcomes is the price it pays for federalism, individualism, or finality-a
question thankfully beyond the scope of this article.
7. Deal Expressly With Another Key Issue: Consent vs. Coercion
As discussed above, the recent ADR enforcement jurisprudence of the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, leaves much to be desired. Just as
the legal system should differentiate between public and private
decisionmaking, it should sometimes distinguish ADR agreements
according to the quality of consent attending those agreements. Sometimes
private new ADR is jammed down the figurative throats of individuals who
only wanted a job. On other occasions, sophisticated commercial entities
avoid arbitration where it suits their strategy and war chest. Neither seems
logical or just.
A major failing of the courts has been the inability or refusal to deal
sensitively with the question of the voluntariness of ADR, particularly new
ADR. Arbitration of employment claims, particularly employment
discrimination claims, has given many pause to question the wisdom of the
judicial solicitude for private ADR that has dominated for a decade.
Although current legal principles and doctrine provide a potential path to a
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more defensible jurisprudence of ADR enforcement, 181 this area may
require legislative intervention, an unlikely prospect in the present climate.
For the moment, it is sufficient simply to appreciate that the judiciary,
although thankfully liberated from hostility to even benign, old ADR, has
failed to police new ADR adequately. This imperfect oversight and the
potential mischief of private new ADR in some circumstances should
increase our willingness to experiment with more publicly administered
ADR.
8. Appreciate the Differing Sophistication and Power of
Disputants
In determining whether ADR should be private or public, stylized or
informal, coercive or colloquial, decisionmakers must show an appreciation
for the concrete contextual outcomes that befall different contestants and
their disputes under different ADR regimes. Private ADR loosely policed
by the courts may work fine for diamond dealers or two Fortune 500
corporations entering into a joint venture, but may be disastrous for sexual
harassment claimants appearing before an industry board.
9. Differentiate More Precisely Between ADR Methods to Better
Assess Them
Surely it is a truism that ADR methods differ in terms of their relative
mix of speed, cost, accuracy, dignity, and theory-building. This, of course,
is true in the abstract. For example, regardless of the precise nature of the
dispute, flipping a coin is probably not what most of us want for dispute
resolution of important matters. It scores high on the speed and frugality
scale, but is at best a 50-50 proposition as to accuracy and provides no
process values of dignity or guidance for future events, unless one is content
to keep flipping coins and trust that things even out over the long run. The
truism also holds when applied to particular cases. For example, a claim of
181 See Stempel, supra note 33; Stempel, supra note 62. As noted at supra note 67 and
accompanying text, the EEOC has challenged mass imposition of arbitration agreements upon
employees. The Ninth Circuit recently refused to enforce an arbitration clause against a Title
VII gender discrimination claimant. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995). Whether these episodes signal a different legal
perspective on the issue or are merely isolated reactions remains unclear. See also EEOC v.
Kidder Peabody, Peabody & Co., No. M18-304, 1992WL73344 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992)
(large investment banker or brokerage house unsuccessfully objects to EEOC investigation
into its arbitration agreement practices with employees).
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theft between two mortal enemies will probably never be successfully
resolved through mediation, but a boundary dispute between neighbors who
are friends or are at least neutral is a good candidate for mediation. The
Sander list of factors to consider remains a useful guide and has been largely
confirmed by subsequent investigation. 18 2 Consequently, any public or
private institution promoting ADR must match the ADR method to the apt
type of controversy. This need for effective matching augers in favor of a
multi-door courthouse approach. However, the need to respect individual
autonomy, even if exercised for strategic reasons, makes Sander's all-
powerful screening clerk a problematic blueprint for the multi-door
courthouse.
10. Recognize that Research Findings to Date Are Multifaceted:
Although No One Study Settles the Debate, ADR Advocates
Should Focus on the Criteria for Effective ADR that Appear to
be Emerging
A variety of diverse findings emerge from ADR research. 183 This
cautions against any hubris in suggesting any one path to dispute
resolution's apogee, or any one multiheaded institution as the panacea.
Some degree of cautious experimentation, continued study, and open-
minded, ongoing reassessment seems in order. Nonetheless, respected work
to date may suggest an emerging core of ADR "truths."
Symposium panelists Craig McEwen and E. Allan Lind, two prominent
ADR experts, were in substantial agreement in encapsulating the matter.
According to McEwen, a common finding in a variety of studies is that
disputants want the opportunity to participate in "dignified, modestly
formal proceedings" designed to declare a resolution of their
controversy. 184 Lind concurred, noting that disputants have a "strong sense
of fairness" and want their claims, and even those of their adversaries, to
182 Se supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
183 See State Justice Institute, supra note 6 (reviewing ADR research and finding large
range of findings which may or may not be context-specific).
184 Craig McEwen, Comments at Panel Discussion, Conference on Court Reform
Implications of Dispute Resolution (Mar. 31, 1995). This finding is, not surprisingly,
reflected in McEwen's own work. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, et al., Lawyers in Everyday
Life: Mediation In Divorce Practice, 28 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 149 (1994); Craig A. McEwen,
An Evaluation of the ADR Pilot Project: Final Repon (Jan. 1992); Craig A. McEwen &
Richard Maiman, The Relative Significance of Disputing Forum and Dispute Characteristics
for Outcome and Compliance, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 439 (1986); Craig A. McEwen &
Richard Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent,
18 LAw& Soc'yRnv. 11 (1984).
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receive a fair hearing. According to Lind, to be perceived as sufficiently
fair, a dispute resolution mechanism must have adequate dignity,
opportunity to be heard, benevolence (i.e., the participants must view the
process as having no hidden agenda such as aiding one side or merely
sweeping the matter away), and neutrality.18 5
I interpret both of these prominent scholars as suggesting that public,
court-connected ADR efforts should be designed largely for decision-
maldng, rather than cajoling settlement. Without doubt, some attempt at
settlement through the aid of a third party with perspective should be
attempted; therefore, what might be termed "structured initial mediation"
seems useful as a universal front line of the multi-door courthouse.
However, mediation efforts should move on and segue into a
decisionmaking mode if the parties are unwilling or unable to make
progress. McEwen essentially has suggested something like this by urging
that courts provide brief abbreviated trials or arbitrations shortly after a
claim is filed. 186 If this truncated, but not undignified or excessively casual
procedure, is unsatisfactory to the parties, the litigation option should
continue to loom on the figurative horizon. However, if McEwen and Lind
are correct, and I believe they are, an institutionalized ADR system with a
mediation-arbitration-litigation continuum is probably the optimal melding
of adjudication and ADR. It not only provides important "settlement
events"18 7 facilitating voluntary resolution, but also provides sufficient
decisionmaking procedure and authority to satisfy many litigants, 188
185 E. Allan Lind, Comments at Panel Discussion, Symposium on Court Reform
Implications of Dispute Resolution (Mar. 31, 1995). This finding is, not surprisingly,
reflected in Lind's own work. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES:
AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
(1990); Robert J. MacCoun, E. Allan Lind, Deborah R. Hensler, David L. Bryant & Patricia
A. Ebener, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE
ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988).
186 Craig McEwen, Comments at Panel Discussion, Conference on Court Reform
Implications of Dispute Resolution (Mar. 31, 1995).
187 Both McEwen and Lind noted the importance of settlement events to providing
catalysts for case resolution by the contestants. This is hardly a surprising view to those who
accept the "early and firm trial date" notion of traditional adjudicative judges. See Dayton,
supra note 156.
188 Some have suggested that more aggressive case disposition by pretrial method,
particularly grants of partial or total summary judgment, is the optimal means of screening
cases and reducing the full trial load. However, this method presents difficulties.
One fear is judicial error. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court's Shimmering iew of Swnmary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (arguing that increased drive to summary judgment
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therefore making it likely that much adjudicatory business will be resolved
without full dress trial, but retaining that option for litigants who desire it
in cases that need it.
11. Overlooking the Role and Behavior of Lawyers Leads to
Misanalysis
As many have remarked, American law, particularly legal education,
remains a cult of the judge and has been so at least since the time of famed
Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell. Although the
legal profession need not throw 150 years of tradition aside, it should at
least realize the degree to which the ADR debate, like the civil procedure
reform debate and other legal issues debates, has often proceeded as though
lawyers and lawyering were merely fixed and predictable pawns of the
system. Much as it pains me to say it, lawyers are pawns-but only to a
degree. Their available movements and options are fixed by external
factors. But lawyers also move with fluidity and resolve matters within the
parameters created by external systemic factors. Judicial reform efforts,
including ADR and litigation reform in general, must therefore not ignore
attorney behavior, but instead must seriously consider the impact of any
change on attorney behavior. This point was most directly made at the
Conference by McEwen, who observed that lawyers are like any other
human actor-they by and large respond rationally to the incentive structure
within which they operate. Consequently, lawyers will act up and increase
litigation costs, delay, and tension if it is professionally rewarding in terms
of money, power, prestige, and peer acceptance. To the extent that a system
rewards cooperation, compromise, or succinctness, lawyers will behave
accordingly. 189
results in inappropriate and erroneous application often interfering with jury trial right).
Even if one has great confidence in pretrial disposition, the work of McEwen, Lind, and
others suggests that litigants may be happier if their dispute is resolved by a decisionmaking
event, even one short of full scale trial and appeal, rather than by motion on the papers.
Furthermore, providing these mediation-evaluation-arbitration events may be less expensive
and more productive than investing great judicial resources to decide cases by motion. Even
Judge William Schwarzer, a leading proponent of summary judgment (and at times a
spectacularly unsuccessful one: see California v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. 2891
(1993); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)
(reversing Schwarzer grants of summary judgment)), has noted that learning the record,
digesting the motion and opposition, and rendering an opinion takes a great deal of time and
mental energy. William Schwarzer, Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools
Section on Civil Procedure Annual Meeting (San Francisco, Jan. 9, 1993).
189 See Craig McEwen, Remarks at Panel Discussion, Conference on Court Reform
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I summarize this important point in almost cartoon-like fashion due to
the constraints on this article's already burgeoning length (which probably
says something damning about my perception of incentive structures).
However, in determining which ADR methods to incorporate, whether to
demand their use, the order of use, and the means of challenge, the judicial
system must consider lawyer reactions to any systemic change. Some
initiatives will be self-defeating or inconsequential in the face of lawyer
response. Although there is seldom a substitute for rigorous field study, a
modicum of logical reflection on rational human behavior could go a long
way toward avoiding mistakes or missed opportunities. To the degree we
are certain of lawyer motivation and conduct, these factors counsel in favor
of more determinate dispute resolution by courts, either through traditional
adjudication or ADR, and less focus on nondispositive initiatives such as
discovery reform or increased sanctions practice. The 1983 amendment to
Rule 11 failed in large part because it paid insufficient attention to lawyer
response. The 1993 amendment to Rule 26(a) appears largely ineffective for
the same reason. 190
12. Idealized ADR Should Not Be Compared With Slipshod
Adjudication-or Vice Versa
A major failing of ADR critics has been their consistent, but unspoken
assumption that the goodness of traditional adjudication is largely beyond
debate. Just as political conservatives (Republican Sen. Phil Gramm of
Texas comes most quickly to mind) falsely pretend that all private entities
are efficient and all government programs wasteful, the legal profession's
litigation liberals (including me some of the time) falsely assume that
adjudication invariably reaches the right result, that judges are fair and
wise, that juries decide on the relevant merits, and that more rigorous
procedure invariably provides posited protections to less powerful, popular,
or politically influential litigants.
This perspective has perhaps its most graphic display in the work of
Professor Owen Fiss. Fiss's wonderful essay Against Settlement1 91 makes a
compelling and eloquent defense of adjudication and cautions against
excessive ADR boosterism (making Harvard University President Derek
Bok his foil). 192 I find myself rereading the article in times of doubt about
Implications of Dispute Resolution (Mar. 31, 1995).
190 Just as lawyers must be considered, so too must disputants. They will also respond
according to the incentive structure provided by a disputing system.
191 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See also Owen
M. Fiss, Out ofEden, 94 YALE LJ. 1669 (1985).
192 Derek Bok, A Flawed System, HARv. MAo., May-June 1983, at 38.
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being a lawyer or law teacher. 193 But without doubt, the article paints an
inaccurate picture of the litigation world. To be sure, as Fiss asserts, courts
frequently propound values and defend important rights, concepts, and
institutions. Undoubtedly, the independence and reflective rationality of
courts has protected the rights of many litigants, particularly society's most
disempowered, but deserving. But just as surely, courts have been harsh and
oppressive, arbitrary, ill-informed, and partisan. 194 When comparing ADR
(e.g., arbitration before a typical AAA panel) with adjudication before the
archetypical Fissian "good" court, most of us would prefer the court absent
some additional knowledge about the claim or the desired costs of
adjudication, although one might elect inferior but cheaper ADR for a small
claim. 195 When faced with a bad or biased judge or a hostile jury, I will
place my trust in the AAA panel any day.
Reviewing Fiss's article from time to time promotes irony as well as
inspiration. His unspoken vision of a court is something like the Supreme
Court under Earl Warren. But much adjudication today is presided over
judges closer to William Rehnquist. Depending upon one's politics and
current judicial composition, ADR can look increasingly attractive or
negative.
13. Recognize that Litigation Pathology Varies Greatly
Despite my earlier attacks on lawyer behavior and suggestion that the
system largely makes lawyers what they are, we should hesitate to adopt the
pseudo-Shakespearean view too quickly. Although many lawyers, clients,
and judges act irrationally through vexatious behavior, irrational refusals to
compromise, or instigating diverting side shows (e.g., sua sponte requests
for Rule 11 sanction motions), these are exceptions to the rule of largely
193 And I have remained in the business, although this might have as much to do with
my mortgage and wanting my kids to attend college.
194 Among those who subscribe to this view is Robert Cover, Fiss and Resnik's
casebook co-author (PROCEDURE (1988)). See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1976);
Robert M. Cover, Violence and die Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). For a w'onderfihl
overview of the differing views of this influential trio, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Metaprocedure, 98 YALE LJ. 945 (1989) (especially p. 974 in correspondence during writing
of Procedure book, Cover describes Fiss as a "romantic" because of his "faith in courts to do
justice').
195 In my estimation, most disputants elect adjudication if time and money are no object,
suggesting that adjudication may not be so bad after all. However, since time and money are
invariably considerations for disputants operating in a world of finite resources, it is not
contradictory that contestants may elect the ADR system even though there is nothing
cosmically "wrong" with the litigation system in general.
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professional, rational, and nonvindictive behavior by the system's
participants.1 96 If litigation pathology was as widespread as asserted by
some critics, the system would have ground to a halt or imploded long ago.
Although it is a mistake to ignore problems and potential for improvement,
an unrealistically negative assessment may result in more harm.
14. The 'Subsidy Question" Should Be Addressed Rather Than
Swept Under the Rug
In order to deal fairly with warring institutions, we should deal fairly
with the question of subsidized dispute processing. The conventional
wisdom, advanced by Sander and others, posits that courts are highly
subsidized since filing fees do not represent the full cost to government of
operating courts.1 97 By contrast, AAA and other ADR organizations
typically charge higher fees, often related to the amount in dispute. 19
But these arguments ignore many factors. First, large fees are often not
actually paid because the contestants have styled the matter in order to
minimize the value of the claim or make it ambiguous. Although this may
be a refreshing means of discouraging bombastic pleadings, it suggests that
private ADR organizations are not as self-supporting as assumed. AAA, for
example, also receives contributions and de facto or in kind support from
the business community.
Second, private ADR groups, whether non-profit or for-profit, receive
subsidies through tax benefits. By contrast, courts do not deduct salaries
and expenses from tax returns. In addition, private ADR has often received
quasi-subsidies in the form of active judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards with minimal scrutiny over the correctness and
legality of those outcomes. This occurs even where arbitration agreements
are ambiguous, consent is questionable, or decisionmakers have rendered
bizarre or questionable results. In essence, courts "pay" the costs of the
more elaborate but nonetheless valuable appellate system.
196 See Robel, supra note 169, at 901-04 (judges are driven more by considerations of
professionalism than personal views and desire for public acclaim).
197 See Sander, supra note 26, at 125-26; Robel, supra note 169, at 892-93.
198 See AAA, COMMERCIAL ARBrTRATION RULEs (1993) (providing for sliding scale
filing fees linked to the amount of the claim, ranging from $500 for a claim up to $10,000 to
a $5,000 filing fee for a claim of more than $1 million). See also AAA, ARBIrRATON AND
THE LAW, 264 (1991-1992). In addition to the filing fee, AAA contestants also pay arbitrators
for hearings exceeding one day in summation and pay additional administrative fees of $150
per day in single arbitrator cases and $200 per day in multiple arbitrator cases.
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15. Categorical and Formal Thinking Is Usually the Enemy of
Wise Reform
At the risk of pointing out the obvious, both proponents and opponents
of ADR must be reminded that rigid or formulaic approaches are unlikely to
be apt across a range of differing situations. Although the complexity of
modem life drives many toward reductionism, common sense suggests that
neither adjudication nor its alternatives is consistently good or bad for all
types of controversies. This was an insight of Sander's proposed multi-door
courthouse that remains worth remembering so long as it does not ignore
the value of "normal" adjudication and contestant prerogatives.
16. Prevent the Cult of the Judge From Creating Slouching
Solomons
The cult of the judge that dominates American law199 has in modem
form often glorified judicial intervention in ways outside the traditional role
of the judge as umpire presiding over adversarial presentations. 2° Some
degree of judicial proactivism and creativity, however, is undoubtedly wise.
Perhaps the best illustration of this point is Martha Minow's essay (written
while she was still a law student) noting how King Solomon played the role
of an intelligent activist judge.201 When faced with the claims of two
199 Certainly, legal education has been a cult of the judge. Nearly 150 years after
Langdell, the typical coursebook is a collection of appellate court opinions in which students
hang upon every word and attempt to dissect the opinion. In addition, the judiciary has been
given considerable regulatory authority over court rulemaking and admission to the bar.
Although much judge-bashing occurs as well, particularly in academic writings, legal
education and commentary remains largely judge-centered. To the extent that congressional-
executive-judicial tensions reflect a fundamental shift in judicial hegemony, this may be
meaningful judge-bashing. See Stempel, supra note 5, at 686-89, 720-27.
200 The notion of an interventionist, result-oriented judge (and the result sought may be
simple elimination of the case from the docket) was traditionally thought to be the creation of
liberals in the legal profession. Today, the activist judge I describe is found across the
political spectrum. Ironically, at the same time that judicial activity is probably less
constrained (but not completely unfettered: see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 277-80 ) there
appears to be a decline in what might be termed the "progressive" judicial tradition of
interpreting law and deciding cases in a manner designed to further contemporary social
values. See John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge.
Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1326-28 (1990).
201 See Martha L. Minow, 7he Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Justice, in
ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTUR OF PROCEDURE 447-464 (1979)
(discussing the famous episode of Kings 4:16-28).
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mothers each alleging maternity over a disputed baby, Solomon did not sit
passively and attempt to discern the true mother based on what trial lawyers
call "demeanor evidence" (e.g., Did one wring her hands? Did the other
perspire? Did one speak haltingly?). 202 Instead, Solomon offered to impose
a compromise by cutting the baby in half, eliciting responses that revealed
the true mother. As Minow shows, a modicum of judicial activism may
indeed be the tonic for solving a seemingly intractable dispute.203
But Minow's striking illustration should not lead judgophiles to
champion routinized departures from the traditional role. Just as not every
lawyer is Clarence Darrow, not every judge is Solomon. Without further
revisiting the debate on managerial judging, it should be sufficient to note
that there are dangers of mistake, favoritism, or lax administration of justice
when judges become managers, settlement impresarios, or active
participants in the dispute rather than reasonably detached umpires of
adjudication. 204 Although few would argue for a completely passive
202 Which suggests that Solomon knew something many lawyers and judges do not:
demeanor evidence is overrated. If Solomon had applied the conventional wisdom of less
reflective trial lawyers (and, unfortunately, many judges and jurors), he would have been
inclined to believe the nervous or halting witness, who may well have been the real mother
too upset to speak in a composed fashion. Similarly, an emotional witness telling an
unbelievable story may also sway a jury, as the acquittal of the Menendez Brothers
demonstrates. See HAzEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ JUROR
(1995) (noting juror-author's belief that Lyle Menendez's testimony of being driven to murder
his parents as a result of child abuse and fear of imminent harm from his father was feigned).
All of this may suggest that, despite our reverence for the jury system, it is incorrect to
criticize ADR measures as inferior because they place less reliance on the episodic trial arena
event. However, some form of relatively sober gathering of interested parties may be
necessary to make dispute resolution satisfactory to the litigants.
203 Note that the solution to the dispute was not a compromise.
204 See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992). See also Liteky v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1993) (reiterating traditional view that judicial opinions
formed about parties due to proper exercise of judicial function are not grounds for recusal).
See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1976) (removing district
judge from protracted case on grounds of bias) ("Judge [Miles] Lord seems to have shed the
robes of the judge and to have assumed the mantle of the advocate"). Of course, when judges
become too detached they may become agents of injustice. See COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED,
supra note 194; William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law,*
42 RECORD ASS'N BAR CITY OF N.Y. 948 (1987). For example, the removal of then-district
judge H. Lee Sarokin from the famous tobacco litigation over which he had presided for a
decade can be characterized by his defenders as occurring simply because he used intemperate
language in making a correct discovery ruling based on the record before him, an essentially
uncontroversial judicial activity that lacked the unorthodox case direction, ex parte contacts,
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judiciary calling balls and strikes (but not bothering to check for Vaseline in
the pitcher's cap), the spectre of the meddling judge who does everything
but make traditional rulings or conduct regular trials is similarly
frightening.
II. THE "RIGHT" KIND OF MuLT-DOoR COURTHOUSE:
PROMISING AVENUES FOR JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF ADR
A. Stressing the Public-Regarding Decisionmaking Potential of ADR
With these caveats in mind, the notion of a more ADRized judicial
system is not as threatening or depressing to me as it may seem to staunch
defenders of adjudication. ADR will be improved and concerns over its
accuracy and fairness mitigated if more ADR is brought under the control of
the judiciary rather than left to the private sector or blocked by defenders of
litigation. A continued role for court-connected ADR is not only wise, but
necessary if society is to avoid the dangers of privatization raised by
Weinstein. 205
Unfortunately, judicially incorporated, annexed, or administered ADR
initiatives have too frequently taken the form of efforts to encourage
settlement or resolve disputes on a mass basis or by formula. These
initiatives are often misplaced. The best type of ADR for judicial adoption
is that which provides a definitive assessment of individual claims by a
neutral. figure acting within a regime of adequate process. 2°6 It is on this
point that Judge Weinstein has sometimes been controversial and at odds
with the Second Circuit.20 7 Other judicially led efforts to engraft further
and other indicia of favoritism surrounding Judge Lord's removal from the Reserve Mining
case. For a variety of views on Judge Sarokin's removal, see Panel Discussion,
Disqualification of Judges (The Sarokin Mauer): Is It a Threat to Judicial Independence, 58
BROOK. L. REv. 1063 (1993) (Remarks of John D. Feerick, Jack B. Weinstein, Monroe H.
Freedman, Stephen Gillers, Joseph T. McLaughlin and Daniel J. Capra).
205 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 284-98.
206 See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (noting observations at Symposium
of Craig McEwen and E. Allan Lind).
207 See, e.g., In re Eastern & Southern Dists Asbestos Litigation, 129 B.R. 710, 743
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and remanded, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Joint Eastern &
Southern Dists. Asbestos Litigation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10700 (E.D.N.Y. 1993);
vacated, 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993). See also, Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 176, at 589
(Weinstein "would transform judges into legislators, community workers, ministers,
evangelists, administrative bureaucrats, and executive-branch policymakers'); Roger H.
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settlement mechanisms upon the adjudicatory system pose even more
problems. 208
Most of the judiciary's future ADR efforts should be directed toward
providing the contestants with a forum, a reaction to their claims, and a
presumptive decision rather than attempting to hammer out a settlement. If
the judicial system, including both ADR and traditional adjudication,
functions effectively, contestants will reach appropriate settlements as a
matter of course, needing only modest and traditional judicial settlement
brokering.
In short, the multi-door courthouse structure remains a useful blueprint
for courts, although not necessarily for the same reasons put forth at the
Pound Conference or including the same mechanisms as envisioned by
Sander. Of prime importance is the status of the multi-door courthouse as a
courthouse. Placing ADR mechanisms under the control of the public sector
is a worthwhile means of meeting the concerns of critics who have argued
that ADR can too easily become a kangaroo court slanted against one of the
disputants.
What these critics have not always appreciated is the degree to which
their criticisms are driven by the private control of arbitration or other ADR
methods and its mass imposition with little regard for the quality of consent
displayed by those thought likely to be on the losing end of the ADR
result. 209 Although the experience of some inferior or specialized courts
suggests a degree of favoritism for repeat players or litigants with superior
Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Ton Cases: A Dissent, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 69 (1989).
208 For example, both the adoption of the "English Rule" that the losing litigant pays the
opponent's legal fees or the amending of Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 to provide greater fee shifting to
the loser have been advocated as means of reducing court congestion and discouraging
"needless" adjudication. However, both are bad ideas. See Stempel, New Paradigm, supra
note 5, at 687-88 (observing that Bush Administration advocated "English Rule" in highly
publicized "Quayle Report" and that former Federal Judicial Center Director Judge William
Schwarzer has been an active advocate of toughened Rule 68). See also Katz, supra note 106;
G. Marc Whitehead and Robert B. MacDonald, The Truth About the "English Rule", 21
LrrOATION 3 (1995); Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-7ime to Abandon
Ship, 19 U. MicH. J. L. REV. 425 (1986).
209 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV.
81 (1992); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REv. 1, (1987); Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986) (making public-private distinction and arguing that adjudication is
distinguished by formality, visibility, and decisional rigor); Stewart Sterk, Enforceability of
Agreements to Arbitrate: An Eamination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV.
481 (1981).
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resources,210 it seems impossible that public ADR faults of this type would
rival those of private ADR forums, which at least have the potential to be
aggressively partisan. In the modem era of public skepticism about the
ability of government, 211 including court, 212 to pursue the public interest
210 See Mark Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, In
RICHARD ABEL, THE POUTICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL. I, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(1982). lazerson's case study of New York Housing Court concluded:
A legal system that encourages conciliation between landlords and tenants-two parties
of vastly unequal remsources-by curtailing the procedural rights of the weaker can only
succeed in amplifying that inequality. Procedural formality recognizes inequality and
attempts to compensate for it by making both parties conform to the same standards.
Once formality is withdrawn the courts are transformed into collection agencies
operating with the seal of the state of New York.
See generaly Galanter, supra note 131 (repeat player litigants, and, by implication, ADR
contestants, have inherent advantage of experiential knowledge, economies of scale, and
greater rapport with tribunal).
2 11 See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
YALE LJ. 1219 (1994) (reviewing history and literature of the social choice/public choice
movement and finding no basis for judicial alteration of adjudication as counterweight to
public choice influences on other branches of government); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199 (1988) (critic of public choice characterizes it as successfully
creating great cynicism about government).
212 Most of the public choice/interest group/special interest chapter of government
literature has focused on legislatures and administrative agencies. Perhaps overlooked is the
degree to which chief executives and the judiciary are subject to the same influences. If public
choice scholarship is correct and special interest politics and agenda order affect government
activity at all, then surely the judiciary is a government function vulnerable to these
influences. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public
Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123 (1989) (describing "interest group" and "Arrow's Theorem"
branches of public choice literature). Whether courts are as susceptible to these influences as
are other government activities remains an open question.
Surprisingly, few commentators have addressed this point and the unspoken
conventional wisdom posits that courts are far less vulnerable to public choice pressures
because of their comparative insulation from electoral politics. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESl,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that the institutional structure of
courts makes them appropriate arenas for making policy decisions in a fair and nonpartisan
manner); Maxwell Steams, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical
Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell Steams, The Forest and the Trees: A
Social Choice Theory of Standing (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(defending restrictive standing doctrine of Article I courts on the ground that it reduces the
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and rational social policy, suggesting greater public control of ADR may
seem folly. However, the premise for this suggestion is simply that the
public and political nature of the courts provide (all other things being
equal) greater guarantees of fairness and justice on average than do similar
dispute resolution mechanisms administered by private entities. 213 Although
special interests or a rampaging majority may corrupt the public
adjudication system, the system nonetheless is at least not established,
funded, operated, and controlled by special interests or a rampaging
majority.
In my view, the greater danger lies not from courts distorting the
market of dispute resolution choices should they more aggressively enter the
ADR business, but from allowing the courts to stand idly by as a
"marketplace" of ADR while substantial market imperfection develops.
Here, I differ from those who argue that courts should permit voluntary
arbitration and ADR, but not mandate ADR.214 Even if ADR is voluntary,
it should be supervised and guided by the courts.
In particular, court-controlled ADR should attempt to level the playing
field between:
opportunities of litigants for strategic behavior designed to reap gains from "agenda control"
via the order in which test cases are brought).
213 1 realize that many scholars currently question the very coherence of the public-
private distinction. See Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later
Disdnction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). Although I acknowledge that those who might
be termed the "new critics" of the dichotomy have a point: the distinction has historically
been overdrawn, failing to acknowledge the frequently blurred differences between public and
private. The distinction continues to hold a core of intellectual coherence and value for
analysis. Although "the people" may not always be in prudent control of governmental action,
government action is on the whole likely to serve the interests of society at large while private
regulatory agencies, whatever their merit, will have strong pressures to promote the self-
interest of the controlling group.
Furthermore, many private organizations are not subject to institutionalized mechanisms
for change. For example, elections happen on schedule (even recall is a possibility) but some
private governing bodies effectively hold control until the death of the leaders. The most
likely response of individuals to oppressive private organizations is "exit." You can always
quit the Boy Scout troop if the scoutmaster's kid routinely bullies your son at the campouts
while the scoutmaster and other leaders stand idly by. You could sue, too, I suppose, if the
bully inflicts serious damage. Arbitrating before the regional council of the organization, of
which the scoutmaster is a past president, provides a less attractive forum. "Quitting" a
private ADR arrangement is considerably more difficult than dropping out of The Boy Scouts,
a factor which supports a healthy public dispute resolution infrastructure that includes both
classic adjudication and ADR.
214 See Beristein, supra note 107.
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(a) the naive and sophisticated;
(b) the powerful and feckless;
(c) strategic players and ingenues;
(d) repeat players and one-shot players;
(e) commercial and consumer interests.
According to the conventional wisdom, lawyers should do some of this
leveling because of their essentially equivalent training and ability to invoke
aspects of the system on behalf of their clients.215 However, differing client
resources and demands, coupled with variance among counsel, make private
practitioners an imperfect equalizer, although one that has been too
frequently overlooked by critics of ADR.2 16 In both sponsoring court-
connected ADR and reviewing private ADR, the courts have some role in
balancing competing justice and efficiency interests in appropriate cases.
Consequently, my vision of the good multi-door courthouse, like
Sander's, is one in which the disputing mechanisms and techniques are
selected with the specific dispute in mind and imposed upon the contestants
rather than elected voluntarily. Although mandatory ADR, particularly
court-annexed abitration, has been criticized as adding excess cost,217 delay,
215 See Stephan Landsman, Introduction to the Adversary System, in STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVESARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 1-39 (1988).
216 See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
217 See Bernstein, supra note 107. Bernstein's assessment, based on a game theory
model of the litigation process in districts with court-annexed arbitration, is at odds with the
conclusions of scholars like McEwen and Lind and others who have studied the issue. See,
e.g., Lind, supra note 185. Bernstein's error, as I see it, is the failure of her model to account
for the behavior-directing effects of mandatory court-annexed arbitration. Bernstein assumes
that lawyers faced with mandatory court-annexed arbitration will make certain assumptions
about the value of the claim, calculate the cost of the arbitration procedure, and likely expend
more resources disputing than would be the case had they not been required to arbitrate.
Bernstein thus concludes that mandatory arbitration is just another additional hurdle that will
not add value except in cases where the stakes prompt parties to participate voluntarily. She
then concludes that voluntary arbitration is useful but mandatory arbitration is
counterproductive. She neglects to consider that the presence of the catalytic arbitration event
can: (a) focus the parties and counsel sooner than would otherwise be the case; (b) trigger risk
aversion u well as a desire to conform to social norms and be reasonable (or at least appear
reasonable); or (c) interject a detached perspective to bear on the matter. Any of these impacts
of arbitration may, apart from the game-theory modeling posited by Bernstein, prompt the
parties to settle more readily or accept a reasonable arbitration award. Many of these benefits
are lost if the court-annexed arbitration is not mandatory.
In addition, voluntary arbitration makes not only for lower usage but also a skewed
pattern of usage. The parties and lawyers who opt for voluntary arbitration may not be the
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or opportunity for strategic behavior, 218 the benefits of mandating
participation in ADR outweigh the drawbacks. The most convincing
research suggests that ADR is not likely to be sufficiently widely adapted to
serve its function unless imposed on the contestants.2 19 Lawyers trained in
the adversarial model resist overtures for voluntary ADR, fearing that the
opposition (perhaps aided by a partisan or insufficiently perceptive court)
omniscient rational utility maximizers of Bernstein's model. The entities most likely to benefit
from arbitration may forsake it due to cognitive error. Only mandated ADR can avoid this.
Other economic theoretical work about ADR has concluded that mediation can add value
irrespective of the issue of volition. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic
Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994) (suggesting the utility of compelled
participation).
218 The ADR literature has largely overlooked the troubling possibility that nonfinal,
nonbinding disputing events such as mediation and arbitration can give less scrupulous
contestants the opportunity to revise and polish their versions of events in order to falsely
obtain a better ultimate result at trial.
For example, if a mediator reacts negatively to certain information, the party is likely to
revise or eliminate the presentation of that information at trial, and so on. Similarly, the
dramatic cross-examination at the arbitration that reveals a key defense witness to be a liar
will probably not occur a second time at trial since the witness now knows how to couch
negative aspects of his testimony in ambiguity and avoid being positioned to answer directly a
hurtful question.
Because of this danger, it is important that a record be kept of all ADR events and that
this record be available for presentation at subsequent ADR events or trial. An arbitrator,
evaluator, or judge may wish to limit the use of this record to only compelling circumstances
but it should be available to keep disputants "honest."
219 Lind, supra note 185. See also ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS (1992); BARBARA MEIERHOEFER,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTICT COURTS (1990); E. ALLAN LIND,
ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (1990); BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA (1989); Joshua Rosenberg et al.,
Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings and Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1992);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study In
Comnunity Mediation, 81 KY. L.J. 855 (1993); Uloyd Burton et al., Mandatory Arbitration in
Colorado: An Initial Look at a Privatized ADR Program, 14 JUS. SYS. J. 183 (1991); John
Barkai and Gene Kassebaum, Pushing the Limits on Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Hawaii
Erpeuernce, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 133 (1991); Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of
Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 119 (1991); Roger
Hanson et al., Court-Annexed Arbitration: Lessons from the Field, 15 STATE COURT J. 4 (Fail
1991); Craig Boersema et al., State Court-Annexed Arbitration: What Do Attorneys Think?, 75
JUDICATURE (June-July 1991).
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will take advantage of them.220 But when forced to utilize arbitration, early
neutral evaluation, or similar devices, lawyers and clients seem substantially
satisfied with the process and the outcome. 22 1 Although the critics of
mandatory ADR raise important concerns, their misgivings to date are based
largely on anecdote, hunch, or modeling errors. 22
This is not to suggest that the judiciary acquire, co-opt, or eliminate
private ADR. Quite the contrary, private ADR should continue to play an
important role. But private ADR should largely be the domain of situations
in which the contestants have adequately consented to the forum2B or in
which the contestant upon whom constructive or formalistic consent is
imposed objectively and demonstrably receives something of value in return
for submitting to the private ADR forum. 224 For the most part, "old" ADR
220 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ELr AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (noting common errors of reasoning based on misperceptions);
Sunatein, supra note 172, at 1164-66 (noting that "myopia" and pre-existing frames of
reference may prompt persons to voluntarily make objectively unwise decisions).
221 See sources cited supra notes 184-88.
222 See supra notes 218 and 219.
223 For example, predispute arbitration agreements could receive far more scrutiny than
they do from courts according to the consent dimension. See Stempel, supra note 33.
224 Proponents of private ADR have long theorized that its use by commercial actors
will enable consumers to receive value from lower prices occasioned by the vendor's lowering
of prospective disputing costs due to use and enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements. Prof. Kenneth Scott so testified as an expert witness for BankAmerica in the
Badie v. BankAmerica litigation (see supra note 68) challenging the Bank's use of arbitration
clauses for consumer credit accounts. See Hal Davis, Banks Follow Brokerages: Arbitrate Yes,
Litigate No, NAT'LLJ., Sept. 12, 1994, at B1, B3.
However, there is a notable absence of any evidence tending to confirm either (a) that
mass privatized arbitration really lowers corporate disputing expenses (although American
business clearly believes it does) or (b) that any savings generated by lowered disputing costs
are passed on to consumers. Arbitration has been the norm regarding securities trading
disputes since the McMahon decision of 1987 and the Rodriguez decision of 1989. However,
there is no visible reduction in brokerage expenses as a result. See Poser, supra note 66.
Similarly, BankAmerica's credit cards appear to be charging fees and interest equal to that
levied before the Badle decision (see supra note 68) permitted it to impose customer-wide
arbitration.
It may be true that
[t]he idea that a contract has to be completely consensual and knowing is a 19th century
concept. There's nothing illicit about it simply because it's non-consensual. Sure there's
an imbalance of power, but we enter into adhesionary contracts of law all the time. You
sign it without reading it. Commerce would grind to a halt if such contracts were
forbidden.
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situations continue to be appropriate contexts for the use and enforcement of
private ADR. However, a substantial portion of the "new" ADR should
probably be brought under the wing of judicial ADR operations or,
alternatively, subjected to increasing judicial scrutiny of private new ADR
outcomes. 22
Prof. Alan Rau, quoted in Davis, supra, at B3 regarding the Badie case.
Rau's observation is generally correct, although one can argue that the forum and means
of resolving disputes is an aspect of contracting that requires greater solicitude for consent.
See Stenpel, A Be er Approach to Arbtrabiliay, supra note 33 (arguing that law should
enforce adhesive arbitration clauses if they are adequately displayed and explained and are not
unconscionable but should refuse to enforce oppressive, hidden, or deceptive arbitration form
agreements). But the implicit premise of Rau, Scott, and others defending mass form
arbitration contracting is that the contract as a whole provides some significant value and
would not be offered in its current form without the arbitration clause. Beyond this, we may
want to demand substantial value or compelling circumstances before permitting entities to
require arbitration as a prerequisite to entering into even obviously valuable contracts such as
employment agreements. See Stempel, Slaaaory Vision, supra note 62, at 299-302
(discussing growth of mandatory arbitration clauses in job contracts).
225 For example, Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides for only the most
deferential review of arbitration awards, providing an arbitration award may be vacated or
modified in certain situations:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their power, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the courts may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
Courts have narrowly interpreted this already narrow list of grounds for disturbing an
arbitration result. For example, a party "tricked" into signing a bill of lading with an
arbitration clause can not challenge an arbitration award on grounds of fraud. The party must
present a defense of fraudulent inducement to the arbitrator, who then implicitly rejects the
defense if the arbitrator renders an award against the party. The award itself ia not 'procured
by fraud" unless the victorious party bribed the arbitrator or something similar. See Stempel,
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B. Updating and Modifying the Sander Model
Although my vision of the multi-door courthouse, like Sander's, leaves
disputants with no prerogative to refuse assignment to a "nonadjudication"
door, it retains more room for voluntarism and repetition than does
Sander's. The Sander courthouse was to have a "screening clerk" who made
firm decisions as to which door the incoming dispute must next enter. This
construct needs several modifications.
supra note 33, at 1397-1402. See also Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1984) (taking a narrow view of "bias" under Section 10).
Awards that clearly exceed the scope of the matter submitted to arbitration have run
afoul of Section 10(d). See, e.g., Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers,
Inc., 639 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981).
Some decisions also support a "manifest disregard of law" ground for vacating awards in
cases where the arbitrator did not merely err in applying law but expressly refused to apply
concededly controlling law. See, e.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (11th Cir. 1990); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 420 v.
Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1985). Even these mildly interventionist
cases may exceed the court's power of review under the statute.
When dealing with labor arbitration, the courts are if anything more deferential. See
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(labor arbitrator's award will be affirmed if it "draws its essence from the contract," an
embarrassingly ambiguous phrase I interpret to mean that the only standard of review is based
on the scope of the award). See also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29 (1987) (striking down court interference with labor award on public policy grounds
but providing that in some limited circumstances other statutory directives could compel the
court to vacate labor arbitration); Lewis Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the
Scope of Judicial Review, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 267 (1980) (despite seemingly narrow directive
of Enterprise Wheel, reviewing courts frequently do explore the merits of arbitral
interpretation); Mark W. Lee, Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining
the Standard of Review, 11 WM. MITCHm.L L. REV. 993 (1985) (arguing that Enterprise
Wheel standard should be replaced by Section 10 for labor arbitration awards).
In view of the burgeoning use of new ADR, greater merits-based review of mass-
imposed arbitration agreements is in order. This preferably would occur through amendment
of Section 10 to expressly expand the court's power of policing these arbitration awards.
However, if faced with congressional inaction, a legitimate but expansive re-interpretation of
Section 10 could provide for expanded review is permissible "activist" judging. See, e.g.,
WilliAM N. ESKRIDOB, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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1. The Intake Process
First, the "screening clerk" should be upgraded to a judicial officer of
substantial training and discretion. The state courts that have implemented
multi-door programs have already done this to some degree in that the
director of the program is a professional with staff that appears to have
considerable education and training beyond that normally required of
courthouse "digit" clerks who administer the case files. 226 I, however,
would rachet up the personnel component further. The courthouse
employees actually presiding over the intake of specific cases and making
particular decisions regarding the path of the dispute should be lawyers with
training and background substantially similar to that of United States
Magistrates. Although it is not essential that these "Intake Magistrates"
have a J.D., it seems highly desirable in view of the importance of the
intake and direction function of the multi-door courthouse.227 At the risk of
asserting lawyer chauvinism, it seems undeniable to me that, on average,
lawyers will do a better job of evaluating legal disputes than non-
lawyers. 228 Lawyers will have a better feel for the substantive, procedural,
tactical, and professional issues at work in various disputes. As a result,
they will understand the dispute processes from the insider's perspective of
226 See Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door
Courhouse, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 577 (1988) (describing District of Columbia program and
staffing).
227 Selection of an agenda is often as important as the decision about the agenda itself.
See Stearns, The Forest and the Trees, supra note 212 (discussing Arrow's Theorem
regarding agenda control and voting cycling and applying it to constitutional standing
doctrine, concluding that restrictive standing doctrine is important means minimizing degree to
which doctrine evolves because of order in which cases are presented).
In my view, this explains the generally cold reception Justice Stevens received when he
suggested that a national court be established solely to rule on petitions for certiorari. See
Curtis J. Sitomer, U.S. Chief Justice Outlines Ideas to Ease Court's Caseload, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONIToR, Feb. 7, 1983, at 4; BNA, Justices Are Split Over Proposal to Revise Court's
Jurisdiction, 43 ANTiTRusT & TRADE REa. RFrR. 535, Sept. 23, 1982 (Stevens' proposal
publicly criticized by Justice Brennan).
Quick and strong opposition to this notion of a gatekeeper to the Supreme Court
reflected the profession's view that such a court might be as powerful as the better understood
and scrutinized Supreme Court itself.
228 See William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal
Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1, 4 (quoting Georges Clemenceau's famous dictum "war is too
important to be left to the generals," a saying that should be modified by adding the word
"entirely"); see also Stempel, New Paradigm, supra note 5, at 755.
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having participated in these mechanisms.2 9 Similarly, these court officers
should ideally have actual experience practicing law or working in an ADR
organization or court. However, the resume requirements for this job need
not be too rigid.230
Second, although the "Intake Magistrate" should have the authority to
require participation in selected procedures, contestants upon intake should
be required to engage in a short discussion of apt alternatives in light of the
instant ease. 23 1 This could be done by telephone conference with counsel
(although some degree of party participation might sharpen the focus and at
least explore whether early settlement is an option). The parties would then
have a short period of time (e.g., 30 days) for consultation with counsel and
to select a preferred ADR option (e.g., mediation, arbitration, evaluation,
or a hybrid), including of course the opportunity to exit the judicial system
in favor of immediate settlement or private ADR. The Intake Magistrate
would not be required to defer to the parties' request or decide between
competing proposals, but would be allowed to order a course of action
suggested by a party. The Intake Magistrate would be similarly empowered
to require the parties to participate in an ADR device of the court's
choosing. 23 2
After this "open enrollment" period of sorts has passed, the Intake
229 Surely this is true for litigation, and almost certainly true regarding arbitration and
many ADR hybrids. Intake Magistrates and others in the multi-door courthouse may, of
course, need specific training regarding ADR methods with which they are less familiar.
Mediation, in particular, may be a process not experienced by many lawyers who would
otherwise make excellent Intake Magistrates.
230 For example, a court should be able to hire a recent judicial clerk or perhaps even a
recent law graduate as an Intake Magistrate under exceptional circumstances (a really stellar
candidate might be worth selecting even absent practice experience), although it might provide
too much callow youth for the task and some problems of litigant satisfaction (the contestants
may be happier iftheir case is processed by an older, more experienced person).
231 Although not detailed in Sander's article, this appears to be the prescribed or
informal practice of actual multi-door courthouses. See Kessler and Finkelstein, supra note
226.
232 This includes summary jury trial. Although many of the concerns expressed about
summary jury trial merit concern and continued study, it and other ADR techniques should be
at the court's disposal. This means that courts (including judicial officers of less than Article
I rank) should be able to compel litigants to participate in any one ADR device or series of
devices if the court thinks it useful. Although courts may err, the risk of ADR error seems no
greater in frequency or magnitude than the risks of procedural and substantive error that
courts take on in the ordinary course of business. See Richard A. Posner, The Swnmary Jury
Tal and Other Metods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986).
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Magistrate would select a party's proffered path or assign the matter as the
Intake Magistrate sees fit. This selection would be subject to a limited right
of appeal to a judge assigned to preside over this aspect of the court's
caseload. The norm would be assignment to an ADR technique offered by
the court, or perhaps even a ladder of ADR wings where the case
circumstances suggest it or where there are significant social interests in
avoiding full dress trial.
For example, under one scenario, a case might be slated for mediation.
If mediation does not work, arbitration is next. If this fails to produce an
acceptable result or prompt an accord, the parties may be required to
participate in a summary jury trial. If the case continues to remain ADR-
intractable, the matter would be slated for full scale adjudication (most
likely with an opportunity for further discovery than was permitted during
any of the ADR phases of the matter). At any point in the proceedings, a
party may make any of the currently available nondiscovery pretrial motions
(e.g., for judgment as a matter of law, venue transfer, dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction), but the court would be free to defer decision on these in favor
of permitting ADR.
2. Information Exposure
Thus, a third difference between my suggested courthouse and the
Sander approach is the availability of traditional aspects of pretrial
litigation, including some early discovery (but discovery that can be limited
by the presiding judicial official in the interests of applying an ADR method
early in the process prior to the expenditure of great resources by the
parties) as well as entertainment of pretrial motions that affect both
nondispositive and dispositive issues in the case. For example, the Intake
Magistrate may require basic but modest discovery by both sides in order to
determine which ADR method to require. The discovery may even aid in
prompting the Magistrate to slate the controversy for a more dispositive
resolution. For example, the facts may suggest that ADR efforts will be
futile, but that the conflict hinges on a narrow matter that can be decided in
a one-day trial or by an Article III judge's decision on a substantive legal
point.
All of the activity at intake and along the ADR capillaries of this
reconstituted judicial corpus would be presided over by judicial officers
with education, training, and experience roughly equivalent to that of the
Intake Magistrate. There would be some obvious differences, of course. For
example, the mediators would have a purer mediation background than the
arbitrators, while the Intake Magistrates would possess an educated general
knowledge and presumably have greater experience and comprehensive
expertise than many of the ADR Magistrates (e.g., Mediation Magistrates,
[Vol. 11:2 1996]
JUDICIAL ADR AND THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE
Evaluation Magistrates, Mini-Trial Magistrates, Discovery and Pretrial
Magistrates).
3. Staffing the Multi-door Courthouse
A seemingly intractable concern is the degree to which the judicial
officers should be court employees, volunteers, or independent contractors.
To date, most courts have used volunteers as their judicial adjuncts for
ADR.233 Although this approach certainly is defensible, 234 I would prefer
that ADR Magistrates be full-time judicial personnel subject to the
selection, training, control and evaluation of the court. Also, they should
receive sufficient compensation and benefits so as to attract society's most
able lawyers for the task. Use of volunteers or independent contractors
presents the opportunity to obtain ADR presiders who would not be willing
to become full-time government employees. The AAA has used this
approach for years, and often has arbitrators who are corporate CEOs and
name partners in prestigious law firms to preside over claims. But, in many
instances, reliance on volunteers brings forth a calvacade of professionals
who simply are not very busy, perhaps for a reason. In addition, the range
of quality and control over volunteers is too large for comfort. 23 5 Because
233 See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1487 (1994) (early neutral evaluators in Northern
District of California are volunteers); Kessler and Finkelstein, supra note 226, at 581-82
(mediators and settlement moderators in D.C. Superior Court are volunteers); CJRA Delay
and Expense Reduction Plan for the Eastern District of New York (Edwin J. Wesley, Rptr)
(Dec. 1993) (evaluators and mediators used for ADR are volunteers). The general practice for
court-annexed arbitration has been to provide modest payment to the arbitrators. The pay is
thought useful for prompting arbitrators to take their responsibilities seriously but the
participation is also considered a pro bono activity of sorts. See BARBARA MEIERHOFER,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990); Raymond J. Broderick,
Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983).
For an example of judicial opposition to court-annexed arbitration and other court-
connected ADR, see G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing Values: A Comment on
Judge Parker's Reformation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. REv. 1935
(1993).
234 It appears to have worked well in Florida, which has mandatory mediation and
utilizes certified volunteer mediators. See Sharon Press, Building And Maintaining A Statewide
Mediation Program: A View From the Field, 81 KY. LJ. 1029 (1993); James J. Alfini,
Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This The End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 47, 48-59 (1991) (describing Florida program).
235 It is large with respect to full-time employees as well. But an employer generally has
more opportunity and incentive for training, supervising, and evaluating employees than it
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the competence of individual ADR officers is so important to the success of
any ADR mechanism 23 6 (just as the quality of the judge is crucial to the
quality of adjudicative outcomes), a serious attempt to provide court-
connected ADR requires a commitment to staffing it with employees and
providing the requisite fiscal support. Some ADR advocates have been
hesitant on this point largely because ADR has been "sold" (or
"oversold") 23 7 as a means of reducing court costs. A good deal of evidence
suggests that ADR may not reduce total disputing costs.238 Providing high-
quality, court-connected ADR is unlikely to reduce the costs of judicial
administration, even if volunteers are utilized. Indeed, using volunteers or
contractors may be only slightly less expensive than using court-employed
ADR Magistrates. Use of volunteers requires substantial written materials,
training courses, and supervision by a staff of professionals. 23 9 When all the
costs are finally and thoroughly counted, the gap between a volunteer
program and one of full-time, professional judicial officers may be
sufficiently narrow to remove cost considerations as a basis for selecting a
less desirable staffing method.
4. Quality Control
A fourth distinction between the Sander approach and my proposal is
what I loosely term "appellate review." The contestants should have an
opportunity to challenge the ADR directions of the Intake Magistrate.
Something akin to the final order rule240 and its rare but important
exceptions 24 1 should govern administration of a challenge. However, the
does for volunteers.
236 See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 233.
237 Chief Judge Thomas Griesa (S.D.N.Y.) speaking to a meeting of the Committee on
Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June, 1992).
238 See State Justice Institute, supra note 6 (reviewing studies).
239 See Kessler & Finkelstein, supra note 226, at 586-87 (describing orientation and
oversight of ADR volunteers).
240 The final order rule provides that aggrieved litigants may ordinarily appeal a ruling
only after final judgment of the controversy. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1994 & Supp. 1995);
Liberty Mutual I=. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
241 By statute, district courts may certify doubtful and controlling questions for appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995). In addition, courts may designate a
sufficiently concrete and settled aspect of a case final for purposes of review. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b).
Orders that conclusively determine the rights of a litigant (as well as nonparties) separate
from the merits of the case are reviewable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1977); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
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quasi-injunctive nature of mandatory participation in court-connected
ADR24 2 suggests that review should be accorded somewhat more liberally
than review on the merits. In Federal court, contestants who disagree with
the initial or subsequent case processing orders of the court (as rendered by
Intake Magistrates, Mediators, Evaluators, Arbitrators, or others) should be
permitted to file objections with either a "full scale" Article I Magistrate (if
the generalist magistrate position continues to exist in the multi-door
courthouse of the future) or an Article III trial judge.
The nature of review would fall somewhere between the extraordinary
events of mandamus and ordinary appeals (where reversals occur
approximately 40 percent of the time).2 43 The reviewing judge would
examine challenges to ADR directives looking (but not painstakingly
searching) for a clear abuse of discretion or the imposition of serious
inconvenience or expense that is not likely to move the dispute toward
resolution. All ADR activities would be nonbinding, at least unless a
constitutional amendment were to change current rights of due process and
jury trial. Consequently, each litigant retains the right to move toward full
scale trial of a dispute so long as it does not forfeit that right by refusing to
follow court orders regarding ADR (and, for that matter, discovery or other
pretrial orders).
5. Utilizing the Fruits of ADR in Adjudication
The ultimate availability of trial not only insulates ADR from
constitutional infirmity,244 but also permits judges to give ADR processing
decisions reduced scrutiny as compared to the degree of review required of
substantive rulings, dispositive orders, and judgments. 24 5 Parties unhappy
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Erroneous orders that exceed the court's jurisdiction may be
challenged by mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994 & Supp. 1995); La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
242 Injunctive orders are considered sufficiently final as to be immediately appealable
because they are difficult to review and correct after final judgment on the entire case since
they require or constrain the parties' conduct during the pendency of the case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
243 See Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing
In State Supreme ourts, 1870-1970, 21 L. & Soc'Y Rsv. 403 (1987).
244 See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. Pa. 1979); Davis v.
Gaona, 396 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1990); Firelock, Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo.
1989).
245 Yes, I know that procedural events effect substantive outcomes. I am a civil
procedure teacher, after all. But, although the line is blurry and elastic, there is a basic
distinction between procedure and substance. Generally speaking, substance is more
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with the ADR outcome can obtain trial de novo - complete retrial of the
matter-as though the ADR (usually court-annexed arbitration) had never
occurred. As much as we need continued adjudicatory capacity and the
backstop of adjudication to make ADR work, we do not need to be quite so
skittish about permitting the fruits of ADR to be used in subsequent
adjudication. In particular, I propose that, in any subsequent adjudicative
proceedings, litigants be permitted to present evidence regarding the ADR
events and results. Although there is, of course, the potential for prejudice,
judges and juries should know what occurred in the arbitration or mediation
that preceded the trial.
This suggestion will undoubtedly horrify more than a few in the legal
profession. But it is worth taking. First, although it would not help a
defendant that the jury knew that an arbitration panel thought the defendant
owed the plaintiff a million dollars, this fact would not be unfairly
prejudicial. The finding would be the result of a court-connected, public
process2  presided over by a court officer and subject to court supervision.
If this process is so inherently unfair that it produces outcomes which must
be shielded from jurors, it is sufficiently unfair that it should be scrapped
altogether.
A less controversial aspect of my suggestion involves maintaining a full
record of decision-directed ADR proceedings and permitting litigants to
utilize that record at trial. The most obvious application would be use of a
testimonial transcript from an arbitration hearing or summary jury trial to
impeach a witness at the "real" trial. This would encourage counsel and
important. I am all for due process, but given the choice between wonderful process and
horrible substance or poor process and wonderful substance, I take the latter. For example, a
fair hearing is of relatively little use if you can be forced to undergo the hearing because you
criticized the President, drank a beer, painted your house a certain color, bought stock in a
start-up company, rented a car, or decided to become a lawyer. If these and similar rights are
protected by even pretty slipshod process, most of us are satisfied. At some point, of course, a
procedural system can be so bad that procedure is substance, negating even good substantive
law (or the ostensibly good substantive law on the books; consider the constitutions of
totalitarian countries, which never in practice provide the freedoms outlined in the document).
Most of us would not want an adjudicator who routinely conferred er pane with government
prosecutors to decide free expression cases or who flipped a coin in contract disputes. ADR
critics have raised many issues worth reflection, but no one has made the case that any
standard form of ADR is sufficiently deficient that it routinely undermines substantive law-so
long as the adjudication option remains and is not made prohibited through imposition of
costly or exhausting ADR participation that exceeds the stakes of the dispute.
246 Court-connected ADR events other than the conferences and mediation should
generally be public absent stipulation of the parties approved by the court (by a Magistrate,
Article M judge, or court order).
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contestants to avoid chameleon-like litigation tactics24 7 or using ADR
simply as a means of testing and polishing its presentation for litigation. 24 8
The precise contours of record-keeping and disclosure to the
adjudicator are difficult to draw in the abstract. For example, should
records be kept of some mediation discussions so that representations by the
parties are available for use at trial? Should mediation offers and rejections
be admissible? Although the conventional wisdom is that settlement
discussions are confidential, 24 9 a different rule should perhaps obtain for at
least the more formal aspects of mediation (mediator discussions with
individual contestants would remain confidential). Although mediation
implies an effort at settlement, it is a more public, formal, and substantive
event than private settlement negotiations. To the extent that the mediator
must act in order to compensate for power imbalances and other problems
(an issue discussed at greater length below), mediation becomes quasi-
adjudicatory. Just as transcripts are kept of a judge's conference at sidebar,
mediation meetings should probably be recorded and available for
subsequent use if the mediation does not produce a final result.
In addition, the contestants' rejections of settlement and perhaps their
concessions regarding settlement should, perhaps, be admissible in
subsequent proceedings (including arbitration as well as trial). This is, of
course, counter to the conventional wisdom, which posits that a contestant's
settlement position is not the business of the jury and, perhaps, not of the
judge. Although the evolution of the judiciary from deciding cases toward
attempting to force settlement of them has rightly been criticized, that
evolution entails a different issue (the apt role of judges) than does the
matter of allowing the court to have and use settlement-related information.
Admitting settlement information raises the issue of whether the information
is sufficiently relevant so that it will permit better adjudicative decisions and
encourage fair resolution of the matter. Despite the confidentiality
traditionally accorded settlement matters, it increasingly seems that a
decisionmaker gains valuable knowledge by knowing what a party
247 See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank, Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362-63, (7th Cir.
1990) (discuuing "mend the hold" doctrine which, under certain circumstances, prevents a
party from changing its litigation position regarding contested matters).
248 See supra notes 154-163 and accompanying text (discussing opportunities for
contestants and counsel to use ADR to learn to present a better, but false, face to
adjudicators). There is, of course, nothing wrong with a lawyer who tries to learn from the
arbitration hearing in order to better represent the client at trial. But where the attempt to "go
to school* from ADR is solely tactical and not bounded by fidelity to the actual facts of the
case, a lawyer uses ADR unscrupulously.
249 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 608 (providing that statements made in settlement
discussions are inadmissible).
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demanded in settlement or rejected as a proposed resolution. This
information may indicate the party's own valuation of the claim, its
reasonableness, or appropriate remedies. Although there are obvious
dangers of bias or misinterpretation, this exists for any data subject to the
adjudication process. 250  Perhaps the value of the ADR-generated
information will outweigh the danger of misinterpretation. It at least seems
worth a try.
Like Sander, I accept the notion that the Seventh Amendment and its
state counterparts limit the power of the judiciary (or legislature or
executive) to substitute ADR for adjudication against the will of a
contestant. Unlike Sander, however, I do not see this as either cause for
dismay or a major impediment to an effective multi-door courthouse.
Despite being a defender of the jury system, I see some desirability in at
least experimenting with different means of conducting jury trials and
presenting cases. Despite the occasional horror stories of jury error, it
would be a mistake to scapegoat the jury for failure to improve or
streamline judicial dispute resolution. Judges and ADR officers (public and
private) also make mistakes. In reality, jury trials are not as cumbersome,
slow, or expensive as commonly believed. More important, an effective
sequence of ADR events will likely restrict the demand for jury trials to the
cases in which they are most useful, as well as focus the case on matters in
which jury input is most valuable.
The multi-door courthouse I envision is one in which things move
quickly while still allowing for effective information gathering and
sufficient opportunity for counsel to prepare a case for optimal presentation.
Too much speed in the process may not allow the parties the opportunity to
have meaningful settlement talks. However, settlement-directed ADR, such
as the initial conference and mediation, should generally take place earlier
rather than later. Many mediation programs for small cases arrange this for
the day of trial. However, it may be worthwhile for many cases (large and
small) to hold serious conference or a brief mediation early in the
litigation. 251 Preparing even small cases for trial results in the expenditure
250 One of my favorite stories in this regard is one told by Judge Rya Zobel (D. Mass.),
the current Director of the Federal Judicial Center, when she was presiding over a trial
competition that I attended while in law school (in New Haven, March 1981). Judge Zobel
recalled how her father once successfully objected to keep a government report out of
evidence in a case of alleged arson. Shocked by the subsequent result of conviction, he
inquired of the jurors, who stated that they believed the excluded document was a confession.
So much for the value of firewalls between juries and prejudicial evidence. Although a motion
in limine may have cured thia particular problem, juries faced with information gaps may
make similarly erroneous assumptions.
251 See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text (suggesting that specific disputing
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of resources. Cumulatively, this probably amounts to a large enough sum to
justify earlier but abbreviated settlement efforts for even small cases.
Multi-door courthouse intake and ADR proceedings should be largely
informal as the parties and counsel deal with assignment officers, mediators,
arbitrators, or other ADR personnel. To protect against the dangers of
informality, conferences and calls may need to be transcribed in some
manner so as to create a record for review. The intake and subsequent ADR
that I propose would take place rapidly. The system would be designed to
deliver more quickly to the disputants a satisfactory opportunity to be heard
on their claims. This would include frequent resort to decision-directed
ADR and a conscious attempt not to expend excessive resources on
settlement-directed ADR. For example, mediators would move with finesse,
but would not spin metaphorical wheels on a case in which no compromise
is available. Arbitrators and other ADR officers would move quickly with
streamlined discovery, procedure, and documentation (since any mistakes
would largely be subject to judicial correction).
6. Authority and Discretion in ADR
Two aspects of this proposed dispute resolution workshop bear
emphasis. First, the Intake Magistrate would have authority to order good
faith participation in ADR (directed to either settlement or decision) subject
to the review described above. Second, the court officers presiding over
ADR would not be fixed in their primary roles. Mediators would be
permitted to exercise discretion and judgment in determining when they
must act to control an abusive or unfocused contestant and when to segue
from listening to the contestants and seeking voluntary resolution to
delivering either a formal or informal early neutral evaluation. Similarly,
arbitrators could decide a key point and then give the parties the remainder
of the day to discuss settlement in light of the ruling, or could provide the
parties with the rationale for the decision. This would possibly aid their
determination of whether to seek trial de novo. The history of ADR,
particularly private arbitration, has been to say as little as possible in order
to insulate outcomes from reversal and to prevent public knowledge of
private squabbles. This ethos is probably misplaced, or at least overdone, in
the context of court-connected ADR in which ADR events have the
potential to be part of a decisionmaking stream involving a continuum of
settlement opportunities and decisions, as well as ultimate adjudication and
appeal.
Expanded use of court-connected ADR presents a classic problem of
agency costs. To the extent that the ADR Magistrates or other court officers
events provide catalysts for settlement).
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are closely scripted and confined to more narrow roles (e.g., mediators that
just listen and work toward voluntary settlement with minimal editorializing
rather than make pronouncements or decisions), the chances of error and the
possibility of imposing "involuntary," court-opposed results are reduced.
To the extent that ADR officers have more discretion, they have more
opportunity to resolve matters creatively and expeditiously (e.g., the
mediator asks the parties to stipulate to be bound by her assessment, they
agree, and she renders a binding decision). 252 Discretion poses danger but
also more opportunity for gain. Because the skill of the person presiding
over ADR is a key factor in the success of and contestant satisfaction with
ADR,253 more discretion should be accorded to the public ADR officer. If
the ADR officer is incompetent, the results will be dreadful (even if his role
is circumscribed). If he is good, discretion will only make ADR outcomes
better on the whole. If discretion is abused, judicial review remains.
If properly structured and staffed, the posited multi-door courthouse
would channel disputes based upon individual case characteristics.
However, the broad patterns of case routing would probably parallel the
conventional wisdom regarding the categories of disputes most apt for
different ADR methods. Where the parties have a genuine interest in
maintaining a relationship, some attempt at a less adversarial and finite
resolution is in order (e.g., an early settlement conference, mediation, or
evaluation). Where the substantive legal outcome is unclear and has
significant zero-sum traits, flexible ADR efforts of this type should also
probably be attempted. Where the dispute is between strangers or enemies
and hinges on a clear determination of fact or law, the ADR effort should
be aimed at a principled decision, such as arbitration, that will likely be
sufficiently acceptable to obviate the need for trial or streamline the actual
trial. Where the parties simply lack sufficient perspective on the merits,
early neutral evaluation may be the answer. Where the controversy is
complex or the stakes large, a summary jury trial may be worth its
investment in time and effort (to avoid a multi-month trial or to convince
the contestants that full-dress trial is not worth the extra effort in view of
the odds). Where matters are more complex, implicate important values, or
hold potential precedential importance, the multi-door courthouse should
invest in ADR only if it brings a quick, negotiated resolution. In such a
situation, it should aim directly for adjudicative resolution without
252 Of course, this should be subject to review should one of the contestants feel it was
coerced into the arrangement or defrauded by the arrangement.
253 See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 233, at 1530-35 (noting that satisfaction of
participants in Northern District of California ENE program was most correlated to the skill of
the Evaluator even though there was wide variation in the manner in which evaluators
discharged their duties).
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intermediate efforts at decision-making ADR such as arbitration.
C. Issues of Power and Coercion in Litigation
Questions of role, intervention, activism, and evaluation are perhaps
most pointed in the controversy surrounding the utility and apt deployment
of mediation in domestic relations matters. Originally, mediation of
divorce, support, property division, and child custody matters was first
greeted as a welcome change from the bitterness often attending traditional
litigation of these matters.25 In the past decade, however, many have
challenged mediation in this context as stacking the deck against women, or
at least reducing the procedural protections that they receive in traditional
litigation.255 The feminist criticism of mediation parallels the poverty
lawyers' criticism of small claims court:256 a less formal proceeding
designed to result in settlement rather than a rational public judgment of the
facts and law inherently advantages the contestants with more financial
resources and bargaining power (usually the husbands). Where there has
been physical abuse or other mistreatment of the wife, the problem is
exacerbated.
These are most serious concerns and require any court-connected ADR
system to respond. Although some of the concern may be overstated and
based on anecdote, courts have responded in apt ways. For example, the
District of Columbia multi-door courthouse does not route domestic cases to
mediation if there has been violence or abuse. 25 7 In addition, the well-
trained court employee mediators I propose will presumably be very
competent. This competence, training, continued supervision, and
evaluation increases the odds that mediators will recognize the power
2M For example, the notions of no-fault divorce and equitable distribution were initially
thought to lower the level of acrimony attendant to the dissolution of marriage, and to better
reflect contemporary attitudes about gender equality and roles. Subsequent research has
suggested that both measures may have harmed women. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621 (1991).
25S See, e.g., MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REAiT OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (arguing that mediation has bias in favor of shared
custody that disadvantages women); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation
and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (contending that mediation exerts
power subtly over women with inadequate procedural protection and opportunity for exit or
review); Trina GriUo, 7he Mediadon Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE LJ.
1545 (1991).
256 See Lazerson, supra note 210.
257 See Kessler & Finkelstein, supra note 226, at 581.
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imbalances of a relationship that may potentially prompt unjust agreements.
The discretion vested in these mediators should enable them to act forcefully
to prevent such agreements, and to render evaluations and prospective
rulings as needed to procure a fairer outcome. If the husband does not like
it, he has the option of arbitration or full scale adjudication. As a practical
matter, this may be cold comfort to the wife trying to litigate on a limited
budget under a distasteful interim regime of inadequate support or mangled
child custody. However, the wife is not any worse off than would be the
case if there were no court-connected ADR (at least so long as ADR efforts
do not significantly slow the process, increase costs, or provide additional
opportunities for strategic behavior to the husband). Consequently, in this
context (and others), the multi-door courthouse must not permit ADR to
comprise another layer of process that simply adds to the mix without
providing the third party perspective and catalytic events necessary to
produce resolution or clarification of issues.
For that reason as well, lawyers remain critically important and I would
urge that they be a part of all court-connected ADR activities, even
mediation (subject, of course, to the parties' own informed decisions about
forgoing a lawyer). Although disparate resources usually means disparate
access to legal services, less powerful contestants will generally always be
better off with at least some legal assistance than they would be without it.
Although lawyers on more than a few occasions throw sand in the gears of a
process, they usually recognize the value of settlement and urge their clients
to be receptive to it in appropriate circumstances. Simply because a
relatively small percentage of lawyers lack good judgment, have
inappropriate "Rambo" temperaments, or are desperate to generate fees,
should not create a conventional wisdom that ADR will function better if
lawyers have a reduced role. On the contrary, a skillful domestic relations
mediation with husband and wife well-represented by counsel strikes me as
the best defense against the feminist critique of mediation (and may provide
the comparative advantage over traditional litigation that originally
animated this portion of the modem ADR movement). My intuition has
long been that lawyers have an important role to play in minimizing abuses
of mediation (or any other form of ADR). Consequently, I was fortified
(and perhaps relieved as well) to see that experts much more conversant in
the actual operations of ADR and mediation have taken this view. In a
recent article, Craig McEwen, Nancy Rogers, and Richard Maiman
comprehensively make this point by applying both theoretical and empirical
analysis.258 Even a modicum of competent legal representation will go a
long way in discouraging the dangers that some see in mediation,
258 See Craig A. McEwen, et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approach to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995).
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particularly for women. However, because lawyers vary in quality, the state
should provide mediators of skill vested with the discretion to actively
intervene in order to prevent abuses and to segue from mediation to other
ADR forms or directly to litigation. Although the debate will undoubtedly
rage about whether this constitutes "real mediation" 25 9 or justifies
mandatory programs, 260 it seems inevitable that mediation officers must be
willing to depart from passive neutrality when warranted (just as a judge
does), and that mediation, like any form of disputing, probably works better
when lawyers (the world's leading dispute resolution specialists) are part of
the process.
D. Opting For Quality Rather Than Cost Containment
The modem multi-door courthouse I paint as a judicial Nirvana261
assumes a commitment of resources that may be highly unrealistic. 262 For
example, many well-qualified and well-trained non-Article III court officers
are necessary to serve as ADR officers if the proposed system is to work
well and with sufficient efficiency. The suggested system also requires that
matters move forward with some dispatch. Delayed or cumbersome public
ADR would provide too much opportunity for strategic behavior such as
stalling or wars of attrition by contestants with the larger war chest (e.g.,
the large company locked in combat with an irate customer) or a more
favorable litigation position (e.g., the current occupant of disputed
property). In addition, the modem multi-door courthouse must possess
modem technology to facilitate conference calls, videoconferencing, audio
and video recordings of proceedings, and other methods that would improve
process protections without the inordinate costs that often plague full dress
pretrial and trial proceedings.
Unfortunately, legislators and the public appear unwilling to make this
259 Id. at 258, at 1392-94.
260 Mediation should be mandatory if ordered by the Intake Magistrate, just as
arbitration, neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, or a settlement conference should be
mandatory if ordered by the court via rule or individual assessment of the case.
261 Although perhaps I am too late in offering this vision. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REy. 635 (1989) (criticizing Judge Weinstein's
characterization (Wha Discovery Abuse?, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 (1989)) that modem litigation
is not so troubled as the critics suggest: "Nirvana has been located and it is in Brooklyn").
262 Although modem adjudication has its problems, Judge Weinstein's characterization
then and now is closer to the mark. Judge Easterbrook would solve docket problems by
limiting the rights accorded under the substantive law. See Easterbrook, supra note 261, at
643-45. That may be effective in easing court backlog and procedural costs, but it is a bit like
substituting a dictatorship for democracy in order to ease government gridlock.
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commitment of personnel, technology, and money to the courts. Although
penny-pinching the judiciary is nearly always shortsighted, it is particularly
counterproductive if the goal is effective reform of the traditional
adjudication model and court infrastructure. Unfortunately, however,
penny-pinching the judicial system (like bashing it) tends to be good
electoral politics, which poses more than the usual set of dangers in this
context. Insufficiently supported ADR and multi-door courthouse initiatives
would likely confirm the fears of ADR critics. Either their brave new world
of inferior justice will have arrived, particularly for individuals and poorer
litigants, or public backlash against this development will ultimately defeat
reform. Effective judicial use of ADR requires a modem multi-door
courthouse and sophisticated, well-trained judicial officers.
Fortunately, a ready pool of such personnel does exist. There are nearly
one million American lawyers, many of whom (especially recent law school
graduates) are underemployed, who could fill the multi-door courthouse.
Rather than continue to waste or misdeploy these resources, as lawyers
leave the profession or overcongregate in some areas, perhaps society
should attempt to harness this expertise. A natural role for many of the
nation's lawyers disenchanted with practice is as ADR officers or staff.
Tapping this resource again raises the funding issue.
Good lawyers generally will not work for peanuts no matter how
satisfying the task (although the career decisions of many legal aid and
public interest lawyers continues to refute this assessment). If the pay and
job conditions are too discouraging, they will continue to slug it out in
private practice, business, or government agencies. They may even hang a
shingle and advertise in the yellow pages. But many want to be a part of
something other than client-centered adversarialism and aspire to lawyering
with a greater public purpose. 263 They are the natural applicants for the
ADR court officer positions posited for the modem multi-door courthouse.
An ADR-enhanced multi-door courthouse could continue to satisfy the
concerns of those who resist substantial increases in the size of the
judiciary, particularly the Article III federal judiciary, while at the same
time vastly increasing the dispute resolution and adjudication capacities of
the courts. The judicial personnel used for administration of court-
sponsored ADR initiatives such as intake, mediation, evaluation,
arbitration, settlement counseling, 264 and hybrid ADR will relieve the
263 The relative ease with which courts have obtained volunteer arbitrators, mediators,
and settlers provides some evidence of this. See Fosenberg and Folberg, supra note 233, at
1489-90; Kessler & Finkelstein, supra note 226, at 586-89; Broderick, supra note 233.
264 1 stress that most of the judiciary's future ADR efforts should be directed toward
providing the contestants with a forum, a reaction to their claims, and a presumptive decision
rather than attempting to hammer out a settlement. If the judicial system, including both ADR
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judicial workload in qualitative terms even if not in quantitative terms. 265
The rough organization of these judicial officers has been previously
sketched. Although, as noted above, it would be most useful if mediators
and arbitrators had some experience in practice, the ADR judicial officer
system I posit could evolve and operate like the continental European model
in which prospective judges train for the position and view it as a career
choice rather than as the capstone of an otherwise distinguished career and a
political appointment process (the model which dominates for Article Ill
judges and increasingly for Article I Magistrates Judges who aspire to be
Article III judges). Although the European model is not a perfect analogy,
and American courts would surely want to resist an overbureaucratic
judiciary (even in its "nonadjudicatory" branches), it provides a reference
point worth considering at a time when traditional adjudicatory resources
are hard pressed, and powerful political and social forces resist expansion of
the Article III judiciary. Furthermore, some of the traits most sought in an
Article III judge-legal intellect, firm independence, and skill in crafting
precedent-are simply not likely to be as valuable or necessary for one who
presides over mediation, early neutral evaluation, or nonbinding arbitration.
In short (and at the risk of sounding elitist), a front line of judicial
officers administering court-controlled ADR need not be Holmes, Brandeis
and traditional adjudication, functions effectively, contestants will reach appropriate
settlements as a matter of course without judicial settlement brokering.
265 See Robel, Private Justice, supra note 169 judges seek to work on the most
interesting, important, and precedential litigation matters and are, therefore, receptive to
privatization that provides them more time to do so; Robel defines privatization more widely
than either Weinstein or me in that she regards court-connected ADR as a type of privatization
since it tends to remove disputes from traditional Article III adjudication).
As Prof. Thomas Rowe noted in his presentation at the Conference, expanded court-
connected ADR will not necessarily reduce the total volume of claims because of the
"superhighway" effect, or what I have previously called the "Robert Moses problem" (after
New York Public Works czar Robert Moses, who was responsible for the Triboro Bridge,
other improvements, and major roads in the region, including the infamous Long Island
Expressway): a larger, faster road is built to relieve traffic, but causes traffic to increase
because more people want to drive on the larger, faster road. Consequently, an improved
court system may not show gains (particularly immediate gains because there may be pent-up
demand) in speed or reduced volume of cases. See Thomas Rowe, Videotape Remarks at
Panel Discussion (Mar. 31, 1995) (on file with author); Panel Discussion, Civil Litigation in
the Twenly-lfrst Century: A Panel Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1199, 1224 (1993)
(including Margaret A. Berger, Judith Resnik, Kenneth R. Feinberg, Ralph K. Winter,
Deborah R. Hensler, Stephen Subrin, and Elizabeth M. Schneider (arguing that even a bad
new road may bring increased traffic and that deficient procedure will cause additional
expense without efficiency).
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or Cardozo. In fact, the ideal mediator might be quite different in talent or
temperament than the "Yankee from Olympus," 266 the studious Brandeis, 267
or the sociologist observer Cardozo.268 Undoubtedly, some will interpret
the foregoing statements as elitist overgeneralization suggesting that
contestants, claims, and lawyers should be, to use Orwell's famous phrase,
"less equal than others."269 On the contrary (for the most part), I think that
many of the matters likely to be addressed and resolved by judicially-
controlled ADR will be among the most important social functions of
government. It is vital that claims for which traditional litigation is
economically unwise be treated seriously by the judicial system rather than
be queued behind judicial activity directed toward discovery disputes in
multimillion dollar commercial litigation. I do not intend to demean some
disputes as unworthy of full adjudication or beneath the dignity of federal
courts. However, I do suggest that liberals and moderates face the inevitable
problems of resource scarcity and popular sentiment. In my lifetime (and I
am not that old), we will not see federal or state governments willing to add
scores of Article III judges (or state court analogs) as a matter of course. 270
266 See CATHERINE P. BoUREN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: THE LIFE OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES (1944). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES (1994)
(collection of Holmes' work with Posner commentary); SHELDON M. NovicK, HONORABLE
JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989); MARK DEWoLFE HowE, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS (1963) (all generally praising Holmes' intellect but
acknowledging criticisms that Holmes was patrician, judgmental, occasionally curt in human
relations, willing to let social chips fall where they may, and less interested in small disputes).
267 See Robert Cover, Your Law-Baseball Quiz, N. Y. TIMES, April 5, 1979, at A23,
col. 3 (comparing Brandeis to baseball great Lou Gehrig in productivity, noting that baseball
will probably never see another player participate in more than 3,000 consecutive games as
did Gehrig, and the Supreme Court will probably never again see a Justice for whom multi-
volume reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission would constitute "recreational
reading"). It was, of course, Brandeis who made the famous statement differentiating the
Court from other parts of government because "we do our own work." Brandeis even had the
intellectual and emotional energy for political intrigue. See BRUCE ALAN MURPHY, THE
BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982) (discussing nonjudicial activity of Brandeis).
But see Robert Cover, The Framing of Justice Brandeis, NEW REPUBLIC, MAY 5, 1982, at 17
(criticizing assertion that Brandeis acted improperly).
268 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); John
C.P. Goldberg, Note, Communiry and the Common Law Judge: Reconsructing Cardozo's
Theoretcal Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324 (1990).
269 See GEORO ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (1946).
270 Pending federal legislation proposes a seven-year salary freeze for federal judges as
well as abolition of the Legal Services Corporation and other civil justice reforms (aptly
described by Judge Weinstein as a "meataxe when a scalpel is required;" Weinstein, supra
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E. Lingering Distributive and Value Questions
With or without court-connected ADR, justice will inevitably be
rationed according to wealth (who can buy traditional adjudication),
patience (who can wait for traditional adjudication), or personality (who is
willing to cling tenaciously to the goal of traditional adjudication for his or
her case). In this context, bringing a good deal of ADR, particularly new
ADR, under the judicial wing will likely improve the quality of "justice"
for the mythical, "average" litigant.271 If I am wrong, however, a
contestant who finds no satisfaction in the ADR rooms of the multi-door
courthouse retains the right to pursue traditional adjudication. Some greater
degree of decision-oriented ADR in the courts increasingly appears the most
feasible means of saving the courts by permitting them to hold fast to core
functions. 272
A widely accepted proposition holds that brisk dispute processing
prompts increased and more rapid resolution of claims. The looming of an
adjudicatory or a quasi-adjudicative event (to borrow Samuel Johnson's
phrase) sharpens one's concentration. 273 Unfortunately, the procedural
reform efforts of the past 15 years have failed to improve decision-making
on substantive claims, but have instead added additional opportunities for
delay, strategic behavior, and the avoidance of determinations. ADR that
enables the judicial system to more easily make these determinations will
assist the judicial system, and vindicate the values promoted by
adjudication's defenders. Surely, to commentators like Resnik or Fiss, this
is less satisfactory than the actual expansion of adjudication, but it should
be considerably more palatable to this cohort of the profession than a
note 1). See How the Proposed Federal Legislation Could Affect Your Court, JAD LINK, Vol.
2, No. I (Aug. 1995).
271 Unfortunately, the possibility of better empirical data about courts seems more
remote than ever, as current politics pushes for reduction in government spending and
evidences a certain disdain for the mission of research. For example, the House
Appropriations Subcommittee has recommended no funding for the State Justice Institute of
the National Center for the Study of State Courts. The Institute, which among other things
recently produced an excellent Symposium and proceedings about ADR (see supra note 6),
received more than $13 million in fiscal 1995. Even the born-again budget-cutter President
Bill Clinton had proposed $7.6 million for the Institute for fiscal 1996. See How the Proposed
Federal Legislation Could Affect Your Court, supra note 270, at 1, 7.
2 72 See Robel, Private Justice, supra note 169.
273 See Samuel Johnson, quoted in Patrick A. Parenteau, Everything You Wanted to
Know About Environmental Law, You Learned In Kindergarten, 23 ENVrL. L. 223 (1993)
(prospect of a hanging can concentrate the mind wonderfully").
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continuing drift toward settlement-directed procedures framed by an
increasingly limited availability of civil adjudication. More judicially-
controlled ADR can, in fact, open doors that must have appeared closed
during the past 20 years.27 4
One positive attribute of ADR is its flexibility and less-structured
communication dynamic. Mediators, evaluators, and arbitrators can talk and
interact with contestants in ways normally thought inappropriate for a
judge. Procedures and determinations need not hew so tightly to prescribed
formats. Although this, of course, holds some potential for mischief, it
holds similar potential for greater fairness and contextually "correct"
determinations of disputes. 275
If it embraces the mantle of ADR's flexibility and responsiveness
(rather than its potential for merely truncated procedure and insufficiently
reflective decisionmaking), the multi-door courthouse would be:
informational and educational rather than dictatorial; respectful of process
values, but informal and streamlined; conversational with contestants, but
vested with power to enforce and police the paths of ADR chosen or
274 As outlined, my proposed modem, multi-door courthouse looks suspiciously like the
two-tier trial system for civil cases suggested by Albert Alschuler or the streamlined small
claims court recently proposed by former Federal Judicial Center Director Judge William
Schwarzer. Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for
a Two-hier 4stem in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808 (1986).
The resemblance is only a bit beyond skin deep. Unlike Judge Schwartzer, I favor
offering the same range of ADR and adjudicative services for all cases within the court's
jurisdiction. The gatekeeping, or rationing of the multi-door courthouse, is to be applied by
judicial officers acting in the context of a specific case rather than tracking a case solely by
dollar amount, subject matter, or parties (although the Intake Magistrates will undoubtedly
apply presumptive rules of thumb in making their routing of the cases).
My vision of the multi-door court does parallel Aachuler's two-track system,
particularly when a case is arbitrated in lieu of or as prerequisite to litigation. But, although I
advocate more decision-making and less pretrial maneuvering and settlement brokering, I
emphasize the ADR ideals of flexibility and voluntary (if court-spurred) resolution of
controversies more than does Alschuler.
275 This flexibility could even extend to the degree in which court clerks and Intake
Magistrates are helpful to contestants (for example, the way in which AAA tribunal
administrators and staff typically explain things to arbitration contestants and assist them in
moving forward). Although one should be careful in damning court clerks (some are more
helpful than lawyers deserve), my own experience in practice often confirmed Max Weber's
worst fears about the tyranny and inflexibility of the petty bureaucrat. See MAX WEBER,
CRITICAL STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY (Frank Fischer and Carmen Siriann,
eds.) (1994). Infusing some ADR into the more formal judiciary may infuse the system with
some of the "client service" aspects of private ADR.
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applied; and interested in litigant satisfaction, acceptable substantive
outcomes, final and reliable case disposition, and cost savings.
Although this sort of ADR-enhanced courthouse may not meet the
ideals of those most committed to adjudication, it does avoid the problems
of excessive reliance on settlement efforts and possible coercive, judicial
intervention as a response to caseload pressures. To illustrate the limits of
making settlement too much the icon of even an ADR-oriented courthouse,
consider the now-classic discussion of settlement in the now-classic work on
negotiation, Getting to Yes. 276 Two sisters were fighting over an orange. To
compromise their positions on asserted rights to the orange, they split it in
two. However, one sister wanted to eat the fruit while the other wanted the
rind for baking. Thus, each would have gotten more of what they wanted
had they focused on their interests rather than their asserted rights. 27  The
authors use the parable to illustrate the advantages of creative negotiation
over either litigation or straight 50-50 compromise.27
Although the illustration is a powerful one and its point well taken, it
also confirms the limits of a settlement-directed judicial system. Sometimes
both disputants want the fruit. Sometimes disputants have an entitlement for
which they should be permitted to assert their rights and have them enforced
by the government. Where this is the case, rational parties usually reach a
rational accord. However, when this is not the case, decisions must be made
and enforced. Thus, in civilized societies, traditional adjudication and its
availability continue to form the basis for the continuum of private and
public ADR.
Although a multi-door, ADR-enhanced courthouse may fall short of the
"justice as a temple" vision, it looks more attractive than standardless,
managerial judging; coercively, court-managed negotiation; or judicial
blackmail. Under the current system, judges too often practice benign
neglect and delayed intervention. Such insufficient, remote, or absent
judicial involvement may permit waste, gamesmanship, sharp practices,
spoliation, or unfairness. To the extent that court ADR officers will fill
some of the current "judging gap," the system will be improved even if the
average Arbitration Magistrate is not a Learned Hand. 279
276 RoaER FISHER AND WILLWAM URY, GErTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WIrHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
277 ld. at 59.
278 Thus, sharing a trait of Martha Minow's application of the King Solomon parable to
judging. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
279 As with Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo, Hand may be a figure who was a great
judge, but would not have been the optimal screener, mediator, or arbitrator. See GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) (Hand had difficulty making
decisions, was meticulously cautious, in part out of pronounced fear of error, and was slow in
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F. Collateral Reforms to Enhance Court-Connected ADR.
Although the judiciary could move to adopt a role as administrator of
multi-door ADR without other modifications, the initiative proposed would
fare better if additional changes occur. First, in expanding its ADR
operations, the judiciary, with the help of Congress and the executive,
should alter the law of ADR enforcement so that the "default" option for
new ADR is the judicially-administered ADR. Private processing of most
new ADR claims should be permitted only in cases of clear agreement or
where the private authority provides sufficient guarantees of fairness,
access, reliability, and expediency. In short, it should be more difficult to
privatize a segment of dispute resolution on the basis of mass edict and
boilerplate contract.
Second, civil and criminal adjudication should be separated. The
current unification of criminal and civil claims increasingly appears
disastrous for the courts. Civil litigants currently take a back seat as
criminal matters move to the head of the queue on the basis of the Speedy
Trial Act. 280 Although one can make a terrific case for repealing the Act
and similar state practices giving calendar preference to criminal matters,
this is probably both too politically controversial and unlikely to pass
constitutional muster even with a "law & order" Supreme Court. However,
a separate criminal court would force political-social forces to focus
accurately on the costs of the criminal justice apparatus. If faced with the
need to install more criminal judges and support staff, decisionmakers will
take a hard look at the costs and benefits of various criminal initiatives
(e.g., the "war" on drugs), sentencing practices (e.g., mandatory
minimums, determinate sentencing), or procedures (e.g., the law of
evidence suppression). Although the result might not be a victory for the
defense bar (e.g., defendants could lose procedural protections instead of
seeing expanded or improved criminal courts), it would focus the issues in
clearer relief.
Most important to me (as I admit to more concern over the state of civil
litigation), is the possibility that civil justice will improve if it is freed of
the need to wait for criminal adjudication, plea bargaining, and sentencing.
The matrix through which ADR and settlement proceeds assumes the
availability of adequate avenues for adjudication and judicial review. If
criminal matters choke the civil docket, these conditions are, at best,
imperfectly satisfied and produce a court system more likely to exhibit civil
case pathology. Like the need for resource investment, the suggested
rendering decisions).
280 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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division of criminal and civil courts (and their multi-door options) may be
politically unrealistic, but virtually essential for bringing enhanced civil
adjudication to fruition. Perhaps my desire to split the civil and criminal
functions merely reflects my relatively greater interest in and concern for
the civil process. Regardless of the overall court structure, criminal ADR
remains a less-explored area, as Judge Weinstein notes. 281 Certainly, he is
correct in criticizing the impact of inflexible sentencing on the judiciary and
suggesting that society look for alternative means of policing, punishing,
and rehabilitating. However, the most prominent criminal ADR topic of the
moment, victim-offender mediation, holds little promise. Recent analysis
convincingly argues that the criminal mediation movement manages to
simultaneously harm the interests of victims, offenders, and the state.282
Criminal (victim-offender) mediation "disserves the interests of victims by
stressing forgiveness and reconciliation before victims have the vindication
of a public finding that the offender is guilty," and "suppresses victims'
outrage and loss by assuming that these negative feelings can be expressed
and resolved in the course of a few hours spent meeting with the
offender." 283 It harms offenders "by using selection criteria that are not
clearly related to the goals of the program; by eliminating procedural
protections such as the right to counsel or rules of evidence; and by using
the leverage of pending criminal process to gain advantages for the victim, a
private party." 284 It "disserves the interests of the state because it devalues
the substantive and procedural norms observed in public processes." 285
The perhaps trite, but frequently true, public policy yardstick of "three
strikes and out" counsels against investing further social resources into this
ADR effort, although it can be argued that criminal mediation has a role to
play as a voluntary adjunct to prosecution. 28 6 This may be true, but only if
criminal mediation is so voluntary and separate from traditional prosecution
that it consumes few public dollars for infrastructure or staffing. Applying a
standard assessment of the potential usefulness of ADR (which has held
sway since at least Sander's famous article), one is immediately struck by
281 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 292-94.
282 See Jennifer G. Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMoRY LJ. 1247 (1994).
283 Id. at 1249-50, 1273-80.
284 Id. at 1250, 1281-90.
28S Id. at 1251, 1291-99.
286 Id. at 1301-08. A cynic might argue that we already have criminal ADR via plea
bargaining, and that this ADR is too standardless and under the potentially arbitrary control of
the prosecutor. Although plea bargaining may be problematic, it at least remains under the
control of the state and, thus, subject to traditional avenues of democratic control, as well as
the professional control of the prosecutor's office.
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the absence of encouraging traits. Most criminal matters, particularly
random crime, do not involve parties who wish to maintain a functioning
relationship. Most crimes do not present close issues of fault and doubt as
to the correct rule of law. In cases of intra-family (e.g., physical abuse) or
intra-organizational crime (e.g., bribes, theft), mediation may be apt,
although forced mediation under such circumstances raises more concerns
than even the most ardent feminist might harbor regarding domestic
relations mediation.
In many cases, common sense suggests that criminal mediation is a
dead end, a point strikingly made by the example of the notorious subway
vigilante Bernhard Goetz. Years before his famous subway shooting
incident, Goetz was mugged in 1981 by three youths, one of whom was
arrested but, "wise in the ways of the criminal justice system," alleged that
Goetz had precipitated the altercation. "Because both the attacker and the
victim had filed complaints, the victim soon received written notice of an
informal hearing at which he could mediate his dispute with the mugger.
The victim declined the opportunity. "287 The judiciary should not need a
great deal of study to determine that it is folly to attempt to apply to
muggings the type of ADR that might work for two seventh graders having
an altercation during gym class.
G. The Other Side of the Coin: Judicial Lessons for the ADR
Community
The courts may have some traits which private ADR organizations may
find worth borrowing. Some possibilities include: firm scheduling; more
decisionmaker control of fact development; more pre-decision activity;
more reasoning and documentation of the rationale for decisions; and more
public reporting or equivalents.
1. Firm Scheduling
When faced with an uncooperative opponent, counsel attempting to
schedule and proceed to AAA arbitration often feel trapped with a
Kaftesque situation fed by valium. The parties attempt to agree on hearing
dates, but schedules rarely coincide. Executives have so many pressing
duties that cannot be rescheduled, as do private arbitrators; after all,
arbitration is not their prime occupation. After a date is set, an arbitrator or
party witness may become "unavailable" (and, of course, no one else could
present the company's position with sufficient vigor). International
287 Aischuler, supra note 273, at 1808.
[Vol. 11".2 19961
JUDICIAL ADR AND THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE
maritime or insurance arbitrations can be even worse.2s8 The solution to this
dilemma seems obvious: private ADR officials should set and keep firm
hearing dates, grant exceptions in only the most compelling circumstances,
and enter adverse decisions against those who fail to comply. Courts should
exercise review deferentially, and hesitate to upset a result (usually an
arbitration award reviewed under the auspices of 9 U.S.C. § 10) based on
this type of default.
2. More Decisionmaker Control of Fact Development
Streamlined decisionmaking is a wonderful thing, but not if it occurs in
a vacuum or is based on distorted information. In many mediations or
arbitrations, the contestants should be required to provide sufficient
information to one another and the tribunal. Although this carries the
potential to saddle ADR with too much litigation-like discovery, modest
production requirements (principally document exchange) impose minimum
procedural costs and probably have a substantial impact on the quality of
substantive outcomes.
3. More Pre-Decision Activity
Just as courts function better by narrowing issues, resolving certain
matters on the papers, and planning the presentation of claims, ADR could
profit from its own versions of motion practice (e.g., deciding some aspects
of claims where facts are not disputed), settlement conferences, and case
management. This already occurs much of the time in large cases.
4. More Reasoning and Documentation of the Rationale for
Decisions
This should include transcripts, recordings, and similar activity to make
and maintain a record for review.
5. More Public Reporting or Equivalents
A frequent criticism of ADR, particularly mass-produced, new ADR of
the sort that occurs. in the securities industry, is its lack of public
reporting. 289 Production of "stealth" decisions does not inform the
profession or the public of emerging rules, and may impede the predictive
288 For an extreme example of the problem, see Lyons, Arbitration: 7he Slower, More
ExpensiveAltemaive?, 11 AM. LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107.
289 See Poser, supra note 66.
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and prescriptive function of law. It also tends to advantage insiders. 290
Although, through the magic of private incentive, entrepreneurs often step
forward when government reporting is absent, this often raises what may be
prohibitive access barriers. For example, a well-done Securities Arbitration
Reporter chronicles securities arbitration, including empirical summary
statistics from time to time. Its annual subscription price of several hundred
dollars may place it out of the reach of many individuals, and even lawyers
and law libraries where securities disputes are not part of everyday activity.
Many unsophisticated investors and lawyers may not even be aware of the
existence of this publication. Although traditional case reporting is not
perfect, standard judicial decisions are generally viewed as adequately
available. 291
Ill. CONCLUSION
Several years ago, in another symposium, a prominent federal judge
wondered whether Courts could become obsolete. 292 Predictably, he
answered in the negative. 293 He was, of course, almost tautologically
correct. Until our vocabulary changes dramatically, we will find it
impossible to even discuss dispute resolution without the pole star of the
traditional Anglo-American judiciary. Even if new nomenclature replaces
traditional labels, the need for an institution that functions much like our
courts seems essential so long as American society remains modem,
capitalist, rights-based, and individually oriented. Whatever the
nomenclature or modifications, something like tribal or totalitarian dispute
resolution seems (thankfully) almost impossible to envision.
Absent massive and undesirable social change, courts must continue to
be both dispute resolvers and norm articulators. They must operate with
sufficient procedural protections, accuracy, fairness, and flexibility to fulfill
roles which are likely to expand rather than contract as the world becomes
more complex and the body politic resists efforts to expand government
290 See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions
and Govenunen Ltigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 Mica. L. REV. 940
(1989) (finding that government attorneys maintained file of unpublished federal court
opinions which were useful in subsequent similar litigation).
291 Professor Robel's "disposable opinions" being an obvious and troubling exception.
See Id.
292 See Joseph A. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1385
(1992).
293 Id. at 1398 ("Courts are not obsolete-they serve in areas and ways that no other
entity can.").
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functions. 294 Because we need it to be, justice will continue to be a temple
in the vision of most observers. Because resources are limited and other
preferences compete with optimal adjudication, justice may be a less
accessible temple, or one with substitute arrangements (perhaps a drive-in
church). Justice will invariably also have aspects of an assembly line.
Justice in the real world thus comprises a mixture of visions that must be
intelligently and flexibly applied at least as much as they are debated.
Society must both aspire to sound outcomes and realize that a society that
eschews the constraints of reality makes the perfect the enemy of the good.
Faced with these conflicting demands and constraints, the proper role
of courts is to have more involvement in ADR rather than less, both to
preserve the role of the judiciary and to correct the seeming market
imperfections of the "new" ADR. The multi-door courthouse is a more
promising alternative than either judicial rejection of private ADR or
judicial imposition of ADR. This is true because it retains a core of
traditional adjudicative activity. In balancing competing considerations, we
should opt for a court system that, in debatable cases, elevates its quest for
fairness and accuracy above its desire for greater speed or inexpensiveness.
Courts should be willing to absorb appropriate aspects of ADR, but
ultimately must remain true to the perhaps corny version of justice as the
overarching norm. In short, the multi-door courthouse proposed must
continue to be, first and foremost, a courthouse.
29 See Weinztein, supra note 1, at 294-95.

